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ABSTRACT

MEMES AND 4CHAN AND HATERS, OH MY!
RHETORIC, IDENTITY, AND ONLINE AGGRESSION
Erika M. Sparby, PhD
Department of English
Northern Illinois University, 2017
Dr. Jessica Reyman, Director

This project takes a rhetorical approach to studying online aggression. Frequently, targets
of aggression are told not to “feed the trolls,” or not to respond to aggressive content lest they
fuel further aggressive acts. However, this tactic does not work because it blames targets for
further aggressive acts—not the aggressor—and it silences discourse. This dissertation examines
methods for resisting online aggression without amplifying it while opening pathways to
constructive dialog online.
Each chapter studies a different popular locus of online aggression. The second chapter
explores image macro memes and how they can perpetuate identity-based stereotypes; it offers
counter-meming as a potential method for resisting memetic aggression. The third chapter takes
two threads from 4chan’s /b/ board as case studies to show how identity rhetoric can shift
discourses around transpeople in hostile spaces. The fourth chapter examines the “mean
comments” six female YouTubers receive on their channels and offers the parodic reading mean
comments video genre as means of subverting YouTube haters. The final chapter closes by
presenting ways to teach methods for resisting online aggression in college and university
writing courses and suggesting avenues for further research.
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CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION: “DON’T FEED THE TROLLS”
Any quick Google search for key terms like “stories of online harassment,” “stories of
trolling,” or “stories of cyberbullying” shows that there is no shortage of aggression on the
Internet. Link after link reveals story after story of people dealing with—and sometimes
committing suicide because of—online aggression, harassment, and cyberbullying; some sites
even collect repositories of user stories (The top six, 2016; West, 2014). In particular, Lindy
West’s (2014) Jezebel article elicits stories from users in the comments section. Some are stories
of women being stalked online, or of teens being bullied by classmates. Some involve taunts and
insults, while others are death and rape threats. No matter what the situation, targets of online
abuse who seek help or tell someone else about their aggression often hear the same four words
meant to provide them with a solution to their problem: “don’t feed the trolls,” or don’t respond
lest you incite further aggression.
“Don’t feed the trolls” has become the go-to adage when confronted with online
aggression. However, this tactic does not work. First, it blames targets for further aggressive
acts, not the aggressors; second, trolls1 and other online aggressors have set up a game that is
impossible to win because no matter how you respond (or don’t) you are giving them what they
want. If you ignore trolls, they have successfully shut down opportunities for productive

1

In this paragraph, I equate trolling with other forms of harassment; however, I want to acknowledge that such
conflation is dangerous and only done here in the service of highlighting the futility of the adage “don’t feed the
trolls.” As Phillips (2015) and other scholars of online aggression have pointed out, trolling, which is the act of
gaming someone to elicit an emotional response, is not to be confused with online aggression, which can include
acts as serious as hate speech and threats.
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discourse. If you respond, you give them the reaction they need to escalate the situation. But the
alternative to “feeding” the trolls is silence. Rhetoric scholars like Cheryl Glenn (2004) have
pointed to the rhetorical power behind silence. She explains that silence is not passive
acceptance; instead, it can be a method for subverting and (re)claiming power. However, in
situations involving online aggression—where speaking without inflicting further vitriol may not
even be an option—silence holds little power. As such, silence is no longer an option. Instead, it
seems imperative that we find a way to respond to trolls, harassers, and cyberbullies without
“feeding” them. This dissertation examines memes, 4chan, and haters (oh my!) from a rhetorical
perspective and posits methods for responding to cyberbullies, trolls, and haters without
amplifying their aggression.
Despite efforts to prevent them, cyberbullying, trolling, and other online aggressions
remain as prevalent now as ever before. Some research suggests that such hostile interactions
may even be increasing. A 2014 McAfee study shows that rates of reporting online aggression2
rose from 27% in 2013 to 87% the following year (“Cyberbullying Triples,” 2014). Consumer
Reports (“That Facebook friend,” 2011) states that around one million users were harassed on
Facebook alone in 2011. These statistics could point to a couple of different things. The first is
that with the rise of anti-cyberbullying sites and movements—and in the aftermath of mass
digital harassment events like Gamergate3—more victims of online abuse may be willing to step

2

Online aggression in this study is used as a broad term that encompasses many kinds of negative digital behaviors,
from playful trolling to insidious cyberbullying to outright death threats and sexual harassment. In general, when I
use the term I am referring to the more hostile discourses and not to trolling.
3

Gamergate, started in August 2014, purported to be a campaign for video game journalism ethics, but this excuse
only served as a thinly-veiled opportunity to harass and threaten top female video game developers and journalists,
namely Zoë Quinn (independent developer), Brianna Wu (Giant Spacekat), and Anita Sarkeesian (Feminist
Frequency). All three were doxxed (which means their personal information, such as addresses and phone numbers,
was revealed in a public forum) and received death and rape threats via social media.

3
forward and report their harassment. However, such numbers seem to indicate that even if more
victims are reporting, more online abusers also seem to be abusing. Another survey in 2014
reported that 28%—over one-quarter—of Americans self-disclose that they have engaged in
trolling activities online (Gammon, 2014).
Anonymity and pseudonymity appear to be major factors in online aggression, with a
large portion—45%—happening on chat-, message-, and image-boards and internet forums like
Reddit and 4chan (Gammon, 2014). Further, although 45% of targets of online aggression knew
their aggressors before the abusive incident (Ybarra, Mitchell, Wolak, & Finkelhor, 2006), 77%
of Americans believe anonymity is the problem (Gammon, 2014). When users are allowed to
post anonymously, they are more likely to engage in cyberbullying or trolling because such
behaviors cannot be linked to their real-world identities; they can say and do as they please while
experiencing virtually no repercussions. Joseph M. Reagle (2014) posits that the protection
afforded by anonymity results in disinhibition, deindividuation (“a loss of a sense of self and
social norms,” p. 94), and depersonalization (“a shift from a sense of self toward a group and its
norms,” p. 97) online. The most common way these traits manifest is through online aggression.
Importantly, this dissertation reinforces the notion that online aggression is connected to
gender and sexual identity. David Dadurka and Stacey Pigg (2011) remind us that such issues as
sexism and racism are recapitulated in certain areas online; women and people of color are still
not accepted into online communities the same way white men are. Part of this power dynamic is
connected to the nature of Internet communities, many of which are “assumed to be white and
male” (Miltner, 2014). Miltner (2014) explains, “white masculinity is the constructed centrality
in many participatory collectives.” In other words, unless users are able to create individual
profiles that can assert otherwise, members of online participatory collectives—be they
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messageboards, chat forums, or other kinds of social media—are assumed to be white, male, and
heterosexual. Thus, it is common to find that members of certain digital spaces tend to identify
with a culturally dominant ideal of what it means to be a white heterosexual man.
As such, this dissertation builds on a long history of research in rhetoric, writing studies,
digital humanities, technical communication, and communication studies that examine gendered
hostility online. Each chapter focuses on gender for its main case studies and draws from specific
works, but a few key pieces guide the project. As far back as the mid and late-90s, scholars have
researched the implications of gendered hostility online. Kramarae and Taylor (1997) show how
men are more verbal and open in online communication than women are because gender identity
issues from the real world carry over into the virtual one. Peterson (1997) also found that women
online are often the objects of sexual harassment and “other rude behaviors” (p. 359). Gurak
(1997) devotes a chapter of Persuasion and Privacy in Cyberspace to exploring issues relating to
“Gender in Cyberspace,” including dispelling the myth that women are able to participate online
as equally as men have. Romano (1999) echoes this argument, noting that women often have
difficulty communicating online because “the discursive environment itself” prevents them from
feeling comfortable (p. 252). Gail E. Hawisher and Patricia A. Sullivan (1999) note that when
women are denied input on visual representations of their bodies online, “old identities like those
of the ‘pin-up girl’ or academic talking head are reproduced” (p. 288). Cynthia L. Selfe (1999a)
comes to a similar conclusion, stating that although we think of the Internet as an “Un-Gendered
Utopia” (p. 305), in reality it tends to rehash the same tired gendered narratives that are reflected
in the offline world. This dissertation updates this research by offering more contemporary
examples and providing methods for resisting these marginalizing discourses.
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More recently, Emma Alice Jane (2014) and Dana Cloud (2009) have shown that online
aggression is inextricably linked to gender identity. Women are often the target of sexual and
violent online aggression: “issuing graphic rape and death threats [to women] has become a
standard discursive move online” (Jane, 2014, p. 558). Because of online aggression’s strong ties
to gender identity, this dissertation draws on feminist theories and methodologies. Kimberlé
Crenshaw (1989) coined the term “intersectionality” to refer to the ways in which a person’s
multifaceted identities can interact to result in marginalization or privilege. In other words, a
person is never only a woman; she is always a combination of her many identities, such as
woman and white and middle-class and heterosexual. And these identity factors interact to
provide her with certain levels of both oppression and privilege. This dissertation recognizes that
any identity is multifaceted and that few people are always absolutely privileged. In the study of
memes, I acknowledge that, while many harmful memes are focused on women and people of
color, even white heterosexual males can be the butt of a memetic joke. Similarly, although
4chan pretends to be underprivileged and downtrodden, their identities indicate that they enjoy
certain privileges in the offline world. Identity, privilege, and marginalization are complex, and
this dissertation both recognizes and seeks to untangle some of that complexity.
Key to this intersectionality is the notion that not only do social hierarchies tend to put
men on top and other identities below, but also that within the category of “male” there are what
RW Connell and James W. Messerschmidt (2005), and Emma Renold (2004) call “hegemonic
masculinities” that dictate what kinds of males are highest on the social hierarchy. As such, not
only are the gender identities of the women who often find themselves the victims of online
abuse complex, but so too are the gender identities of the (mostly) males who perpetrate it.
Online aggression seems to hinge on those who have power exercising it over those who do not,
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but in reality this dissertation reveals that it is often perpetrated by those who perceive they have
little power and feel threatened by the idea of someone else exercising some. This power play is
illustrated in all three chapters. The male geeks in Chapter 2 feel they need to protect their subculture from female geeks, the beta males in Chapter 3 want to keep their space male-dominated,
and the haters in Chapter 4 seek to silence women who want to speak in public. Each of these
men feel their masculinity is threatened,4 so they turn to online aggression to defend it.
Feminist methodologies for online research also suggest that it is best practice to both
alert subjects in online communities to the fact that they are currently under study—and in some
cases to ask for consent to do so—and to show them the results of the study so they can verify or
reject the claims and conclusions it makes (McKee & Porter, 2009, p. 165). However, I have not
and will not do that with the work in this dissertation. As this dissertation shows, the world of
trolls, haters, and other online aggressors can be unforgiving, particularly when they have a static
and named target. Those who stand against them open themselves up for potential cyberattacks,
including doxing, online identity theft, and contacting family members, co-workers, or
employers with often fabricated “incriminating” evidence. And, as a woman researcher, I would
also be vulnerable to the typical rape and death threats women face in general social media
spaces. The trolls will eventually discover that I am writing about them, especially once I begin
to publish my work, and I may begin to see some retaliation.5 As such, I intend to maintain

4

Connell and Messerschmidt (2005) point out that in the study of hegemonic masculinities, the role women play in
shaping masculinity is often left out. Unfortunately, the same is true of this dissertation, which largely focuses on
male perpetrators of online aggression, although with good reason. I acknowledge that there are female aggressors;
however, they often adopt the anonymous mantle of hegemonic masculinity to carry out their aggression.
At 2016’s Conference on College Composition and Communication, I presented findings from the third chapter of
this dissertation. An attendee sent out one tweet about the presentation, and it resulted in a response from a troll.
5
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anonymity while working on this project for as long as possible in order protect myself from
potential threats and cyberattacks.6
The findings in this dissertation are especially relevant to this cultural moment. While
this dissertation was in progress, several digital media outlets—including NPR, Mic, and Popular
Science, among others—closed their comments sections, in large part because of the hostile
interactions that were happening there (Ellis, 2015; Jenson, 2016). At a time when digital
hostility is prevalent, several websites have responded by opting to shut down discursive spaces
rather than try to moderate aggressors in an attempt to maintain spaces for open dialog and
debate.7 Simultaneously, the 2016 U.S. presidential election season and rhetoric surrounding
President Trump’s campaign and victory (from both him and his supporters) echo that used by
online aggressors in places like 4chan and other darker corners of the Internet.8 Finally, as we
enter what many are calling the “post-truth era” or the “age of alternate facts,” it has become
increasingly clear that online aggressors do not respond to simple facts or even well-reasoned
logic; instead, users must find different methods for subverting and resisting online aggression.
This dissertation attempts to do just that. Chapter 2, “Meming and Counter-Meming:
Remixing Digital Media to Challenge Gender Stereotypes,” examines image macro Internet
memes, or remixable images that contain text. As this chapter shows, many of these image macro
memes tap into existing ideologies to gain popularity and spread across the Internet. For the most

6

And of course, nothing could happen. If my research remains in the academic world, there is no guarantee that
trolls will find it. However, I do not intend to constrain my work to only academia. Instead, I look to Whitney
Phillips, and her reactions to trolls on her blog as a paradigm for how to handle the haters.
7

Moderating comments on popular websites can be a huge drain of resources. The more comments an article
attracts, the more expensive it is to moderate it; NPR frequently went over-budget when moderating comments.
Trump supporters (or those purporting to be so) use several of 4chan’s discursive terms (many of which will be
discussed in Chapter 3) online. They have also turned the beloved meme Pepe into a fascist symbol.
8

8
part, this results in harmless jokes or activates public political conversations on a large scale.
However, these memes can also exploit and normalize harmful identity stereotypes that
perpetuate histories of marginalizing women, people of color, and LGBTQ+ people. As such, it
is important to find ways to subvert these damaging memes. Through a case study of Fake Geek
Girl (also known as Idiot Nerd Girl, an image macro popularized in the early 2010s that implies
all girls identifying as geeks or nerds are faking their affinity for male attention), this chapter
posits counter-meming, or changing the text on existing image macro templates, as a possible
method to resist memes that perpetuate harmful stereotypes. This chapter also examines the
tangled implications of privacy and Internet memes and offers a rhetorical meme literacy that
explains in part how certain memes gain popularity.
Chapter 3, “4chan and Transwomen: Using Identity Rhetoric to Open Trans-Friendly
Discourse,” studies 4chan’s /b/ board, which is an imageboard known as a hotbed of
marginalizing hostility online. This chapter opens with a detailed explanation of /b/’s technical
design, ethos, and collective identity to show that behavior on this board is heavily influenced by
all three. A case study of the Tits or GTFO phenomenon shows that hostile behavior on /b/ is
more likely a reflection of the board’s technical design, ethos, and perceived collective identity
than of its individual users’ identities. A second case study of a transwoman’s self-identification
via constitutive rhetoric demonstrates that the collective identity—which purports to be a
monolithic whole—breaks down when its own identity rhetoric is used against it. As such, this
chapter shows that while we may vilify many online spaces that denigrate marginalized
identities, the collective identities that drive them are fragile and can be ruptured; these ruptures
have the potential to open constructive discourse in otherwise hostilely polarizing environments.

9
This chapter also questions the relative success of the transwoman’s rupture by examining how
her use of identity rhetoric, while successfully opening a pathway to productive dialog,
reinscribes the marginalization of her individual identity.
Chapter 4, “Reading Mean Comments: Using Parody to Subvert YouTube’s Haters,”
examines hate speech on YouTube through a study of six popular female YouTube celebrities:
JennaMarbles (Jenna Mourey), PsychoSoprano (Colleen Ballinger), MyHarto (Hannah Hart),
IISuperwomanII (Lilly Singh), Grace Helbig, and Mamrie Hart. This chapter examines eight
videos, quantifying the number and type of mean comment each YouTuber receives, showing
that the term “mean comments” belies a hostile reception for female content creators that often
focuses on sexualization and violence (sometimes simultaneously). Each YouTuber parodies this
online aggression through the reading mean comments genre, which becomes a way for them to
subvert mean comments and unify their fans. However, this chapter also acknowledges that the
risk behind this kind of parody is that it may serve to normalize online aggression rather than
subvert it. As such, those parodic attempts that clearly separate themselves from the original
spirit of the mean comments—such as Jenna’s and Hannah’s—have the most potential to
mobilize their fan communities against the haters.
The final chapter, “Learning to Feed the Trolls,” goes beyond analysis. This chapter
offers pedagogical suggestions for how to incorporate pseudonymous and anonymous digital
social media into a variety of college-level writing courses in meaningful ways. It argues that it
is not only important to equip our students with the rhetorical tools to prevent and resist online
aggression, but that it is also imperative that we—as teachers, scholars, and teacher-scholars—
engage in some of these subversive methods as well. The chapter closes by suggesting that it
may be our moral and ethical imperative to do so.

CHAPTER 2
MEMING AND COUNTER-MEMING: REMIXING DIGITAL MEDIA TO CHALLENGE
GENDER STEREOTYPES

Introduction: What Is an Internet Meme?

Internet memes are a digital phenomenon that has become a locus for online aggression.
Richard Dawkins coined “meme” in 1976 to refer to any aspect of human culture or behavior
that propagates socially. In particular, the term denotes any cultural entity or thought that
replicates itself—as genes do—in the minds of others. He explains, “Examples of memes are
tunes, ideas, catch-phrases, clothes fashions, ways of making pots or of building arches”
(Dawkins, 1976, p. 192). Cole Stryker (2011) adds, “[R]eligion is a meme. Art is a meme. Every
form of human expression is a meme” (p. 18). This early conception of memes leaves space to
classify almost anything as a meme. However, with the rise of the Internet over the last two
decades, the meaning behind “meme” has mutated to fit a digital context. When most nonexperts or non-academics refer to memes, they mean Internet memes, or “piece[s] of content
(e.g., a video, story, song, website, prank, trend, etc.) that achieved popularity primarily through
word of mouth on the web” (Stryker, 2011, p. 21). This modern conception of memes tends to
focus more on images than other kinds of content, but almost anything propagated online can
qualify as a meme. This chapter focuses on image macro memes and their potential to shape
discourse around marginalized identities.

11
Image macros are the most popular type of Internet meme. This style of meme was
popularized in 2006 after a user on a Super Mario fan-site super-imposed a photo of his golden
retriever puppy over a color wheel background and added text that gave facetiously unwise
advice to another user on the site, telling him or her to “eat mushrooms / they made Mario grow”
(“Advice Dog,” 2008).1 The meme problematically asserts that, because mushrooms have a
positive effect in a video game, they will have a similar effect in the real world, when in reality
there are many kinds of mushroom—some harmless, some psychedelic, some poisonous—and so
one should not just “eat mushrooms” unless they know for certain what their effects will be
(Figure 1). But users on the site found hilarious the juxtaposition of the text with the puppy’s
enthusiastic face and brightly-colored background. The result was Advice Dog, an image macro
that achieved popularity after it made its way to 4chan and was remixed into new and different
iterations that all shared one thing in common: an adorably excited puppy giving bad advice.

Figure 1. Advice Dog

1

Super Mario is a series of games from Nintendo wherein one of the actions playable characters perform is finding
and eating mushrooms to grow bigger, making the gameplay easier.

12
Other image macros that rose in Advice Dog’s wake share a couple of key format and
stylistic characteristics. Many include an animal’s or person’s head and use a pinwheel
background with varying shades of colors, but others include a full photo of a person with no
pinwheel background. All image macro memes follow “a set of stylistic rules for adding text”
(Davison, 2012, p. 127). The key feature is both the placement and characteristics of this text:
there is some sort of introductory text on the top of the image, and then more text— usually the
punchline—on the bottom. Philosoraptor is another example of a humorous image macro; this
meme includes a drawing of a curious-looking raptor and includes text asking seemingly deep
questions that generally rely on wordplay for humorous effect. Figure 2 asks “Wouldn’t it be
ironic / to die in the living room?” The joke here relies on the recognition of a pun between “die”
and “living room.” This kind of wit—common in image macro memes—points to Knobel and
Lankshear’s (2007) meme criteria, two of which are “some element of humor” and “anomalous
juxtapositions” (p. 209).

Figure 2. Philosoraptor
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However, not all memes are innocently humorous. As Dadurka and Pigg (2011) note,
“race, gender, class, sexuality, and power dynamics do not disappear in web spaces” (p. 10).
Despite early claims that the Internet was a raceless and genderless—and therefore racism- and
sexism-free—utopia, we of course know that identity markers like race, gender, and sexuality
continue to exist and that racism, sexism, homophobia and other discriminatory practices
continue to happen both in online spaces and in the digital texts created there. Consequently,
although several memes center on relatively innocuous humor similar to that displayed in Advice
Dog and Philosoraptor, many others hinge on negative stereotypes to gain a cheap laugh and
reinforce hegemonic social hierarchies. Further, Milner argues that this kind of memetic
antagonism against marginalized identities is part of what is called “the logic of lulz.” Lulz2 is
laughter had at another’s expense. A key aspect of its logic is that it “often antagonizes the core
identity categories of race and gender, essentialising marginalized others” (Milner, 2013a, p. 64).
These memes have the power to shape digital discourses around gender, race, ethnicity, and
other identity markers.
There are many examples of popular memes that do this. Some memes—such as
Successful Black Man and Ordinary Muslim Man—are complex in their negative portrayals.
They appear on the surface to dismantle stereotypes surrounding race, ethnicity, and religion, but
a closer look reveals that both reassert or even celebrate white privilege and social domination
over African-Americans and Muslim-Americans. Both open with a line of text that makes
stereotypical assumptions about each’s identity: Successful Black Man (Figure 3) begins with “I
beat my wife and kids constantly,” which aligns African-Americans with violence, and Ordinary

2

A pluralization and bastardization of the word “lol,” which stands for “laughing out loud.”
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Muslim Man (Figure 4) opens with “I will blow up your family,” which taps into the stereotype
that all Muslim-Americans are terrorists. However, both seem to reverse their assumptions in the
closing lines: Successful Black Man plays board games with his family and is positioned as a
member of a heterosexual middle-class family, and Ordinary Muslim Man is adept in Photoshop
and willing to offer his expertise and reveals both his education and professional experience. The
closing line works to defy the stereotype presented in the opening. Being a “successful” family
man contrasts with being a violent domestic abuser, and being an “ordinary” professional
contrasts with being a terrorist.

Figure 3. Successful Black
Man

Figure 4. Ordinary Muslim
Man

However, although the memes seem to defy stereotypes that characterize African
Americans as violent and Muslim Americans as terrorists, they present a narrow scope of success
and ordinariness grounded in socially dominant views. “Success” is defined in terms of
heterosexual marriage, procreation, and moderate wealth, while “ordinary” is reinforced by
education and sophisticated technological expertise. Both terms are framed to value the very

15
social hierarchy that produces negative stereotypes against African-Americans and MuslimAmericans by excluding other forms of “success” or “ordinariness” that may be valued by those
communities. As such, both memes highlight that Successful Black Man and Ordinary Muslim
Man require the adjectives “successful” and “ordinary” to be perceived as such. Speaking
specifically of Successful Black Man, Milner (2013a) explains, “The name of the macro itself
creates a racially-presumptuous association. If a black man is successful, he requires a modifier
in front of his name to set him apart from a ‘normal’ black man. He’s novel enough to premise a
joke” (p. 71). Just as “the title [of Successful Black Man] makes apparent invisible associations
between blackness and a lack of ‘success’ (defined narrowly and materialistically)” (Milner,
2013a, p. 71), so too does Ordinary Muslim Man point out “invisible associations” between
Muslim men and ordinariness. As Milner notes, the reader is “likely to see an ‘other’” in these
memetic figures (Milner, 2013a, p. 71). The memes use negative stereotypes to further
undermine marginalized identities.
Further, viewers laugh at these memes because of the mid-sentence line break that defies
expectations. Even if a viewer knows that the black man is supposed to be “successful” or that
the Muslim man is meant to be “ordinary,” the sudden shift from stereotype (“I beat my wife and
kids constantly”) to defying the stereotype (“in Scrabble”) results in a joke that is funniest if the
bottom line comes as a surprise to the viewer. In other words, the viewers who are likely to get
the most enjoyment out of these memes are the ones who identify with racist and anti-Muslim
sentiment. The racial and ethnic figures in Successful Black Man and Ordinary Muslim Man are
not considered to be a social norm. They are reduced to “the exception that proves the rule”
(Shifman, 2014b, p. 162). These memes do not defy stereotypes; they reinforce them by making
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a joke out of the idea of an African-American or Muslim-American man who fits the socially
dominant ideal of what it means to be “successful” or “ordinary.”
But, perhaps more importantly, these memes also shut down any opportunity for
constructive discourse. These digital texts rarely exist on their own but within the context of a
larger discourse that also reinforces identity marginalization. For example, comments on a
Reddit thread titled “I miss Successful Black Man” largely focus on one thing: explaining why
the meme is not racist. Every time someone tries to talk about how the meme has racist
undertones or could be interpreted as racist, other users chime in to explain why it’s not. One
user who self-identifies as a black man even admits that it plays on stereotypes, but asserts that
“stereo types [sic] are funny” (MrRagston, 2015). In a thread about Ordinary Muslim Man, the
comments tend to be far more vitriolic. Many commenters express their hatred and bigotry,
fueled by the notion that Muslims could share similar values to them—such as having and
supporting families, raising children to be good global citizens, and being productive members of
society—by reducing them only to their religious beliefs while averring that said beliefs make
them less than human. Slizzard_73 (2016) states about Muslims, “I don’t respect people who
hold stupid beliefs. Islam is a mother load [sic] of bad ideas and should be criticized.” Rather
than dismantle negative stereotypes, Successful Black Man and Ordinary Muslim Man enhance
them through downplaying the seriousness of racist stereotypes and inciting more intolerant
discourse; they both also preclude any opportunity for constructive dialog.
This chapter builds to a case study of one particular meme—Fake Geek Girl—in order to
offer counter-meming as a method for opening pathways to productive discourse. First, I
describe how memes achieve widespread success and popularity online; then I examine memetic
representations of gender to expose their problematic nature. Then, I explore Fake Geek Girl and
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the counter-memes it spawned. Finally, I point toward the problematic identity appropriation
behind both memes and counter-memes. The examples in this chapter not only show that memes
and counter-memes have the capacity to create, reinforce, or deconstruct stereotypes, but also
illustrate that we as digital rhetoric scholars and writing teachers have the responsibility to
harness memetic capacity to create social change and open pathways for civil dialog online.

Research Methods and Data Attribution

Methods

Memes spread across the Internet quickly and are always on the move, often disappearing
from one place and reappearing in another. Therefore, it is difficult to keep track of where
memes originate and spread, what memes are popular at a given moment, and which ones have
fallen out of favor. Thus, to determine which image macros to discuss in this chapter, I drew on
my own knowledge of popular memes. As an avid Internet browser, I encounter dozens of
memes a day.3 Some of them fall into the innocuous humor category, but a large number rely on
stereotypes to get a cheap laugh. Examples of such memes are Successful Black Man, Ordinary
Muslim Man, Fake Geek Girl, Scumbag Steve, and Over Attentive Girlfriend, among others I
will discuss later.
I acknowledge that simply being aware that these memes exist is not enough to provide a
basis for a study. Therefore, I cross-referenced my personal knowledge with Know Your Meme

Although it is important to note that my Internet browsing experience is unique to me. Google’s algorithms ensure
that the content that shows up matches previous searches, and my networks and communities reflect my own
interests and relationships. As such, there are many memes I discuss here that some readers may not be aware of or
that belong to niche communities of which they are not part; likewise, there are many memes beyond the ones
discussed here with which the reader may be familiar.
3
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and Reddit. Know Your Meme is an online database of popular memes. It is a wiki that calls for
user-submitted entries, but the administrators have the final say on which memes make it to their
site and under which category. Memes are classified as confirmed (are or have been widespread),
submitted (has not yet been reviewed), deadpooled (rejected), researching (under review), and
popular (confirmed memes with high user interest). Most of the memes I reference in this chapter
fall into the “confirmed” category, which means that the research team at Know Your Meme
found them to have at some point been spread widely enough to be considered “viral,” even if
they no longer fit that criteria. Here, I also found widespread memes that I was previously
unaware of but that fit this study, such as Cool Chick Carol and Good Girl Gina.
I also checked Reddit to ascertain the memes’ current level of popularity. Most of the
memes I discuss appear in r/AdviceAnimals—a general subreddit that posts and discusses image
macro memes—and many of the memes that hinge on gender stereotypes are also discussed in
r/TwoXChromosomes—a subreddit dedicated to providing a place for women to have
meaningful discussions about things that are important to them. Through cross-referencing my
personal knowledge of popular memes that rely on negative stereotypes and cultural discourses
with Know Your Meme and Reddit, I have found a representative sample of image macros to
analyze. The threads on Reddit have also provided me with context for the memes and
discussions have allowed me to ascertain how the public interprets them.

Data Attribution

Memes rarely have a set authorship. In general, they are created anonymously; at most,
the meme creator uses a pseudonym, but the alias almost never links directly to a real-world
identity. Most memes begin their rise to popularity on 4chan—which supports almost-fully
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anonymous messageboards—or Reddit—which only connects users to pseudonyms. Memes
become popular when they travel to more accessible places like Imgur, Facebook, Twitter, and
other social media spaces as well as offline media like t-shirts and news shows. Finally, once a
meme loses its potency, it falls out of circulation and exists only on static webpages like Tumblr
or archived Reddit threads.4 Because some of the memes I discuss below are no longer popular, I
obtained illustrative examples of them in one of two ways: I either pulled them from Know Your
Meme—which stores popular examples of most image macros—or found them in a Google
Image search.
Once a meme becomes widespread, the explosion of remixes and imitations that follow in
its wake can further obscure both the original version and its creator. Thus, tracing a meme back
to its original author is difficult, to say the least. Even the experts at Know Your Meme have
difficulty tracing some memes to their original date of creation or site of propagation. Thus, I
will not post any author attribution with the meme images I use. It would be absolutely
impractical to trace the origins of every meme I discuss. Some of the images I use display
watermarks for sites like Meme Generator or ImgFlip. These labels merely denote which
generator the meme creator used to pull the meme template; they do not serve as attribution. My
decision to maintain the anonymity of these memes will also hold true to the spirit of image
macros, which are meant to be shared and remixed on a global scale with no set owner. They are
free, open, and deliberately composed for recomposition.

4

Warnick and Heineman (2012) cite WhatPort:80 when they describe the life cycle of a meme: from subculture, to
related subcultures, to mainstream, to archive.
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The Cultural Significance of Image Macro Memes

Clay Shirky (as cited in Stryker, 2011) argues that memes are valuable because they
represent the creation of something, even if it is ultimately insignificant: “There’s a spectrum of
creativity from mediocre to excellence, but there’s a gulf between doing nothing and doing
something. And anyone who’s slapped a few words on a picture of their cat has already crossed
that gulf… [E]ven a lolcat, one of the stupidest creative acts, is still a creative act” (p. 31). To
Shirky, doing something is better than nothing. Internet memes are mundane texts and often
represent the simplest of creative acts, but they are culturally significant for a number of reasons.
Some scholars have found that not all image macro memes rely on innocuous humor.
Ryan Milner (2013c) and Stephanie Vie (2014) have pointed to memes’ potential for rhetorical
power. Milner’s study on Occupy Wall Street memes looks at how users on all sides of the
movement engaged with it through meming and counter-meming—and even what could be
called counter-counter-meming. He argues that these memes are “a populist way to engage with
public discourse” (Milner, 2013c, p. 2360). They lead to polyvocality in the public sphere
because they act as a “common language” with which people can have discussions on a global
scale (Milner, 2013b, p. 5). Similarly, Vie’s study of the Human Rights Campaign logo as digital
activism, or “slacktivism,” on Facebook shows that memes provide a voice to the public. She
studied how the logo was propagated and remixed on Facebook during and after the Marriage
Equality event in late March 2013. Vie (2014) argues that the logo became a counter-meme
against homosexual marriage bias: it “is an example of how even seemingly insignificant moves
such as adopting or remixing a logo and displaying it online can serve to combat microaggressions, or the damaging results of everyday bias and discrimination against marginalized
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groups.” The event and logo opposing the backlash preventing marriage equality was powerful
because it was part of a larger “cultural ecology” of digital activism grounded in mundane,
public discourse (Vie). Milner and Vie illustrate that much of the power memes hold stems from
their universality: public audiences can consume and remix them uncritically and unreflectively.
Like Milner and Vie, Shifman (2014b) also acknowledges that memes can provide a
platform for public expression, but she cautions that they can also continue traditions of silencing
marginalized voices. She argues that memes “allow citizens to participate in public, collective
actions, while maintaining their sense of individuality” (Shifman, 2014b, p. 129). However, if
memes engage in damaging cultural assumptions, Shifman argues that they can be dangerous:
“the constant flow of derogatory texts that relate to one specific photo of a group representative
forefronts the very idea… of stereotyping as molding perceptions about groups into readymade
‘templates’” (Shifman, 2014a, p. 348). Similarly, Kate Miltner (2014) points out, “memes…
have the power to co-opt and silence.” Memes that play with marginalized identities—such as
Successful Black Man, Ordinary Muslim Man, and others—reinforce their negative cultural
assumptions. Shifman (2014a) also points to the identities of the meme-makers: “Since these
memes tend to reflect the socio-demographic background of meme creators (typically white,
privileged young men), they commonly replicate well-entrenched hegemonic stereotypes” (p.
348). Jacqueline Vickery (2014) explains that memes have the potential to allow meme creators
and viewers to create new kinds of digital discourse, but they often do not: “Participatory and
remix culture allow users to challenge forms, transgress boundaries, and appropriate space.
However, normative assumptions and hegemonic culture also work to bind the meme” (p. 323).
Memes circulate within the public realm, so their memetic success necessarily hinges on their
ability to tap into a social hegemony that reasserts normative privilege.
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Memetic Production and Spread

Memes are paradoxically simultaneously sophisticated and unsophisticated. They have
the potential to carry a substantial amount of social and cultural meaning and require creators to
employ a complex meme literacy; however, the actual act of their production is relatively simple
and primitive. A user can generate a meme quickly and with little to no training, but for that
meme to see widespread success, it must do several key things: 1) it must establish identification
with a wide variety of users, 2) it must be kairotic and relevant, 3) it must be able to be remixed,
4) it must establish strong rhetorical velocity, and 5) it must make intertextual inferences. 5 This
process is not linear; it is recursive and overlapping. Although the following discussion treats
these five elements as distinct, they are intertwined. Their artificial separation in the section
below serves only to highlight each one’s importance to achieving widespread popularity.

Memes and Identification

Shifman (2014b) outlines several attributes of memes, and, although she does not address
it directly, rhetoric is key to this framework. The first is “a gradual propagation from individuals
to society” (Shifman, 2014b, p. 18). In other words, more individuals than only the creator and
others in his/her immediate network must notice and appreciate a meme. Therefore, most memes
establish some kind of identification with viewers to maximize their appeal and draw the widest
possible audience. Warnick and Heineman (2012) explain that identification in digital spaces
“works through association: the rhetor attempts to associate some substantive part of himself or
herself with the same part in the members of their audience. The result, if effective, is that an

5

This list builds on the three attributes of memes that Shifman (2014b) details in Memes in Digital Culture.
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audience begins to ‘feel’ as the rhetor feels or to ‘see the world’ from the perspective of the
speaker” (p. 98). Some of the most effective memes tend to link identities across cultures,
backgrounds, and universal experiences.
The Rage Faces provide an example of successful identification with an audience.
Originating on 4chan in 2008, these images portray an ever-growing series of crudely drawn
people reacting to various things (“Rage Comics,” 2011). Although not all Rage Faces express
rage, they are all so-named because of Rage Guy, the first one (Figure 5). The key feature of the
Rage Faces is the facial expressions, which, while exaggerated, are meant to represent universal
human emotion. Figures 5-7 are only three examples of dozens (possibly hundreds) of rage faces
that cover nearly every emotion from anger to joy, happiness to despair, and even from feeling
smart to feeling stupid. Figure 6, Cuteness Overload, represents someone who is overjoyed at the
prospect of seeing something adorable, and Figure 7, one of many Lip Bite Faces (this one is
titled “Pfftch”), expresses a failing attempt to hold in laughter. Often, these images are also
juxtaposed with others to create a comic and tell a story.
The key feature of these memes’ spreadability and popularity is their capacity to establish
identification. The Rage Faces are “interpreted by an audience who ascribes certain connotations
to each meme” (du Preez and Lombard, 2014, p. 266): users see their facial expressions
illustrated in a cartoonish and humorous manner. Phillips (2010) adds, “[M]emes spread…
because something about a given image or phrase or video or whatever lines up with an alreadyestablished set of linguistic and cultural norms.” Rage Faces spread because they tap into
universal human emotions with which almost everyone can relate. Rather than say how they feel,
users can post an image that represents it for them.
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Figure 5. Rage Guy

Figure 6. Cuteness Overload

Figure 7. Pfftch

Cynthia Lewis (2007) and Lynn Lewis (2012) also link memes and group identities
through identification. Lewis (2007) explains, “[M]emes themselves both construct and are
constructed by group identities through repeated performances” (p. 232). Certain groups identify
with certain kinds of memes, as illustrated by the Dancing Man meme’s transformation from
4chan to Reddit to Twitter to Facebook. In February 2014, someone on 4chan posted an image of
Sean O’Brien meant to body-shame and cyberbully him for dancing in public. The original post
stated, “Spotted this specimen trying to dance the other week. He stopped when he saw us
laughing.” (Figure 8). On 4chan, the Dancing Man meme was malicious. However, as it moved
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through other online communicates, it evolved. On Reddit, it became a largely sympathetic
meme where users commiserated with O’Brien and wished him well—although a few corners of
the website engaged with the meme in a malevolent, 4chan-esque way. On Twitter, Dancing
Man turned into a call for action against cyberbullying that resulted in over one-thousand women
throwing O’Brien a party to which he was the sole male invitee. Finally, the meme made its way
to Facebook as a Buzzfeed story that made for easy sharing among other members of a user’s
network. As the meme traveled through each new community, Dancing Man mutated to fit its
identity, thus revealing the cultural norms that drive each space: 4chan’s often antagonistic
behavior, Reddit’s identity plasticity, Twitter’s global reach, and Facebook’s slacktivism.
Phillips (2015) explains that memes are not “passive…. [They are] evolving content” (p. 145).
Users constantly change memes’ meanings and adapt them to new audiences as they move
through the Internet.

Figure 8. Dancing Man

Lewis (2012) connects this memetic activity to digital identification. She argues that the
repeated performance of certain memes results in recognition; the more a meme or style of meme
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appears within a group of users, the more they recognize it. Lewis (2012) argues that this
“recognition because of repeated performance” leads to group identification. Because memes are
generally meant to incite laughter of some sort, they reveal a group’s shared sense of humor. The
memes that appeal to a group speak volumes about their values—such as 4chan’s use of Dancing
Man as a cruel meme versus Twitter’s use of it to bolster O’Brien and fight against body
shaming.

Memes and Kairos

Memes are also kairotic and often react to real-world issues. In their studies of Occupy
Wall Street memes and the Human Right Campaign logo on Facebook, Milner (2013c) and Vie
(2014) each demonstrate the effectiveness of memes that tap into relevant and timely issues. A
more recent example of kairotic memeticism involves the lampooning and defending of Kim
Davis’s unlawful refusal to issue same-sex marriage certificates in Rowan County, Kentucky in
2015. Mere hours after the news broke that Davis was refusing to perform her legal and
professional obligations, memes began to appear. Within a day, there were enough image macro
memes to fill a Google Search page. Most memes ridiculed her: they either pointed to her
hypocritical stance on marriage6 (Figure 9) or to the fact that regardless of her stance or previous
marriages she was legally required to perform her professional duties. A rare few memes
defended her7 (Figure 10). Today, Davis has fallen out of the limelight and the public has moved

6

Davis cited religious tenets of traditional marriage as the reason she refused to issue the marriage certificates, but
many meme creators exposed her own problematic marriage past, revealing that she was divorced and remarried
several times and had children with each husband.
7

It is perhaps interesting to note that not only did fewer memes defend her, but of those that did an even smaller
number conformed to the accepted format and style for image macro memes. Such an occurrence points to the
potential for a study involving politics and meme creation.
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on from this cultural event. As a result, no one is making new Kim Davis memes. Likewise,
there are no new Occupy Wall Street memes and virtually no one still uses the Human Rights
Campaign logo as their Facebook profile picture. The kairoticism of these memes has expired;
they were only relevant for a brief period of time, so their memes no longer have an interested
audience.

Figure 9. Meme ridiculing Kim Davis

Figure 10: Meme
defending Kim Davis

Internet Memes and Intertextuality
Shifman (2014b) explains that memes are also intertextual; they “often relate to each
other in complex, creative, and surprising ways” (p. 2). Lewis (2012) explains that memes
“linger in intertextual traces” (p. 118); she discusses popular shows as examples of this memetic
intertextuality, such as The Simpsons and Family Guy that often reference current events,
movies, or—particularly in the case of Family Guy, which is heavily inspired by The Simpsons—
other TV shows. Lewis also points to media artifacts like t-shirts, websites, text messages, and
news reports. Almost anything can spawn a meme, but often a viewer must be aware of its
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intertextual traces and references to fully understand and appreciate the meme’s meaning: new
memes constantly refer to older ones, and often knowledge of previous ones is required to
understand the newest one.
This intertextuality is an inevitable product of the mainstream Internet’s fast-paced
consumption of popular media. Stryker (2011) explains, “You find that in order to gain a basic
understanding of X, you must first learn about Y and Z. But then, in order to understand Z, you’ll
need to watch a YouTube video, check out a forum thread, and visit someone’s Twitter account”
(p. 218). Internet media on the web is produced fast, and if a user misses some crucial cultural
moment, no matter how small, s/he may be at a disadvantage for understanding future content
that draws on it: “These intertextual threads are strands that elaborate a memetic tapestry. More
strands intertwine and the ‘inside joke’ grows more complex even as it spreads” (Milner, 2013b,
p. 4). Meme intertextuality simultaneously establishes insider knowledge while capitalizing on
references to other popular memes and cultural artifacts.
In February 2015, the Internet saw the viral explosion of a phenomenon known as “The
Dress.” Someone posted a photo of a dress online and a heated debate ensued about whether it
was blue and black or white and gold (Figure 11).8 Internet users all over the globe made
thousands of memes related to The Dress controversy, including ones that drew on other memes
and cultural artifacts, such as the Willy Wonka Meme. Figure 12’s intertextual traces rely not
only on an awareness of The Dress, but also of the 1971 movie Willy Wonka and The Chocolate
Factory, particularly on its title character’s sharp wit and tendency to act eccentrically
standoffish. Further, meme creators realized that a still of Gene Wilder in a particular scene

8

As it turns out, The Dress was blue and black, and scientists explained that the misperception was caused by
disparities in color perception and chromatic adaptation (Rogers).
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appears to epitomize a combination of sarcasm, pompousness, and apathy. The Willy Wonka
meme is an image macro that places text over this movie still. Typically, the top text opens with
a brief summary of the issue at hand or of another person’s opinion, and the bottom text closes
with an assertion of sardonic indifference toward or mocking disregard for said issue or opinion.
This meme was at the height of its popularity in early 2015, so meme creators who could remix it
with The Dress found that their memes were some of the most frequently reposted at the time.
The intertextuality and kairos of the Willy Wonka/The Dress meme guaranteed its success.

Figure 11. The Dress

Figure 12. Willy Wonka
meme

Memes and Remix
Another aspect of meme literacy that Shifman (2014b) names is “diffusion through
competition and selection” (p. 18). This aspect of a meme’s development is captured in remix, or
“technology-based manipulation” (Shifman, 2014b, p. 22). To be compelling, a meme must
remain relevant. As Stryker (2011) has pointed out, memes “live and die by natural selection in
the same way that biological entities do. If a meme fails to spread, it’s dead” (p. 19). Therefore,
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memes must consist of “the most compelling, ‘sticky’ content to rise to the top” (Stryker, 2011,
p. 20). However, because memes rely on a punchline for a quick laugh, yesterday’s “sticky”
content may not be as interesting today. They must stay kairotic through remix. Sometimes this
remix can be as simple as changing the text on an image macro; this is why there are often
hundreds or thousands of versions of each image macro. For instance, Successful Black Man
plays on almost every racially motivated cultural assumption of African Americans, such as
violence, poverty, drug use, low intelligence, affection for grape soda, watermelon, and fried
chicken, and any other stereotype one can think of. However, some remixes are more complex.
Advice Dog (Figure 1) is an example of a meme with a complex remix history. First it
was remixed into Courage Wolf, which is meant to be ironically encouraging. However, instead
of giving straightforwardly bad advice, as Advice Dog does, it instead gives intense—and often
still bad—advice (“Courage Wolf”). Figure 13 opens with the question “Staring at hard times?”
and ends with the extreme suggestion that one should “make it blink first,” encouraging the
viewer to not give up and instead keep working to overcome some sort of adversity. The result
leaves the viewer invigorated and amused if not a bit baffled. Insanity Wolf is a remix of
Courage Wolf. However, unlike Courage Wolf’s bizarre but inspiring advice or even Advice
Dog’s outright awful advice, Insanity Wolf no longer only gives advice; instead, he offers, as the
meme’s title suggests, insanity. He often gives commands that usually involve telling “viewers to
rape, kill, and commit other acts of insanity,” or suggests that such acts have already happened
(“Insanity Wolf,” 2009). Figure 14’s implication that the memer has killed his family and buried
them in a remote location is an example of the meme’s absurdity.
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Figure 13. Courage Wolf

Figure 14. Insanity Wolf

Davison (2012) explains that there are three parts to a meme: 1) the manifestation, or the
“observable, external phenomena” of the meme, 2) the behavior, or “the action taken by an
individual in service of the meme,” and 3) the ideal, or “the concept or idea conveyed” (pp. 1223). He explains that as long as one or more of these three parts is reproduced or imitated in a
remix, “the meme [itself] is replicating, even if mutating and adapting” (Davison, 2012, p. 123).
In the case of Advice Dog, Courage Wolf, and Insanity wolf, the manifestation is the placement
of a canine figure in the center with a color pinwheel background and text on the top and the
bottom. The behavior is following this format to add new text and create an anomalous
juxtaposition that is only funny because it is bizarre. Only the ideal changes as the meme is
remixed from one version to the next: Advice Dog gives bad advice, Courage Wolf gives absurd
advice, and Insanity Wolf makes insane commands or suggestions. The remixes take the core
notion of “advice” and intensify it with each new reiteration.
Because two of Davison’s (2012) meme characteristics—the manifestation and
behavior—can be traced through Advice Dog, Courage Wolf, and Insanity Wolf, and because
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only the ideal is significantly different among them, all three memes are easily recognized as
being connected to each other. This kind of identifiable remix is also necessary for memes’
survival. Vie (2014) and Vickery (2014) agree that as a meme is remixed and changed, it must
also remain recognizable as connected to the original: “[M]utation in memes is encouraged,
which is variability; a meme must retain enough of its original form or ideas to be recognizable”
(Vie, 2014). Although Insanity Wolf does not seem like a direct descendent of Advice Dog on its
own, through identifying its immediate predecessor, Courage Wolf, users are able to follow the
progression from the original to the current manifestation. And those who may have thought
Advice Dog or Courage Wolf were growing stale were likely pleasantly surprised to find
Insanity Wolf had raised the bar on offering humorously bad and distasteful advice through its
even more bizarre suggestions and implications. Only through remix do memes continue to
evolve and increase their chances of becoming and remaining successful. To remain stable is to
risk going stale, becoming irrelevant, or—worst of all—being deemed unfunny.

Memes and Rhetorical Velocity
Another of characteristic of meme literacy inspired by Shifman’s (2014b) work is
“reproduction via copying and imitation” (p. 18). This aspect is addressed through strategic
recomposition, or what Jim Ridolfo and Dànielle Nicole DeVoss (2009) call “rhetorical
velocity.” This process is connected to meme remix. Once a meme has achieved some level of
popularity, its continued success hinges on other viewers’ ability to step in and become creators
as well. Thus, the original creator—as well as anyone else who works with and changes,
imitates, or copies the meme—must account for its rhetorical velocity; they must compose “for
strategic recomposition” (Ridolfo and DeVoss, 2009). Ridolfo and DeVoss (2009) explain, “The
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term rhetorical velocity… means a conscious rhetorical concern for distance, travel, speed, and
time, pertaining specifically to theorizing instances of strategic appropriation by a third party.”
For a meme to be successful, the original memer must appeal to the broadest audience possible
and create a meme that can reach them quickly and remain relevant for a long period of time.
To appeal to this broadest audience, the meme must establish identification with many
groups of people. The Rage Faces above present a relatively neutral way to appeal to many
individuals because they tap into universal human facial expressions and emotions. However, an
even more effective kind of identification for maximizing rhetorical velocity happens when a
meme taps into a system of beliefs that already exist. The memes with the most rhetorical
velocity are those that make a joke at another’s expense; if a group has a common enemy or
enemies, its memes will lampoon them. Of these memes, the ones with even more rhetorical
velocity are those that play on negative stereotypes and cultural assumptions, such as Successful
Black Man and Ordinary Muslim Man. Both memes have remained popular in the United States
for around five years, in large part because their racism is subtle and ironic. Three groups are
drawn to these memes. The first is the surprisingly large number of people who are genuinely
racist and xenophobic. They read the memes as being openly disparaging of African-American
and Muslim men and laugh at the idea that Black men can be “successful” or that Muslim men
can be “ordinary.” The second group consists of people who are actively against racism and
xenophobia. They read the memes as defying stereotypes and normalizing a traditionally vilified
race and ethnicity. The final group comprises individuals who understand all levels of the meme:
both its latent racism and its race-normalizing qualities. They use the meme to laugh at both
racists and anti-racists without siding with either. Successful Black Man and Ordinary Muslim
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Man have identification elements that appeal to several groups of people, which is why both
have been able to achieve such quick and long-lasting rhetorical velocity.
Image macro memes are particularly well-suited for longevity and rhetorical velocity. For
instance, Dancing Man’s impact has largely dwindled. The dance party turned into an antibullying event that drew many celebrities to speak out on O’Brien’s behalf and call for an end to
cyberbullying, but since then Dancing Man has more or less disappeared from the public eye.
The meme spread quickly to a broad audience, but it gained popularity in each group or network
for different reasons. And since the meme mutated into a cultural event, it did not provide many
opportunities for traditional meme remix; Dancing Man spawned few digital texts to effectively
alter. Nor did the meme gain enough momentum to sustain itself for a long period of time.
However, Successful Black Man and Ordinary Muslim Man, as image macros, are much easier
to remix and change; all a remixer needs do is track down the image macro’s template—often
conveniently stored at sites like Imgflip, Know Your Meme, Meme Generator, and Quick
Meme—and insert text. Of course, Photoshop is also an option. If a memer wants to modify
something about the template but keep the rest of the meme the same, s/he may use Photoshop or
another image-altering program (Pixlr, Microsoft Paint, Flickr, and many others) to change it.

Memetic Production

Although it seems like memers put a lot of work into their memetic productions—
spending hours deliberating over how to craft the perfect meme—rarely is that the case. Shifman
(2014b) and Milner (2013b) point out that although “creating and understanding memes requires
sophisticated ‘meme literacy’” (Shifman, 2014b, p. 100), they are meant to be generated “with
limited resources, and with low levels of digital literacy” (Shifman, 2014b, p. 82). In fact, the
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success of these memes hinges on their simplicity: they are more likely to be remixed and shared
if it is easy to do so. Every type of meme undergoes a different process, and certain types appeal
to specific groups. Because they are also often created by amateurs and constructed of found
images and digital materials, these memes often generally seem incomplete and unpolished. The
goal is not sophistication; it is to rapidly spread an image and message with little effort.
Witnessing the inception of a popular meme is rare. Most guides on how to make memes
focus on how to tap into an existing meme’s popularity by remixing it; few explain how to make
new ones from scratch. Further, even Know Your Meme is unable to recount the circumstances
that spawn a meme. At best, they explain where and when it originated, but almost never why.
As such, the following discussion of meme production stems from my experiences watching
users try to create popular memes. As a frequent visitor to sites like 4chan and Reddit, I see a lot
of attempts at successful meme production. However, I have never seen the inception of a meme
that later became widespread. As such, my explanation is necessarily limited and points to the
need for more research into the inception of popular memes.
Many image macro memes are created mid-discussion; their actual production is quick,
sometimes sloppy, and often unsophisticated. Simply, there are two popular types of image
macros that dominate the meme pool: those that originate from conversations and those that
originate from an interesting photo. Both types are often created on the spot. The image macros
that originate from a conversation require a user to find an image quickly for the background. As
a result, these memes often use stock photos that can be easily found on Google Images. Other
image macros are inspired by awkward or funny photos. Because the end results are essentially
the same—an image with superimposed text—it is difficult to differentiate between the two. For
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instance, it is impossible to determine if Unhelpful High School Teacher (Figure 15) spawned
from a discussion about bad teachers, or if the stock image inspired users to add text.

Figure 15. Unhelpful High School Teacher

As a result, when studying memes, it is imperative that scholars realize that often the
background image is not perfectly suited to the meme. Image macros are made quickly with the
available materials, and their goal is easy accessibility and reach, not always nuance. Some
memes are able to achieve a higher level of sophistication than others, but we can never assume
that any intricacies or complexities were intentional. Of course, by the same token, we also can
never assume that they weren’t.

Irony, Gender, and Image Macros

When an image macro depicts a human instead of an animal, it often serves to ridicule an
identity, especially through stereotyping. Any identity can be the subject of image-macro memes,
but memetic representations of women are fraught with negative stereotypes. Although many
memes depict men negatively, an large number of memes target women; and those that take aim
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at men are rarely as offensive or aggressive as the ones aimed at women: “there’s a strong
argument that women are saddled with the more sexist and mortifying jokes” (Garsd, 2015).
These memes tend to depict traditional views of woman as a sex object whose purpose is to
fulfill men’s pleasures. Memes showing women who adhere to this stereotype are regarded
favorably, while those which show women dissenting from it are mocked. Other memes hold
men—but only certain kinds that enact hegemonic masculinity—at the top of the social hierarchy
with all other gender and racial identities falling in line below.
These image macros often appear at first glance to be nothing more than ironic
representations that skewer the stereotype they epitomize. Indeed, because these memes set up
expectations in the top line only to reverse them in the bottom punchline, they enact irony for
humorous effect. However, their ironic representations are more complex than merely serving as
cultural commentary. Ryan Milner (2013a) points to the potential of these ironic representations:
they could be “‘cultural critic’ or ‘cultural syphon,’ using humor and antagonism to rile angry
responses and shift the content and tone of the conversation” (p. 66). He points to Successful
Black Man’s punchline, positing that perhaps it “reminds us – in a small way – to not take all
stereotypes at face value” (Milner, 2013a, p. 71). On the other hand, Milner also points to Poe’s
Law—the belief that legitimate extremism and satirical extremism are often impossible to
differentiate online—as a reminder that without intricate knowledge of a meme creator’s
“ideological intent” (p. 76), we are unable to accurately decide whether a meme is ironic or
antagonistic. He explains, “the line between playful (if antisocial) irony, satire, and parody and
‘earnest’ racism is difficult to differentiate” and, regardless of intention, these memes can be
exclusionary (Milner, 2013a, p. 74). In addition, I argue that context is more important than
creator intent. When studying gendered memes, it is important to recognize that although they
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may be grounded in irony, it is possible—and depending on the place of propagation, even
likely—that they are also grounded in genuine sexism. As such, it is necessary to examine these
memes in their full context, including not only their place and method of publication, but also the
conversations surrounding them.

Men and Memes: Reinforcing Positive Social Values

Few image macro memes have straightforward negative depictions of men, but those that
do reinforce a kind of macho masculinity through disparaging men who do not live up to that
standard. Milner (2013a) points out that these memes reinforce “alpha” and “beta” structures
online9; that is, they point to a dominant form of preferred masculinity while belittling any other
kind that does not match it. Shifman (2014b) agrees; upon examining several memetic videos,
she found that their humor derived in large part from a representation of flawed masculinity. She
traces this to the sitcom genre of television, which presents “far-from-perfect men who fail to
fulfill basic functions in their personal and professional lives” (Shifman, 2014b, p. 77). Flawed
masculinity is a source of humor; we are meant to laugh at underperforming men.
For instance, Scumbag Steve features a young man who has supposedly loose ethics and
expresses little concern for his reputation in social situations (Figure 16). However, it is his
racially appropriated clothing that earns him the title “scumbag.” He adopts a “gangsta” look by
donning a large fur-lined coat and a sideways-tilted flat-billed cap. Comments on several Reddit
threads make it clear that these clothes are what triggered the “scumbag” portion of the meme; if
it weren’t for this clothing, the jokes about his selfish unreliableness would not have as much of

9

See Chapter 3 for a longer discussion of alphas and betas on 4chan.
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an impact. The image macro invites us to laugh at Scumbag Steve because he is acting non-white
and therefore performing a culturally inferior masculinity.

Figure 16. Scumbag Steve

Another male-centric image-macro is more explicit in its portrayal of hegemonic
masculinity. This meme depicts an overweight man with a ponytail, acne, and glasses and
includes text expressing his assumed superiority (“Butthurt Dweller,” 2010). As Milner (2013a)
explains, “he is overconfident, deluded about his prowess, and sophomorically arrogant” (p. 83).
The meme plays on the term “basement dweller,” which is used in many corners of the Internet
to denote an adult who lives at home with his/her parents—presumably in their basement—but
does not hold a job or contribute to society.10 Typically, “butthurt” refers to someone who
responds overemotionally to something, but in the case of Butthurt Dweller the term means
something more like “smug without the right to be” (Figure 17). But, like Scumbag Steve, part of
what makes the humor behind this meme is that it depicts a man who does not represent

10

According to the stereotype, basement dwellers play video games all day, sometimes while drinking heavily or
smoking marijuana (“Basement Dweller,” 2003).
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stereotypical ideals of manliness. Instead, his appearance emanates a culturally subpar
masculinity, and for that Butthurt Dweller is the butt of a joke (no pun intended). Milner also
points out that this meme is self-deprecating; part of the irony here is that it denigrates the
“internet culture” male—who is stereotypically seen as someone who is “insufficiently
masculine and romantically unsure” (Milner, 2013a, p. 84)—but the meme creators and posters
are part of that same culture. Therefore, the joke is on both those who post Butthurt Dweller and
those to whom it is directed.

Figure 17. Butthurt Dweller

However, a large number of image macros depict men who portray a more mainstream
masculinity while also associating with positive social values to youth culture. Shifman (2014b)
explains that memes are capable of reinforcing cultural ideals: “Internet memes can be treated as
(post)modern folklore, in which shared norms and values are constructed through cultural
artifacts such as Photoshopped images or urban legends” (p. 15). Memes like Misunderstood DBag (sometimes called Misunderstood Mitch), and Ridiculously Photogenic Guy not only depict
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socially acceptable forms masculinity, but they also reinforce popular social values like showing
empathy and being photogenic.
Misunderstood D-Bag taps into the cultural value that we should give social transgressors
the benefit of the doubt. The meme focuses on an image of a blonde man in his early 20s with a
popped collar and a soul patch; he is meant to look like a typical college frat boy. The top line of
text usually portrays an inconsiderate action he has taken, but the second line reveals his reason
for having done such a careless thing or his reaction to it (Figure 18). An ironic reading could
highlight Misunderstood D-Bag’s “douchebaggery” by presenting an exaggerated excuse for his
actions; his reason for being careless often seems hyperbolic. However, discussions on Reddit
reveal that Misunderstood D-Bag is actually often a stand-in meme for real-life confessions.
Redditor skiingineer posted a Misunderstood D-Bag that reads “Cuts in front of you / So person
entering freeway can merge at proper speed” then posts explaining how s/he really performed
this action for this reason earlier in the day. Similarly, one reading “Has a tribal tattoo / Got it
while doing humanitarian work in remote African villages” has garnered comments from
commiserating users, such as UrMomsA_ThrowAwayAct (2012): “I have a tattoo on my foot
that says Ubuntu. I got it years ago after volunteering in Phalaborwa, south Africa, as Nelson
Mandela coined the phrase.. now people think i'm just a big ubuntu fan.. [sic, all errors].” 11As
such, Misunderstood D-Bag highlights the importance of empathy. The meme suggests that there
may be a legitimate reason for Misunderstood D-Bag to perform his inconsiderate actions; we
are meant to forgive him for his transgressions.

11

Ubuntu is also the name of a computer operating system.
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Figure 18. Misunderstood D-Bag

Ridiculously Photogenic Guy features a photo snapped mid-marathon depicting a man
who happened to look up and smile at the right moment. The text always highlights the man’s
attractiveness (Figure 19). The ironic reading can be a parody of male hyper-attractiveness; the
meme makes fun of the guy for being so good-looking. However, a closer reading reveals that
Ridiculously Photogenic Guy aligns with a youth obsessed with being photogenic. Most people
use at least one form of social media, and the majority of youth are fixated on representing their
identities through photos, videos, and other forms of media. Ridiculously Photogenic Guy
represents the perfect profile picture: the image depicts him looking fantastic while doing
something exciting and noteworthy. When running a marathon, people generally appear dogged
and disgusting—and in other photos Ridiculously Photogenic Guy looks the same—but
Ridiculously Photogenic Guy accidentally looked up and smiled at just the perfect moment to be
caught in the perfect photo. Many of the comments on Reddit threads betray jealousy at his
fortuitous photo, such as “I look a lot like this guy. But shorter and uglier” (hivemind6, 2012)
and “That hair... if only I had that hair... life would be so much easier” (wtf_is_an_reddit, 2012).
These comments show that despite the ironic reading that lampoons Ridiculously Photogenic
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Guy, there is some legitimate envy and desire behind his memetic moment. The humor here
derives from both—men are supposed to want to be like him and women are supposed to want
him—and manifests in text like “Runs marathon and wins / my heart.”

Figure 19: Ridiculously
Photogenic Guy

Women and Memes: Reinforcing Male Fantasy

On the other hand, memes featuring women more often than not reinforce male fantasy.
Good Girl Gina and Cool Chick Carol both play into stereotypes of woman as sex object. Good
Girl Gina features a stock photo of a young brunette woman who is often willing to perform
sexual favors for her partner. However, Good Girl Gina was not always focused on sex. Earlier
versions of the meme had Good Girl Gina performing legitimately “good” actions, including the
first one to ever make it to the front page of Reddit. Know Your Meme quotes the now longvanished meme: “Wears a t-shirt at the beach / so overweight friend isn’t only one” (“Good Girl
Gina,” 2012). Although the meme began as a depiction of a genuinely good person, it quickly
devolved into one sexualizing her. Know Your Meme describes her as “an altruistic mate”
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(“Overly Attached,” 2012), or a girlfriend who is as giving toward her boyfriend as he is to her.
However, the text captions that accompany her image set up scenarios and display behavior
favorable largely only to the boyfriend. (Figure 20). Far from “altruism,” the actions Good Girl
Gina performs almost always benefit the boyfriend. Cool Chick Carol is similar to Good Girl
Gina in that she is almost always sexualized (Figure 21). Sometimes Cool Chick Carol hangs out
as one of the guys and wins burping contests, plays video games, or watches Star Wars, but
usually she offers to perform sex acts for her boyfriend or friend with benefits—often while he
plays video games or chats online—thus reducing her to the role of sex object. Good Girl Gina
and Cool Chick Carol are epitomes of male sexual fantasy.

Figure 20. Good Girl Gina

Figure 21. Cool Chick
Carol

These memes could be attempting to skewer the sexual objectification of women by
using ironic humor to draw attention to its absurdity. Certainly, the vacant look in Good Girl
Gina’s eyes could point to her being ridiculed instead of glorified as a kind of stepford-wifeesque figure who only exists to please her man. However, recall the discussion of meme
production above. Memes are generally created quickly and memers need to find their images
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instantly, so they often turn to stock photos to fulfill their meming needs; this photo was not
taken to be used in the situation in which the meme places it, so it is not a perfect fit for its
memetic context. So if Good Girl Gina’s eyes are vacant, it may not be the result of some clever
attempt to lampoon the notion of female sexual objectification. It may simply be a memer
resorting to an imperfect photo to make an image that gains a cheap laugh through recapitulating
tired narratives of women as tokens of male sexual fantasy.
Further, recall Milner’s (2013b) comment that memes like these, regardless of the
memers’ intentions, can be exclusionary and perpetuate damaging stereotypes. Indeed, many
women who encounter Good Girl Gina and Cool Chick Carol react negatively toward them.
Subreddit r/TwoXChromosomes has hosted a few threads over the last five years where women
explain their reactions to these two memes. Most of the conversations about Good Girl Gina
compare her to her supposed male counterpart, Good Guy Greg. They point out that Greg’s
“goodness” is generally gender neutral, whereas Good Girl Gina’s is almost always sexual
(Ragnrok, 2012). Picabrix (2012) also explains how Good Girl Gina creates an impossible
standard for women to live up to: “To be GGGina, you also need to be promiscuous, give pitty
[sic] sexual favours to guys who are unattractive, dislike your own gender unless they do the
same, and basically be unattainably attractive but attainable… to anyone.” The conversations
about Cool Chick Carol strike a similar chord. A comment from a deleted account explains, “At
first I thought it was supposed to be meta-ironic or whatever, but after reading the comments I
realized that a lot of the guys on here actually do view women as blowjob factories. I’m not sure
we need a meme celebrating that” (“Good Girl Gina,” 2012). These comments and other show
that regardless of the intent of the meme creators, the female viewers who encounter Good Girl
Gina and Cool Chick Carol take them at face value, or see their ironic potential but also
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recognize their grounding in actual sexism and misogyny. Perhaps Good Girl Gina and Cool
Chick Carol prefer to satisfy their men—both sexually and otherwise—but the trouble is that
they are only “good” and “cool” because they are willing to do so.
On the other hand, many memes depict women as undesirable because they do not fit a
male sexual fantasy. Overly Attached Girlfriend is an image macro meme that mocks a woman
who, as the name suggests, is overly attached to her boyfriend. She is easily recognizable by her
crazed stare (Figure 22), and she often reveals intense jealousy if her boyfriend interacts with
other women. Overly Attached Girlfriend emphasizes and reiterates stereotypes that women are
clingy and jealous or that they nag their significant others while vying for their attention. She is
considered undesirable because her neediness is a threat to male independence. Although Overly
Attached Girlfriend represents a negative portrayal of the central female figure, the humor is
relatively innocuous. This seems especially true now that she has been paired with Overly
Attached Boyfriend, another meme featuring a young man with a manic expression similar to
Overly Attached Girlfriend’s. He appears both on his own and Photoshopped next to Overly
Attached Girlfriend (Figures 23 and 24). Although Overly Attached Girlfriend has found a
counterpart in Overly Attached Boyfriend, it is also worth noting that there are far more
iterations of Overly Attached Girlfriend. Overly Attached Boyfriend doesn’t even have his own
entry on Know Your Meme; instead he is a sub-entry of “Overly Attached Girlfriend” (2012).
This reinforces that the negative stereotypes behind Overly Attached Girlfriend and Overly
Attached Boyfriend are largely attributed to women and less so to men.
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Figure 22. Overly Attached
Girlfriend

Figure 23. Overly Attached
Boyfriend

Figure 24: Overly Attached Boyfriend
and Overly Attached Girlfriend

While Overly Attached Girlfriend supports hegemonic masculinity through her
representation of an irrational woman who is defined by her relationship to men, other memes
focus on feminism and gender equality—a significant threat to normative masculinity—and are
therefore more hostile. Privilege Denying Feminist depicts a woman who represents the
stereotype of a feminist who only wants equality when it benefits her. Often the top text makes a
request for some kind of equal treatment while the bottom text reveals that she is unwilling to
compromise any of her own privilege to get it (Figure 25). Similarly, Liberal Douche Garofalo
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features Janeane Garofalo seemingly contradicting herself from the top line to the bottom. The
top text in Figure 26 state Garofalo’s belief that more women should be involved in politics,
while the bottom text asserts that a particular woman should not. These memes take feminist
issues as black-and-white totalities while stripping women of political agency through
implications that women lack the ability to think critically. In the case of Liberal Douche
Garofalo, the meme depicts her statement as contradictory because it equates “women” with “all
women who want to.”

Figure 25. Privilege Denying
Feminist

Figure 26. Liberal Douche
Garofalo

The problem with these two memes is that they perpetuate misperceptions about
feminism. The Internet is full of this kind of intentional misunderstanding: Men’s Rights
Activists (MRAs) and Men Going Their Own Way (MGTOW) are movements that have recently
become verbal on their anti-feminist positions. MRAs explain that they are “concerned about
problems facing men and boys and focus on bringing attention to the problems in the wider
community as well as discussing ways to alleviate and resolve these problems” (Brockway,
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2015). Similarly, MGTOW “is a statement of self-ownership, where the modern man preserves
and protects his own sovereignty above all else” (“About,” 2016). Both movements purport to be
about male empowerment; some MRAs even assert that their movement is about establishing
gender equality. However, in practice, both movements serve to belittle women in general and
feminists in particular. According to an article on the MRA’s main page, a feminist is defined as
“an overweight angry lesbian” (White, 2011). In a Reddit thread discussing MRAs, MissMeggo
(2012) asks: “Why is so much of the discussion on r/mensrights about feminism and women and
not about men’s rights? I consider myself a person’s rights kind of person, but it’s really hard to
take any movement seriously when their pain is solely defined by discounting other groups [sic]
pain.” Others responding to her and other comments within the thread ask similar questions. In
an Internet where so much focus is on discrediting feminism for the sole purpose of discrediting
it, anti-feminist memes that intentionally misconstrue the goals of the movement are dangerous.
Spurred by other MRAs and MGTOW followers, some members of these organizations
have used the movements to threaten and even perpetrate violence against women. RooshV—an
American pickup artist who has admitted that he is pro-rape—has been identified as an MRA,
and the GamerGate movement was initiated by MRA gamers. In addition, I had a not-uncommon
exchange with an MGTOW. In a Twitter conversation with a few other scholars, I admitted my
ignorance of MGTOW. A user named “Boobaloo,” apparently triggered by Sensitive Alpha Male
making fun of MGTOWs, replied, “What do you know?” and posted a link to a YouTube video.
Curious, I watched it. One of its main arguments is that not only are humans biologically
programmed to be violent, but males have a natural predilection toward raping women. The
video encourages men not to suppress their biological drives, even if it means violating social
norms and laws (and violating women). MRAs and MGTOWs may not be directly responsible
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for producing memes like Privilege Denying Feminist or Liberal Douche Garofalo, but their
movements represent loci of the kinds of anti-woman and anti-feminist sentiment of which these
damaging memes are symptomatic.

The Call for Counter-Memes: Remixing Fake Geek Girl

Memes like Overly Attached Girlfriend, Good Girl Gina, Cool Chick Carol, Privilege
Denying Feminist, and Liberal Douche Garofalo often propagate hegemonic discourses, but what
makes them especially potent is the rate at which they spread. Stryker points to the large scale of
meme-sharing, but the Dancing Man meme (Figure 8) also provides an example of how quickly
memes—even negative ones—can spread: the original was posted to 4chan in mid-February,
then Reddit a day later, and Twitter a few hours after that. Once Dancing Man hit Twitter, it
spread even faster and it was only a couple of hours before Buzzfeed and other pop news sites
picked it up and the articles were shared on Facebook. The Dancing Man meme started negative
before turning positive, but even purely negative memes travel quickly, reinforcing and
establishing stereotypes. As such, new methods are necessary to slow or prevent the spread of
damaging image macros. This section provides a case study of the Fake Geek Girl meme to show
how counter-meming is one way to open pathways to civil dialog.

Who Is Fake Geek Girl?

The first instance of the Fake Geek Girl (FGG) meme—often also referred to as Idiot
Nerd Girl—was on 4chan in 2010 (“Idiot Nerd Girl,” 2010). Because of the image’s color
pinwheel background, Fake Geek Girl can be considered an Advice Animal image macro, even
though she never actually gives advice (Figure 27). The woman pictured in the meme became its
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figurehead because she wears fashionably thick glasses and, as the original photo reveals, a
cardigan (Figure 28), both staples of geek attire. However, with her perfectly styled hair, makeup
and traditionally attractive appearance, she represents mainstream “geek chic” more so than
authentic geekiness. Notably, she has written “NERD” on her hand, which many geeks consider
her greatest transgression; if she were really a nerd, she wouldn’t need or even want to advertise
it. The top text makes a general reference to geek or nerd culture, while the bottom text reveals
FGG’s ignorance or inexperience while implicitly claiming that the memer is well-versed in this
esoteric element. Scarlet Intern (2012) explains that the meme “essentially reduces all nerd
women to vain, self-centered poseurs who can never truly ‘belong’ the way a nerd man can.”

Figure 27. Example of Fake
Geek Girl meme

Figure 28: Original
Fake Geek Girl photo

Where Did Fake Geek Girl Come From?

The FGG meme stems from the cultural assumption that there is no such thing as a
genuine geek girl, or that all women who claim to be geeks are only doing it for male attention.

52
This stereotype has existed almost as long as geeks and nerds have. Jay Rachel Edidin (2012), a
comics and graphic novel editor, explains that “‘Geek’ is a gendered noun. There’s a
GeekGirlCon, but no GeekGuyCon: every con is GeekGuyCon, unless it specifies otherwise.
You don’t say ‘geek guys’ the way you say ‘geek girls’: once you’ve said ‘geek,’ the ‘guy’ is
pretty much taken as read.”12 The notion of the fake geek girl has gained popularity over the last
decade. Edidin (2012) believes that geek guys disparage geek girls because the masculinity of
geek and nerd culture is fragile, especially now that women like Anita Sarkeesian and Brianna
Wu and feminist gaming blogs like Sam Blackmon’s Not Your Mama’s Gamer have been
gaining influence in the geek world: “For the first time, there are visible swathes of geek culture
that aren’t only female-majority, but unabashedly girly—in a culture where feminization is
directly equated to deprecation of value” (Edidin, 2012). The pushback against female geeks—
and the impetus for the Fake Geek Girl meme—is highlighted in two recent cultural events:
Tony Harris’s rant against female cosplayers13 at conventions and the Gamergate movement.
In October 2012, popular comic book artist Tony Harris posted a now-deleted rant on
Facebook that belittled “Quasi-Pretty-NOT-Hot-Girl[s]” who cosplay (Hern, 2012). His
grammatically frustrating tirade, abridged below, challenges women who identify as geeks:
Heres the statement I wanna make, based on THE RULE: "Hey! Quasi-PrettyNOT-Hot-Girl, you are more pathetic than the REAL Nerds, who YOU secretly
think are REALLY PATHETIC…. You are willing to become almost completely
Naked in public, and yer either skinny( Well, some or most of you, THINK you
are ) or you have Big Boobies. Notice I didnt say GREAT Boobies? You are what
I refer to as "CON-HOT"…. You have this really awful need for attention, for
people to tell you your pretty, or Hot, and the thought of guys pleasuring

12

A “con” is a convention, or a large gathering centered around a genre of geek culture, such as anime or comics.

“Cosplayer” is a term for someone who dresses as a character (from comics/manga, movies, or video games).
Generally, these costumes are made from scratch and are often detailed and realistic.
13
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themselves to the memory of you hanging on them with your glossy open lips,
promising them the Moon and the Stars of pleasure, just makes your head vibrate.
And here it is, THE REASON WHY ALL THAT, sickens us: BECAUSE YOU
DONT KNOW SHIT ABOUT COMICS, BEYOND WHATEVER GOOGLE
IMAGE SEARCH YOU DID TO GET REF ON THE MOST MAINSTREAM
CHARACTER WITH THE MOST REVEALING COSTUME EVER…. Shut up
you damned liar, no you would not. Lying, Liar Face. Yer not Comics. Your just
the thing that all the Comic Book, AND mainstream press flock to at Cons. [sic,
all errors] (As quoted in Hern, 2012)
Harris later posted something resembling an apology that provided little reconciliation and
instead attempted to broaden his scope from fake geek girls to all fake geeks. He concedes that
“the one mistake [he] made in [his] original post was that [he] excluded Men” (as quoted in
Hern, 2012). However, his original post clearly does not include men as its target, in large part
because he makes specific and frequent references to women and female anatomy.
Harris’s rant is a blunt and vivid illustration of the kind of misogyny geek girls frequently
face. His assumption—mirrored in many other instances of geek girl shaming—is that women
want to show power over geek guys by leading them on with sexy costumes that they have no
right to wear because they haven’t dedicated as much time to the material as the geek guys have.
In particular, one of Harris’s biggest assumptions is that any girl who cosplays at conventions
would never actually want to engage in sexual relations with the “pathetic” (in Harris’s own
words) guys they are presumably trying to impress. Such sentiments portraying geek girls as
teases are reinforced all over the Internet, particularly in comments like Brett Michael’s (2011):
“Would any of these girls enter the bone zone with a real life greasy haired, zit-faced, socially
inept code-writing obsessed nerd? Of course not. Which is exactly why they should be mocked
and ridiculed!”
Harris’s and Michael’s sentiments touch on the crux of the fake geek girl argument: sex.
Both reduce the issue to the question of whether geek girls would engage with geek guys
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sexually, and both seem to think they would not. This assumption speaks to a larger issue behind
the fake geek girl assumption. Traditionally, being a geek or nerd has been looked down upon,
especially in American culture, for representing an inadequate form of masculinity. It would be
better to be a jock—popular, handsome, and well-liked—than to be a geek. However, with the
rise of the tech world and the growing popularity of such shows as Big Bang Theory—which
produces a watered-down version of geekiness—superhero movies, and other geeky media,
being a geek has become cool. Geeks who grew up being bullied are angry that the people who
bullied them are now trying to enter their cultural milieu. Their frustration at their perceived
denial of their masculine identities has surfaced.
This frustration hit a breaking point with the inception of Gamergate, a complex event in
the gaming community that began in 2014 when game developer Zoë Quinn’s ex-boyfriend
posted an online manifesto that accused her of sleeping with video game journalists for positive
reviews of her games. Regardless of the truth of this allegation—although it is likely false—the
gamers behind Gamergate used the excuse of “journalism ethics” as a thinly veiled cover for
what turned into the online harassment and abuse of not only Quinn, but also Brianna Wu (a
game developer), Anita Sarkeesian (a cultural critic who runs the Feminist Frequency website),
and many other geek women. All three received frequent death and rape threats across various
forms of social media for their feminist influence on gaming culture. They were also doxed14—
their private information was released publicly online—which made the online threats that much
more distressing. Sarkeesian even had to cancel speaking events; she was faced with bomb
threats and the promise of a mass shooting at one of her presentations (Valenti, 2015).

14

As were several other female geek icons, including Felicia Day, who is known for playing Codex in The Guild—a
show about several players of an MMORPG like World of Warcraft—and for being a video and board game geek.
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Sarkeesian summarizes what Gamergate and other incidents of video gaming misogyny
reveal about the video game community in particular and geek culture in general: “There’s this
toxicity… that drives this misogynist hatred, this reactionary backlash against women who have
anything to say, especially those who have critiques or are feminists. There’s this huge drive to
silence us, and if they can’t silence us they try to discredit us in an effort to push us out” (as
interviewed in Collins, 2014). Gamergate and other attempts to restrict women’s access to geek
culture have tried to show women that they have no place in it, but geek women like Sarkeesian
refuse to step away from one of their key identity markers. And when these women refuse to
submit to the hegemony, hostile geeks go to even greater lengths to shut them down, such as
creating and propagating Internet memes based on negative cultural assumptions.
FGG establishes identification with this stereotype and other geeks—both men and
women—who believe it. Warnick and Heineman (2012) explain that digital identification
establishes a relationship between the creator and viewer. Generally, s/he will do this through
producing a text that reflects not only his/her values, but also those of his/her audience. Memes
especially reflect this digital identification, particularly FGG. The original FGG creator so
strongly identified with the belief that there are no female geeks that he made the first iteration of
the FGG meme, which reveals FGG’s ignorance of a highly popular video game (Figure 29).
S/he then shared it in a public forum where other like-minded geeks could see it and share in its
message, or “facilitate this feeling of mutuality” (Warnick & Heineman, 2012, p. 98). Lewis
(2012) explains how audience response is another marker of identification: “Audience
interaction with memes is an expected part of the meme experience, marked by the processes of
identification…” (p. 117). 4chan users loved the FGG meme and remixed its message over and
over again to reinforce it. Remixed iterations of the meme began to appear with a range of geek
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references that FGG does not understand. This identification facilitated FGG’s rhetorical
velocity; the meme tapped into the geek community’s long-held belief that women are inferior
geeks. The meme’s climb to popularity was slow at first. It didn’t start to garner much attention
outside of 4chan until about a year later when anti-geek-girl sentiment was beginning to reach an
all-time high.15 Once it broke out of 4chan, it wasn’t long before the meme hit viral status16 and
showed up on image-based websites—such as Imgur and Reddit—and the template was
available on several meme generator websites. During this time, it was impossible to avoid the
FGG meme in forums related to anything geeky.

Figure 29. The first Fake
Geek Girl meme

15

Tony Harris had not yet made his infamous Facebook rant, but female geek icons such as Anita Sarkeesian and
Felicia Day, as well as everyday geek girls, were already facing pushback from fake geek girl proclaimers. Some
had been experiencing it for years, while others were encountering these sentiments for the first time due to the
influx of geek girls over the previous decade.
16

The first meme appeared in May 2010 and a few more popped up within a few months after. However, in January
2011 the meme began to appear outside of 4chan and steadily gained popularity. By summer 2011, there were
enough instances of the meme that lists of the “top” Fake Geek Girl memes appeared steadily over the next year
(“Idiot Nerd Girl”).
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Fake Geek Girl, the Geek Gatekeeper

Together, the fake geek girl stereotype and Fake Geek Girl meme work as a gatekeeper to
the geek community; both are tools for keeping women out of geek culture. However, this
gatekeeping should not be confused with geek culture’s general exclusionary practices. Geeks
are often highly competitive about their geek knowledge, always looking to be the one who
knows more about a certain cultural subset than another. They revel in debating the relative
merits of Batman and Iron Man and trying to figure out which would win in a fight. Often, these
conversations and debates can lead to questioning each other’s geek IQ and mild insults. All of
these actions are understood as par for the course in geek culture. But this level of competition is
not what women face. Instead, they often have to deal with the complete disavowal of their
identities as geeks.
Geek girls constantly have to defend their geek credentials against a barrage of questions
and assertions. A girl wearing a Captain America shirt must prove that she is not only interested
in him but has also read every comic book issue (of both his series and of The Avengers) and
watched every the movies starring him. However, a guy need not defend a similar sartorial
choice: by virtue of being a man, his geek credentials are assumed to be true. Andrea Letamendi
(2012), writer for the Mary Sue,17 reinforces Edidin’s (2012) notion that “geek” is often equated
to “guy” when she recounts her experience at an airport security check. Although she was
wearing a Batgirl t-shirt and a Star Wars hoodie, the TSA agent “pointed to [her] Kindle, the one
17

The story behind why the blog is named The Mary Sue is marginally relevant to this chapter. In fanfiction, a
“Mary Sue” is a female character whom the author writes into the story as an idealized version of him or herself.
Typically, people consider the appearance of a Mary Sue to be bad writing. However, the bloggers reappropriated
this pejorative term to work against society’s expectations that all women should be Mary Sues—beautiful, smart,
funny, likeable, and [insert any number of positive modifiers here]. They use it to laugh at the notion that geek girls
in particular should have to surrender any part of themselves to enter the geek community (Polo).
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with the Star Wars comics cover, and immediately looked at the [male] stranger standing next to
[her]: ‘Is this your Kindle?’” (Letamendi, 2012). This slight mixup seems innocuous, but it is an
unintentional microaggression that speaks to a larger issue of geek girl authenticity. Because
geek girls must constantly establish their geek credentials in order to be accepted as a member of
the geek community, they must also constantly defend their authenticity against the gatekeeping
practices of those both within and without of the geek community.
Interestingly, not all supporters of FGG are men. Even some female geeks propagate this
damaging stereotype, such as Tara Brown (2012): “Pretentious females who have labeled
themselves as a ‘geek girl’ figured out that guys will pay a lot of attention to them if they
proclaim they are reading comics or playing video games.” Brown’s contention seems to be that
the older generation of geek girls worked hard to establish their geek credibility by putting in
long hours immersing themselves in their fandom or nerdy interests. She argues that modern
geek girls don’t do that. Instead, she thinks these women focus superficially on the appearance of
being geeky or nerdy without learning the substance behind their particular interests. However,
Edidin (2012) explains why this misperception is dangerous:
For those of us [geek girls] who had to mortgage significant parts of our identities
at the door, it’s hard not to see the new generation of geek girls as interlopers,
getting a free ride where we had to laboriously claw our way in. When you’re part
of an underrepresented group, it’s easy to fall prey to a reductive fallacy that
there’s only room for one way to be female… in geek culture, and anyone who
approaches that identity from a different angle threatens your claim to it.
Edidin (2012) explains that when fellow geek girls push back against the new generation of
female nerds, they are also pushing back against the progress they have made toward women’s
inclusion in the geek community. She understands that it can be difficult to see these young
women joining the collective without having to suffer in the same way the older generation of
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geeks did, but she reminds all geek girls of the importance of working together dispel the notion
of the fake geek girl instead of reinforcing the cycle of geek girl identity oppression.

Fake Geek Girl: Perpetuating Nerd Entitlement and Female Objectification

The fake geek girl stereotype and meme go beyond keeping women out of geek and nerd
culture. Edidin (as interviewed in Zuckerman, 2012) explains that they also thrive in “the sticky
and tenacious subtexts and cultural dogmas that justify and normalize misogyny and harassment
and make the geek community so seethingly toxic to female members–and especially female
newcomers–that it doesn’t even need a formal gate to keep them out.” FGG is just the tip of an
iceberg of systematized oppression against women in geek culture. Edidin (as interviewed in
Zuckerman, 2012) explains that it “is the throwaway byproduct of a culture that regularly
responds to criticism from women with flurries of rape threats.” The stereotype and meme also
continue the tradition of silencing women and telling them that they are not as fully human as
men are. Instead, the fake geek girl stereotype and meme reveal that the majority of geeks—or at
least the vocal majority—see women as sexual objects whose purpose is to relieve geek and nerd
men of their suffering. Failure to do so results in blaming women for their misery and shaming
them for not fulfilling their perceived duties.
Brown (2012) and others who buy into the myth of the fake geek girl think that girls
pretend to be geeky because it grants them some sort of social status. But that status is often
unclear. According to people like Tony Harris (as quoted in Hern, 2012) and Tara Brown (2012),
it’s all for male attention. Redditor GuaranaGeek (2012) agrees: Fake Geek Girl is “afraid of
other geek girls (who actually know their shit) finding out that she's only doing it for the
attention.” But what none of these fake geek girl criers explain is why. Why would these women
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fake their geekiness to attract attention from what are supposedly—by their own description—
substandard men? The answer to this question seems to lie in what Laurie Penny (2014) refers to
as “nerd entitlement,” or the belief that male geeks and nerds are entitled to receive sexual
pleasure from women without having to work for it. In other words, they blame women for their
lack of sexual encounters in their early years.
Penny (2014) uses the term “nerd entitlement” in direct response to a blog comment by
Scott Aaronson, an MIT professor. Aaronson (2014) wrote a lengthy comment about how hard it
was to grow up as a nerdy guy. He blamed part of his unhappiness on the fact that no women
approached him or took pity on him. He thinks perhaps he would have felt more self-worth as a
young nerd if someone had. Penny explains, “to a certain otherwise very intelligent sub-set of
nerdy men, the category, ‘woman’ is defined primarily as ‘person who might or might not deny
me sex, love and affection’” (2014). Penny continues, “Men, particularly nerdy men, are
socialized to blame women… for the trauma and shame they experienced growing up. If only
women had given them a chance…. If only they had said yes, or made an approach.” According
to Penny (2014), the reason women—particularly traditionally attractive women—are shunned
from the geek community is because their sexual inaction is the perceived reason for geek guys’
cultural emasculation when they were younger. And now that many geek and nerd guys have
grown up to be successful scientists or software developers, they believe women are trying to
join their cultural milieus to leech off their success.
This could, at least in part, explain why geek guys are so concerned with fake geek girls
who are apparently trying to get their attention. Perhaps their blaming women for their
emasculation has led to a misperception that women are intentionally flaunting their own
supposed sexual prowess in front of geek guys with no intention of going beyond that. Some of
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this misperception may be explained by Penny’s (2014) brief yet accurate description of
patriarchy: “Men get to be whole people at all times. Women get to be objects, or symbols, or
alluring aliens whose responses you have to game to ‘get’ what you want.” She elaborates on this
claim and addresses Aaronson’s woman-blaming rhetoric by answering his question about where
all the geek and nerd girls were while he was young: “And I answer: we were terrified, just like
you, and ashamed, just like you, and waiting for someone to take pity on our lonely abject
pubescence…. But you did not see us there. We were told repeatedly, we ugly, shy nerdy girls,
that we were not even worthy of the category ‘woman’” (Penny, 2014). The systematized
oppression of women in geek and nerd culture is a direct result of nerd entitlement. Geek guys
see women as less than human, and instead of attempting to remedy this misunderstanding they
continue to blame women for devaluing their masculine identities in mainstream culture. In turn,
they vent this blame through calling geek girls “fake” and claiming that they are only trying to
get their attention so that they can perpetuate the cycle of female enticement and disappointment.
The irony is that being geeky or nerdy is now no longer a niche interest and geeks and nerds—
both men and women—are able to be more publicly comfortable in their geekiness and nerdiness
than ever before, yet this tension remains.

Counter-Meming Fake Geek Girl

If a geek girl tries to speak up against her accused-fakeness, she is silenced through
ridicule, passively shrugged off, or told she is the exception to the rule. The meme and the
stereotype that fuels it precludes any opportunity for productive discourse on gender stereotypes
in geek culture. As a result, new methods are necessary to resist memetic stereotypes and open
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dialog. Counter-meming may offer one method for resisting negative memetic stereotyping while
providing a way to open discourse around key identity topics.
The notion of counter-meming has existed for over two decades, yet few scholars discuss
it. In 1994, Mike Godwin explained how he created a counter-meme, Godwin’s Law of Nazi
Analogies. He noticed that “as an online discussion grows longer, the probability of a
comparison involving Nazis or Hitler approaches one” (Godwin, 1994). He argues that when a
discussion thread makes these comparisons, it is no longer useful, despite how important or
useful it may have been originally. He engineered Godwin’s Law as a meme to counter the
meme of making Nazi comparisons in online discussions.18 After his new meme spread, he
noticed the number of comparisons decreased drastically on the discussion boards who knew
about his Law, and civil discourse was able to reassert itself in these spaces. Godwin’s Law is
the first recorded instance of counter-meming, or “the deliberate generation of a meme that aims
at neutralizing or eradicating potentially harmful ideas” (Knobel & Lankshear, 2007, p. 223).
Once Godwin had realized that it is possible “to generate effective counter-memes,” he asked if
we have “any moral imperative to do so.” He argues, and Knobel and Lankshear (2007) seem to
agree, that all Internet users have an ethical responsibility “to commit ourselves to memetic
engineering—crafting good memes to drive out the bad ones” (Godwin, 1994). Although it is
unclear whether or not Jay Rachel Edidin was aware of Godwin’s practice of counter-meming,
she appears to have taken up his call by remixing and re-appropriating the Fake Geek Girl meme.

Both memes, the Nazi analogies and Godwin’s Law, are not image macros, like the majority of memes I have
discussed so far in this chapter. Instead, they are closer to Dawkinsian memes: behaviors or ways of thinking that
people recapitulate in society.
18
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In 2012, Jay Rachel Edidin, former editor for Dark Horse comics, recognized that geek
girls could no longer sit idly by and watch the FGG meme’s rise in popularity, so she made it her
mission to remix and reclaim the FGG meme and ask others to do so as well. Although she wrote
long before Internet memes existed, Judith Butler (1990) would support Edidin’s efforts:
The critical task [of feminism] is… to locate strategies of subversive repetition
enabled by those constructions [of identities], to affirm the local possibilities of
intervention through participating in precisely those practices of repetition that
constitute identity and, therefore, present the immanent possibility of contesting
them. (Butler, 1990, p. 201)
Butler urges feminists and their allies to find instances where marginalized identities are being
degraded and use their methods of oppression to reverse the damage. Or in the case of the FGG
meme, remix the message on the memetic template so that it bolsters geek girls instead of
denigrating them.
When most scholars and memers discuss remixing memes, they mean changing it for
survival—the objective is usually for it to last longer in the meme pool. However, the goal of
remixing FGG was to kill it through satire. In response to questions about why she remixed the
existing meme, Edidin (as quoted in Fenn, 2012) responded, “What other approaches could I
take? All I can think of is maybe asking quickmeme to take it down, which I absolutely wouldn't
do—there's a critical difference between subverting the content and challenging its right to be
there, and that's a line I wouldn't cross.” Other scholars and activists studying and working
against derogatory digital texts face the same conundrum: how does one subvert damaging
dominant discourses without resorting to censorship? Joel Penney (2015) studies the National
Organization for Marriage (NOM)’s anti-gay-marriage video A Gathering Storm and its
LGBTQ+ parody A Gaythering Storm. He argues that satire is more powerful than censorship
and would agree with Edidin’s decision to remix instead of remove: “Rather than attempting to
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shut down and block out ‘bad’ images, satire resituates their meaning by embracing them and
transforming them through creative cultural processes” (Penney, 2015, p. 229). Referring
specifically to the NOM parody, he explains that the “parodists worked to reframe [the original
video’s] meaning by embracing the image and playfully drawing public attention to its
deplorability” (Penney, 2015, p. 231). So too do the FGG remixes.
Edidin created a few memes herself first, then posted a call for more on Twitter and
Tumblr: “within a few hours, [they’d] filled about a dozen pages of quickmeme.com” (Edidin,
2013). For a short time between 2012 and 2014, there were more instances of the FGG remix on
Google Images than there were original FGG image macros. Edidin kept the background
template, but changed the messages so that they bolster geek girl identities instead of denigrating
them. Edidin (as quoted in Zuckerman, 2012) explains, “The new Nerd Girl memes are
celebratory. They’re funny, and angry, obscure and prosaic. Some poke fun at recurring themes
in the old meme; others speak from personal experience or rehash specific incidents. They’re
snarky and sincere, frustrated and frank.” Figures 30-33 represent four different approaches to
the feminist rebuttal of FGG. Figure 30 fights fire with fire by accusing geek guys of not
possessing all of the knowledge they think geek girls should, thus questioning geek guy
authenticity. Figure 31 criticizes the propagators of FGG for being so quick to point out common
knowledge gaps for any newcomer. Figure 32 implies that the inclusion of girls into the geek
community will not disrupt geek guy masculinity or somehow lessen their geekhood. But one of
the most effective versions boldly asks, “Who are you to say she’s not?” (Figure 33). This image
defies geek guys who challenge the authenticity of geek girls by reminding them that it’s not
their decision what other people like or don’t like.
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Figure 30. Example Fake
Geek Girl counter-meme

Figure 31. Example Fake
Geek Girl counter-meme

Figure 32. Example Fake
Geek Girl counter-meme

Figure 33. Example Fake
Geek Girl counter-meme

Further, once the FGG counter-memes spread throughout the Internet, new countermemes appeared. Although their manifestations (appearance) and behaviors (purpose and
process) have changed, the ideal (message) remains the same: there is no such thing as a fake
geek girl. The Fake Nerd Guy account on Tumblr collects photos, gifs, and image macros that
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parody the fake geek girl phenomenon.19 Some feature men wearing revealing costumes at
conventions while saying things like “You can’t just put on a mask and call it cosplay!”
(fakenerdguys, 2014). Others satirize the original FGG meme. Figure 34’s top line opens with a
quote from a fake nerd guy that reveals his sexist assumptions about geek culture, while the
bottom line exposes his ignorance. Although these memes appear to recapitulate the same
methods as the original Fake Geek Girl meme, irony exposes the ridiculous assumptions behind
the fake geek girl notion. In one instance, a young man is dressed as a character from the video
game Dragon Age (Figure 35). The caption reads, “Look at this manslut, baring his arms and
wearing skintight leggings to pander to the female gaze. Ugh. I bet his girlfriend played Dragon
Age II for him!” (fakenerdguys, 2014). This statement echoes the kinds of sentiments geek girls
hear frequently, but a quick glance at the image to which the caption refers reveals that it is
satire. This young man is clearly not “pandering to the female gaze”; he is just trying to recreate
his favorite character.
These remixes also illustrate identification on the other side of the fake geek girl issue.
Whereas the original FGG meme tapped into identification with the stereotype that all women
who purport to be geeks are doing so for attention, these new versions highlight identification
with the notion that no one has a right to shun others from geek culture. Edidin (as quoted in
Fenn, 2012) has underscored the importance of leaving gatekeeping practices out of the new
meme: “I’m not fond of the ones that are really hostile or depend on negative stereotypes of
geeks—for me, the point [of the remix] is challenging the cycle of gatekeeping, not just changing
its direction.” Many of these satirical remixes expose the latent—and sometimes the painfully

19

The account has essentially been dead since 2014. However, during its peak in 2013 and 2014, it collected 10
pages of satirical Fake Nerd Guy images.
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Figure 34. Example
Fake Nerd Guy meme

Figure 35. Example
Fake Nerd Guy meme

obvious—misogyny inherent in geek culture in an attempt to subvert and reverse it. Eris Walsh
(2015) summarizes what the FGG counter-meme has shown women who face geek
discrimination: “We’re all fans. Period. None of us has any right to judge the legitimacy of
anyone else’s level of geek.” Although women continue to receive pushback from within geek
culture, the FGG counter-meme marked the first time that geek girls banded together to fight
these negative stereotypes on a global digital scale.

The Effects of the Fake Geek Girl Counter-Meme
Unfortunately, the FGG counter-meme’s influence was short-lived. Although it
dominated Google Images, Quickmeme, and Meme Generator for the better part of two years
between 2012 and 2014, the original FGG meme has re-gained momentum and re-asserted itself
on all of these sites. Some of the more recent versions on Quickmeme have hundreds of
thousands of shares on Facebook and Twitter. The FGG counter-meme changed the course of the
meme for only a short time, but its contribution to resisting misogyny in geek culture continues
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to have a resounding impact. In fact, it seems as if both the original meme and the counter-meme
were necessary to open dialog around the treatment of women in geek culture. The original
meme uncovered decades-old prejudices and brought them to mainstream attention, and the
counter-meme represented the moment when geek girls had had enough of being marginalized.
Since the inception of both the meme and counter-meme, countless articles, blog posts,
vlogs, songs, and other media have been produced to address the “Fake Geek Girl” phenomenon.
Some respond directly to the memes, and some simply comment on the idea of the fake geek
girl. Some are legitimate attempts to open constructive discourse, and some simply re-hash the
tired assumptions behind FGG. But because a Google search for the phrases “idiot nerd girl” and
“fake geek girl” returns virtually no results that pre-date the original meme or the counter-meme,
it seems possible—probable even—that all this media and the discussions they incite may find
their impetus in the memes. The FGG memes and counter-memes may have been relatively
invisible in the grand scheme of things, but they have become a vital part of conversations
geared at reducing and eventually eliminating geek misogyny. Counter-memes will not change
the world instantly, but their influence has the potential to ignite and re-open important
discourses around key issues like gender, race, ethnicity, and other identity factors.

The Dark(est) Side to Meming and Counter-Meming: Identity Appropriation

Although counter-meming can offer one way to open the constructive dialog that
negative image macros preclude, both meming and counter-meming remain problematic. One
aspect of memes that few scholars and popular media writers discuss is identity appropriation.
Memes generally appropriate anonymous figures to represent the identity of a large group of
people. For instance, Scumbag Steve becomes a stand-in for inconsiderate friends (Figure 16),
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Misunderstood D-Bag becomes a way for viewers to commiserate with each other through
moments of accidental transgression (Figure 18), and Overly Attached Girlfriend and Overly
Attached Boyfriend become representations of clingy significant others (Figures 22, 34 and 23).
However, many image macros—even both “found” and stock photos—use their images without
knowledge or consent. Jasmine Garsd (2015) explains, “All these Internet celebrities have one
thing in common: They didn’t intend to become famous. Their pictures just happened to go
viral.” Even FGG’s image was used without her permission or any knowledge of who she is. We
don’t even know if she identifies as a “nerd” or wrote the word on her hand ironically, or if she
would want to be the face of an FGG meme or counter-meme. However, FGG is fortunate in
some regards: many memetic figures’ identities have been discovered, but her real-world identity
is yet to be linked to her memetic stardom. Depending on the context of the meme and how
widely the meme figure’s real-world identity is known, this unwitting fame can have a huge
impact on his/her life. For some, it leads to amusement or further fame, but for others it can lead
to intense psychological issues and/or real-life harassment.

Capitalizing on Memetic Fame

Some meme-figures attempt to capitalize on their fame. Antoine Dodson, better known as
the man behind the “Bedroom Intruder” song, tried to use his memetic stardom to launch a career
in entertainment. The meme began when a flustered and frantic Dodson was interviewed by an
NBC news affiliate in Alabama the morning after a man had broken into his family’s home and
attempted to rape his sister while she slept (Figure 36). In his agitation, Dodson made some
exaggerated statements and claims, including his most famous line: “hide yo’ kids, hide yo’ wife,
hide yo’ husbands, ‘cuz they rapin’ everybody up in here.” His interview was remixed into a
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song and music video and put on YouTube where it became an instant sensation. Dodson was
surprised by his sudden fame at first, but he embraced it and used his public recognition to
initiate his own career. He created a website, started a YouTube channel, and tried to pilot a
reality TV show centered on him and his siblings (“Antoine Dodson,” 2010). Dodson has seen
moderate financial success through these endeavors.

Figure 36. Screenshot from Antoine
Dodson’s “Bedroom Intruder”

Likewise, Laina Morris—the woman behind Overly Attached Girlfriend—has attempted
to capitalize on her memetic fame. In 2012, she uploaded a Justin Bieber parody video to
YouTube where she changed the lyrics of his song “Boyfriend” so they depict a crazed and
jealous girlfriend. Someone screencapped the opening shot of the video and used it as the
background of an image macro that features text highlighting stereotypical jealous and clingy
girlfriend behaviors (Figure 37). Morris continued to adopt the persona in other YouTube videos,
both on her channel and others, in an attempt to maintain her popularity (“Overly Attached,”
2012). In 2012, she even started using her channel to highlight charities and fundraise for them.
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For each milestone achieved, she promised to film herself completing a series of quirky tasks in
public places and uploading the videos to her channel (Alfonso, 2012). Dodson and Morris are
only two examples of meme celebrities who have attempted to harness their Internet popularity
for some kind of financial gain, whether for themselves or others.

Figure 37. Overly Attached
Girlfriend

Neutral Memetic Celebrity

Still more meme celebrities are amused yet generally neutral about their memetic
stardom. For instance, Ermahgerd is a meme featuring “Berks.” While browsing through a
friend’s Facebook page, a Reddit user found a photo of an awkward adolescent girl who is
incredibly excited about the Goosebumps books she is holding. He didn’t know the girl in the
photo, nor does he remember whose photos he was browsing, but he uploaded it to a subreddit
on Reddit anyway (King, 2015). Later, another Redditor stumbled across the image and added
text that says “ERMAHGERD” on the top line and “GERSBERMS” on the second one, both
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slightly slurred versions of “Oh my God” and “Goosebumps.” The distortion is meant to be an
exaggeration of how it sounds when someone speaks while wearing a retainer. Other versions of
the meme show Berks (Ermahgerd-speak for “books”) holding other various objects with equal
excitement and speaking with her signature mispronunciation (Figure 38). Maggie Goldenberger,
the figure behind the Ermahgerd meme, expressed that at first she was shocked to see her
adolescent photo resurface after so many years. She says seeing her meme is still surreal: “My
eyes just get wide and I say, out loud, ‘This is so fucking weird’” (Goldenberger, as quoted in
King, 2015). However, although she couldn’t “believe this is [her] 15 minutes of fame,”
Goldenberger says that she “never felt unduly embarrassed about her sudden and unexpected
celebrity” (Goldenberger, as quoted in King, 2015). In fact, she seemed amused by her photo’s
rise to Internet fame.

Figure 38. Ermagerd

However, regardless of the innocuous nature of the Ermagerd meme, it highlights one of
the dangers behind a meme figure being identified. As users attempted to find the real “Berks,”
Goldenberger’s “real name started getting attached to the pictures, and an anonymous bounty
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hunter tracked down and uploaded a photo of her on a beach in Hawaii in a bikini” (King, 2015).
Not only was this quest a potentially dangerous invasion of her privacy, but the photo of her in a
bikini surfaced online. This time, it wasn’t just a photo of her childhood caricature being
ridiculed; it was actually her. Goldenberger managed to keep a sense of humor about the whole
ordeal, which she deemed “the only really hurtful episode of the experience,” joking, “if I’m
going to have a bikini shot floating around on the Internet, I’d like to be spray tanned and under a
waterfall somewhere” (as quoted in King, 2015). Although she laughs off the experience after
the fact, it must have been unsettling and even scary to watch her real-life identity be revealed
and attached to her photo and then to realize that someone was watching her unwittingly.

Memetic Fame and Psychological Trauma

Beyond revealing real-world identities, some would say that such memetic appropriations
are psychologically harmful. For instance, take Ghyslain Raza, or Star Wars Kid. In 2002, Raza
used his school’s AV room and equipment to record himself pretending to be a Jedi fighting
invisible enemies with a “light saber.” He forgot to take the tape out before he left, and other
students found Raza’s recording a few months later and posted it online (“Star Wars Kid,” 2008).
Others remixed the footage several times, but the most notable ones replaced Raza’s pole with a
double-edged lightsaber and added laser bullets for him to deflect, à la Star Wars (Figure 39).
Star Wars Kid was one of the first widespread Internet memes, and is still popular today.20
Viewers find the video humorous; some relate to Raza’s awkward fantasy recreation, others find
the idea of an overweight kid staging a fantasy battle hilarious.

20

Popular media still makes references to it, such as Arrested Development, South Park, Family Guy, American
Dad, and even The Colbert Report.
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Figure 39. Star Wars Kid

However, Raza did not see any humor in the experience. Instead, “he and his parents
regarded [the video’s being shared online] as being cruel and invasive” (Knobel & Lankshear,
2007, p. 223). Garsd (2015) explains that “he was bullied incessantly, to the point that he became
depressed and dropped out of school to go to a children’s psychiatric ward.” His parents also
sued the classmates who posted the video. Not only was he bullied at school, but he was also
cyberbullied online. Raza explains that when he read comments about him online, “What I saw
was mean. It was violent. People were telling me to commit suicide” (“10 Years Later,” 2013).
Some of Raza’s fans felt bad for him and wanted to show their support, so they raised over
$4000 to buy him an iPod and put the rest on a gift card (Baio, 2003), but he did not respond to
the gift.21 Others even signed a petition to give him a cameo role in the upcoming Star Wars III
movie, but nothing came of it. Even with the positive support from his fans, the whole Star Wars
Kid experience was and continues to be traumatic for Raza.

21

At least, there is no online record of him responding to it.
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Public Failure and the Right to Be Forgotten

Although Raza and Goldenberger have similar stories—awkward adolescents caught
being awkward adolescents—each reacted differently. Goldenberger was surprised by her
sudden memetic fame yet also amused by and accepting of it, while Raza was totally devastated
by the spread of his video. Their ages when their memes became widespread and/or the
authenticity behind the moment of the meme could account in part for the disparate reactions
Raza and Goldenberger had to their memetic celebrity. Raza was a teenager when his video
surfaced online; he was still the same age when the video was released online as he was when he
filmed it. Understandably, he would have been unnerved and embarrassed that the whole world
saw him in what he considered to be a private moment. However, Goldenberger was in her
twenties when the photo resurfaced and became a meme. More than a decade had passed since it
had been taken, so she was probably able to more easily detach her real-life identity from the
image of Berks. Maturity and distance would allow Goldenberger to laugh at her memetic fame,
while youth and closeness would make Raza uncomfortable with his.
Furthermore, whereas Raza was performing a kind of play-acting by pretending to be a
Jedi, we have no way of knowing how seriously he took that performance. Although he has
spoken out against cyberbullying, he has said little about his experience filming his play-acting.
On the other hand, we know that the “compelling ‘found’ slice of life” behind Goldenberger’s
picture that appears to capture “the real, paroxysmal excitement of a little girl at precisely the
right millisecond” is actually just the opposite (King, 2015). It is also play-acting. She and her
friends used to dress in costumes or strange amalgamations of clothing and create characters. In
the Ermahgerd photo, Goldenberger is in character as “Pervy Dale.” What’s even more
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interesting is that she wasn’t even a fan of Goosebumps. The books just happened to be nearby
and seemed to fit the character at the time. King (2015) points out that “if the photo had been an
authentic depiction of an authentic moment—an actual artifact from her awkward tween years—
she may have felt different[ly]” about her photo appearing online without her permission.
However, because it was “just a picture of a kooky made-up character” that she was already
displaying in front of a group of her friends (King, 2015), she was able to laugh at it. But Raza’s
play-acting may have been a more genuine part of his identity, which may contribute to his
unease and humiliation at the world having seen it. Children and adolescents engage in similar
play-acting to Raza’s, but it is usually meant to remain private.
Moreover, this online stardom can have real-world effects that go beyond the emotional
or psychological. One effect, Garsd (2015) argues, is that these memes could act as potentially
incriminating evidence against meme celebrities like Goldenberger or Raza in their professional
lives: “people’s reputations are involved here. It does very likely impact… people’s ability to
find a job” (Garsd, 2015). Especially now that their names—as well as the names of many other
meme celebrities—have been connected to their memes, a quick Google search will reveal their
connection to memetic celebrity status. Most importantly, Woodrow Hartzog (as quoted in
Garsd, 2015) points out, “It’s important for us to fail when we’re young… That’s how we
develop our sense of right and wrong. That’s how we develop our sense of empathy. And the
ability to move past that, and not have those same things haunt you.” Garsd (2015) also explains,
“it's hard to imagine the mortification of having our silliest teenage moments live on forever.”
But that’s what has happened to meme celebrities like Goldenberger and Raza. Even though
Goldenberger’s awkward adolescence is over, the meme is still a remnant of a less-refined
version of herself that she would have rather kept private. Turning people into memes is taking
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away their ability to be youthful, particularly when images and videos of young people like Raza
are memed while they are still young. The Star Wars Kid meme took away Raza’s ability to
“fail,” or do something awkward and immature, and grow in private. Instead, he “failed” and the
whole world saw.
It is important to remember that none of these meme celebrities asked for their images
and videos to be posted online and turned into memes. In every example explained above their
likeness was appropriated without their knowledge or permission. Often, even the most careful
of Internet users can find their information and photos in strange corners of the web. It is
extremely difficult for Internet users to take total control of their digital presence. The main issue
is that most countries do not have any legal precedent or statute to protect people from such
unsolicited or unwitting reproduction of their image and videos. There is no way, from a legal
standpoint, to reclaim and remove these memes from the Internet. Garsd (2015) explains that the
European Union and Argentina have implemented “the right to be forgotten,” which “allows for
individuals living in these places to ask search engines like Google to de-index certain pages that
are irrelevant, false or not newsworthy.” In other words, citizens of these countries have the
ability to reclaim some of the privacy that the Internet in general and meming in particular can
take away from them. However, no such protection is available on a global scale, and certainly
not in North America where the majority of Internet memes are born. Some argue that “the right
to be forgotten” limits free speech, but cases like Goldenberger’s and especially Raza’s call for
the need for some kind of protection against appropriation and meming.
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Counter-Meming and Identity Appropriation

Vickery (2014) points out how, because meme creators are also usually anonymous,
memes often thrive on negative portrayals: “The anonymity associated with the creation and
distribution of memes enables potentially transgressive or empowering modes of communication
and participation” (p. 302). Both demeaning and empowering memes exist, although the safety
of anonymity tends to fuel the creation of more of the former than the latter. More importantly,
this anonymity also allows memers to use whatever photos they like without permission. As a
result of the inherent identity appropriation that happens with image macro memes, it is
necessary to be careful when crafting counter-memes not to accidentally cause extra harm to the
person whose identity has been appropriated.

Conclusion: Beyond Counter-Meming

Although counter-memes have the potential to cause as much damage as they rectify,
they are still a method worth considering to address memetic online aggression. Some even
argue that they are an ethical obligation. Knobel and Lankshear (2017), and Godwin (1994) posit
that “once a harmful meme has been identified, we may well have a social and moral
responsibility to chase it down by releasing a positive counter-meme into the idea stream”
(Knobel & Lankshear, 2007, p. 224). However, this notion raises the question, is countermeming enough? Grant Kien (2013) thinks that it is not. He argues, “Counter-memes can be
helpful, but are ultimately always reactive, and do not go far enough in correcting viral media
mistakes” (Kien, 2013, p. 560). He argues that “perhaps the time has come that audience
members learn and follow ethical standards for broadcasting” (Kien, 2013, p. 560). However,
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Kien’s sentiments only treat a symptom of the problem behind harmful memes. The kind of
censorship at which he hints would only remove the memetic exhibition of negative stereotypes
but would not eliminate the beliefs that manifest them.
Instead, I do not see Knobel and Lankshear’s (2007) and Godwin’s (1994) stances as
mutually exclusive from Kien’s (2013): counter-meming is important and may well be an ethical
obligation, but it is limited. In her article on the Human Rights Campaign (HRC) logo meme on
Facebook, Vie (2014) argues that the meme displays how simple actions like using or even
altering the HRC logo works against negative cultural assumptions. She posits that this kind of
“digital activism… can have significant impacts on off-line behaviors” (Vie, 2014). However,
although the HRC meme was considered a moderate victory in the fight for marriage equality in
the United States, homophobia—the driving force behind its opposition—continues to appear in
micro- and macro-aggressions both online and off. The HRC meme may have countered these
negative cultural assumptions, but, because it was a single, one-time rhetorical act, the larger
issue remains. The same goes for the FGG counter-meme. Although it briefly overshadowed the
original, not only has the original meme regained popularity, but the micro- and macroaggressions against women in the geek community also continue to occur.
On their own, counter-memes challenge but they do not deconstruct. However, I don’t
mean to suggest that counter-memes are ineffective. On the contrary, the growing use of countermeming to fight against negative cultural assumptions in digital spaces indicates that we may be
on the brink of large social and cultural shifts in how discourses about traditionally marginalized
identities are shaped. These memes show that the dominant discourses surrounding hegemonic
cultural representations may soon lose their potency. However, given the reactionary nature and
therefore necessarily limited capacity of counter-memes, it seems that the next step toward

80
subverting these damaging cultural forces is to create proactive memes that bolster marginalized
identities. If a counter-meme like the HRC logo or FGG remix can spur a series of proactive
memes that work against hegemonic discourses, they may have the power to combat negative
cultural assumptions on a larger scale. Vie (2014) explains, “When memes move from individual
identity displays to collective identity movements, they have the power to impact lasting material
change in the world” (italics mine). If a reactive counter-meme can momentarily stunt the spread
of negative cultural assumptions, then there is potential for a series of proactive memes to shut
down those damaging discourses altogether.
The precursors to these memes already exist. There are several body-positive image
macros that battle the negative cultural assumptions that women can only be attractive when they
match a certain standard of beauty. These memes create positive messages about female body
image and empower women of all shapes and sizes (Figure 40). Likewise, there are many memes
that bolster women of color and other non-white ethnicities. Figure 41 is an example of a meme
that questions negative social and cultural assumptions about black women. Together, these
individual memes serve as localized points of resistance that form a collective of positive memes
However, they are still reactionary instead of proactive. Body-positive memes react to the notion
of standardized beauty while black woman empowerment memes react to the notion that they
belong on a lower rung of the social hierarchy. While these memes are powerful in their
bolstering of women, they are not as potent as a proactive meme could be.
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Figure 40. Woman
empowerment meme

Figure 41. Black
woman empowerment
meme

To maximize its effectiveness, a truly proactive meme may need to operate within the
image macro meme genre, particularly the Advice Animal format that has proven successful and
lasting. This formula makes for easy remix and traceability to other memes like it. This proactive
meme may also utilize the key elements of meme literacy outlined earlier in this chapter. Doing
so makes it more likely that the meme will be named, which is a shared characteristic of most of
the image macros presented here; this naming appears to be a mark of a meme’s success. As this
chapter has shown, a proactive meme that has these characteristics has a better chance to become
widespread and remain relevant. No such meme exists yet, but the proliferation of positive
counter-memes seems to suggest that it may not be long before one does.

CHAPTER 3
4CHAN AND TRANSWOMEN: USING IDENTITY RHETORIC TO OPEN TRANSFRIENDLY DISCOURSE

Introduction: What Is 4chan?
Founded in 2003 by Christopher Poole (who is also known by the pseudonym “moot”)
and inspired by Japan’s popular Futaba Channel, 4chan is an online image-based bulletin
board—“a simple message board that allows users to post images in addition to text” (Stryker,
2011, p. 39). It contains 65 boards1 that cover a range of common topics like video games (/v/),
sports (/sp/), and music (/mu/), as well as not-safe-for-work (NSFW) topics like various
pornography and politically incorrect (/pol/) boards. 4chan is known more popularly as “the
Internet Hate Machine” (“Internet Hate Machine,” 2014) or “the Rude, Raunchy, Underbelly of
the Internet” (“4chan,” 2009), but many others know it as the “Meme Factory.” In particular,
4chan is the home of the Random board, or /b/, whose users depict themselves as outsiders
lacking a social conscience. /b/, often characterized as the “hivemind” of 4chan (Stryker, 2011,
p. 11), is a fast-paced, anything-goes corner of the Internet with few rules and minimal
moderation. It is best known for producing countless memes, as the previous home base for the
hacker group Anonymous, and as the largest gathering of Internet trolls.

1

As of August 2015. The number of boards sometimes shifts as new boards are added or old ones discarded.
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4chan’s potential value stems from its archaic design that mirrors early Internet sites both
in the way it looks and works and how users are able to interact with each other. The site
promotes both anonymity and ephemerality through its lack of user database or archive. Cole
Stryker (2011) points out that 4chan “stands in contrast to a web that seems to be moving
inexorably toward personal responsibility and a constant identity across all platforms that define
the browsing experience” (p. 13). Stryker is referring to sites like Facebook that require users to
use their legal names and link their real-life identity to their digital one while also archiving
posts, thus creating social accountability for the content users share. Mark Zuckerberg, Facebook
co-founder and CEO, has stated that “having two identities for yourself is an example of a lack
of integrity” (as quoted in Zimmer, 2010). He believes that a person with any more than one
stable identity is dishonest. However, Poole (2013, 2014) disagrees with this conception of
identity, arguing that anonymity can lead to “honest expression” and a “unique sense of
community” (2013). He believes identity is multi-faceted and “prismatic” (2014) and has worked
to ensure that 4chan maintains this spirit.
Poole believes that the most significant aspect of 4chan is the freedom that anonymity
and ephemerality provide to its users, or “anons” as they prefer to be called. He believes this
freedom empowers anons to explore aspects of their identities that they may not otherwise be
able to access in spaces that enforce one constant identity. In response to the solidified,
monolithic identity most social media spaces engender, Poole argues that, “The cost of failure is
really high when you’re contributing as yourself” (as quoted in Stryker, 2011, p. 274). If
someone tells a bad joke or makes a deviant comment on 4chan, it disappears in seconds and few
remember that it happened; if the same thing happens on Facebook or Twitter, it becomes part of
that user’s stable identity on the site. Poole (2010) also explains that “saying whatever you like is
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powerful.” Although he admits he did not understand the implications of his site when he first
created it, he has come to realize that the value in providing a place where people can be
“wrong,” or intentionally offensive, is that it allows them to explore and experiment with their
identities without consequence.
However, anons do not hold individual identities while participating on /b/. Instead, they
join a collective identity of users who have a “specific, often strong, sense of themselves as a
social unit” (Chakyo, 2008, p. 7). Despite, or perhaps even because of, an absence of individual
identities or a tool that allows individuals to connect to or communicate privately, anons on /b/
have developed what appears to be a paradoxically monolithic, stable collective identity that
follows certain norms and patterns of behavior. In fact, the collective identity on /b/ is so strong
that users do not refer to actions on the board as something performed by individuals. Instead,
people—not only anons, but those who discuss /b/ in popular media and even academia—explain
that “4chan says” or “/b/ does,” implying a sense of totality that supersedes individual actions:
what one user does on /b/ is equated to an action performed by the board itself. Further, any
individual action conforms so strongly to the expectations of the collective that it can be
indistinguishable from other individual actions, making the task of discerning the number of
anons participating in one discussion nearly impossible; the collective identity moves and
behaves as one entity.
The key to understanding the nature of this collective identity is rooted in theories of
identification and constitutive rhetoric, which help both explain how users join and construct the
collective identity as well as uncover the implications of individual behaviors within the
constraints of /b/’s design and ethos. These theories also reveal that anons’ behaviors appear to
be influenced by the sustained notion that they are expected to perform identity a certain way.
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Cynthia Lewis (2012) explains, “individual and group identities… are constructed through
repeated performances of self and in anticipation of the expectations, social codes and discourses
available within a given context” (p. 231). Anons on /b/ are willing to say anything to maintain
the performance of this identity, but their behavior stops just short of real-world action; such
actions (or inactions) illustrate that behavior on 4chan may be grounded in carnivalesque
performance and play instead of a reflection of real-world principles.
This chapter explores how /b/’s design and ethos govern its collective identity. Because it
is also predicated on whiteness, misogyny, and heteronormative discourses, /b/’s collective
identity often prevents Poole’s utopic vision of free expression and identity exploration from
fully manifesting on 4chan. He argues that /b/ provides freedom on 4chan, but this study shows
that /b/’s collective identity instead creates strict regulations that lead to the outing and exclusion
of anyone who does not fit. Noncompliance to the collective identity leads to outright exclusion
from it. In this chapter, I present two examples that demonstrate how a collective identity
concentrated almost solely on subversive performances of normative discourses—and that revels
in defying political correctness—limits and marginalizes performances of alternative gender and
sexuality identities. I present two examples—one centered on a self-identifying bisexual woman
and one on two self-disclosing transgender women—that demonstrate how the nature of /b/’s
collective identity enforces identity denigration. As these examples show, although /b/’s
behavior is largely based in carnivalesque performance and play, anons often denigrate women
and transpeople, thus continuing the tradition of silencing marginalized identities in digital
spaces. Further, the latter example highlights an important moment when the collective identity
ruptured, pointing to a way to subvert hostile discourses through identity rhetoric.
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4chan’s Cultural Significance

Although it receives mostly negative attention in popular media, 4chan is culturally
significant for many reasons, most of which have to do with /b/’s impact on mainstream society.
First, anons on /b/ are constantly seeking to influence the web outside of their forum. As Stryker
(2011) explains, “4chan… influences the way you behave on the web, whether you realize it or
not” (p. 12). Phillips (2015) points to the popularity of memes like rickrolling2 and LOLcats3
(both of which were created on /b/) and the actions of Anonymous as examples of 4chan
invading popular culture. More recent and less frivolous examples include 2014’s Gamergate4
and sordidly named “Fappening.”5 During the month I studied /b/, I witnessed several moments
where 4chan attempted to infiltrate popular media. Two notable but ultimately unsuccessful
examples were anti-feminist and transphobic, respectively. First, several threads circulated a
change.org petition for Merriam-Webster to change the word “feminist” to “feminazi.” The nowdefunct petition stated
Feminist [sic] do not have a proper standpoint and they are considering the
genocide of all men and have committed infanticide just like the Nazis did in
WWII. We should combine the names together to show their true colors. (Fresh
Prince, 2015)

2

Rickrolling is a bait-and-switch meme that lures an unsuspecting target to view a video that purports to be
something they may be interested in, but is actually the 80’s-era music video for Rick Astley’s “Never Gonna Give
You Up.”
3

LOLcats are image macro memes that include funny photos of cats captioned with text in a distinctive form of
altered English known as lolspeak. One of the more famous LOLcats is an excited grey cat with the text “I can has a
cheezburger?”
4

See Chapter 2 for a description of Gamergate.

The Fappening is the nickname given to the 2014 leak of hundreds of nude photos of female celebrities (“fap” is a
word used on 4chan to denote masturbation).
5
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The petition was widely circulated on /b/ for two days in late July 2015, but it never garnered
more than a few hundred signatures. In another attempt, anons proposed starting a “transage”
movement, trolling trans people by claiming that if a person of one sex could identify as a
different gender, then a person of one age could identify as another. They proposed starting a
“transage” hashtag on Twitter to draw attention to the movement, with the goal of discrediting all
trans movements. There were multiple threads devoted to this topic in late July, and the idea
made it to the 4chan subreddit on Reddit.com, notable because it shows this movement garnered
more momentum than the “feminazi” one. However, #transage was never trending on Twitter,
and the movement remains more or less dead.
4chan is not always successful in their attempts to influence mainstream culture, but they
continue to make efforts to do so. Many of them—such as rickrolling, convincing people to
microwave their iPhones,6 and possibly also the calls for #transage and feminazi movements—
are based in trolling, particularly the brand of self-identifying trolling Phillips (2015) studies.7
She explains that this “subcultural trolling is predicated on the amassment of lulz, an aggressive
form of laughter derived from eliciting strong emotional reactions from the chosen target(s)”

6

In September 2014, Apple released the iOS 8 update, and anons trolled iPhone users by filling Twitter with claims
that the new update also included “Wave,” a fake software addition that purported to allow users to charge their
iPhones in the microwave. They even created convincing promotional materials to share along with tweets
exclaiming how amazing this update was. Several iPhone users took the bait and nuked their phones, resulting in a
lot of ruined phones and microwaves and many angry iPhone users.
However, /b/’s motives are not always clear. In July, an Alabama high school teacher posted images of himself and
a student in bed, presumably to brag about his accomplishment, so /b/ worked collectively to uncover his identity.
They turned in their evidence to the Tuscaloosa School District and Sheriff’s Department. Joe Bradley Petrey, Jr.
was arrested for “sex acts with a student under 19” in early August 2015 (Townsend, 2015). /b/’s motives for outing
Petrey are unclear, but it may also be an act of trolling at its core. 4chan isn’t generally concerned with the
immorality behind a teacher having an affair with a student. This was made clear by one thread I observed in which
participants discussing a recent court ruling that sent a woman teacher to prison for the same offense as Petrey. They
lamented that none of their teachers had attempted to engage in sexual acts with them while simultaneously making
fun of the underage student who turned her in.
7
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Phillips, 2012b). Trolling is ubiquitous on 4chan. /b/ did not invent trolling, but it has become
home to the largest gathering of trolls. Phillips’ (2015) explanation of why researching trolls is
important reinforces 4chan’s cultural significance: “Troll’s behaviors, which are widely
condemned as being bad, obscene, and wildly transgressive… allow one to reconstruct what the
dominant culture regards as good, appropriate, and normal” (p. 7). She explains that they
“amplify the ugly side of mainstream behavior… [and] are born of and fueled by the mainstream
world” (Phillips, 2015, p. 168-9). /b/ is a culturally saturated text that reflects and reinforces the
mainstream’s hierarchical social norms for identity indicators like race, gender, and sexuality. Its
trolling is an influential phenomenon in digital discourse.
The third way in which /b/ is culturally significant is an extension of the second: 4chan’s
often damaging, violent, and intolerant discourses, whether they are based in trolling or not, have
immediate effects in society. Krista Ratcliffe (2005) points to the danger of discourses like this.
She explains how the narrative of the “good mother” influences people who are not mothers, but
her explanation also works for the disparaging language on 4chan: “Though all these discourses
are external to people’s bodies, they also permeate bodies and become embodied” (Ratcliffe,
2005, p. 70). They affect how people interact with each other, which in turn impacts those
people’s next interactions, all the while “compet[ing] with other socializing discourses”
(Ratcliffe, 2005, p. 70). The behavior displayed on /b/ is not limited to 4chan. Their misogynistic
and transphobic discourses infiltrate the larger cultural discourses of society, whether we realize
it or not. And 4chan is not the only, nor is it even the first, anonymous digital space that
exercises such bigoted behavior. Other messageboards like Something Awful or comments
sections on entertainment sites like Ebaumsworld and 9gag are just a few examples of interfaces
that play host to collective identities that behave in a similar fashion to anons on /b/. Likewise,
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many other anonymous spaces like Gaia Online or even anonymous apps like Yik Yak are
known to draw antagonistic trolls. Anonymous and ephemeral spaces and apps tend to devalue
the contemporary mainstream tendency toward political correctness. As such, an exploration of
how these discourses and trolling behaviors function on 4chan also has implications for other
popular digital social media. Digital discourses are powerful and shape digital culture and values.

Methods and Data Presentation

The methods for this chapter consisted primarily of grounded digital participant
observation wherein I watched anons on /b/ interact with each other. Buch and Staller (2014)
explain this kind of research as an exploration of “the cultures and worlds that exist in
cyberspace” in order “to understand social interactions” that happen in these digital places (p.
112, p. 113). This method involves observing research subjects in a community in order to obtain
a detailed sampling of their social lives. Charmaz (2006) explains that this kind of grounded
method allows researchers to remain “open to the setting and the actions and people in it [in
order to] have the opportunity to work from the ground up and to pursue whatever they find to be
of the greatest interest” (p. 21). I visited the site multiple times in April 2015 to perform some
preliminary research and form hypotheses, and then revisited it daily during the month of July
2015. I recorded screencaps from /b/ on seven days—April 29, and July 7, 11, 15, 22, 23, and
30—and spent the rest observing general behaviors and trends while taking notes. To record key
moments, I screencapped the first post in a thread and all following posts. I followed each thread
to the end—in some cases, a few seconds; in others, over half an hour. After collecting all of the
data, I sifted through it to find instances that revealed 4chan’s collective identity, particularly as
it pertains to the treatment of women, transgender people, and other minorities. I encountered
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many instances of denigration against various gender, sexuality, racial, ethnic, and religious
identities, but chose to focus on gender and sexuality for this study because of my background
and personal interests. Next, I selected two representative instances as case studies for analysis:
one involving the derogatory “Tits or GTFO” meme8 that displays how behavior on 4chan
follows the norms of the collective identity, and another displaying a transwoman working both
in and against the collective identity to open a discourse on a topic that traditionally generates a
hostile reaction on 4chan.
When presenting screencaps from the data, I have altered them to maintain the anonymity
of 4chan’s users and preserve its spirit of ephemerality to the best of my ability. Although not
every scholar has done so when presenting data from 4chan (for instance, Knutila’s 2011 study
of anonymity and contingency), most scholars do. In her studies of trolls, Phillips (2015) refrains
from including full posts and instead focuses on the images posted. In his study of behavior
policing on /sp/, 4chan’s sports-themed board, Trammell (2014) presents altered screencaps that
replace post dates, times, and numbers with a series of Xs. He formats a sample post’s
identifying information as “Anonymous [flag icon] 0x/xx/13 (Mon) xx:xx No. xxxxxxxx.”9 I
take his method for data presentation one step further and completely obscure identifying
information using Microsoft Paint. Figure 42 presents an example of a screencap I have altered.
There are a few things to note here. After “Anonymous” is the date and time the thread and

Here and elsewhere in this chapter I use the word “meme” as coined by Richard Dawkins. He defines memes as
cultural artifacts that “propagate themselves… by leaping from brain to brain via a process which, in the broad
sense, can be called imitation” (192). These memes are any idea—including religion, fashion, trends, or jokes—that
spread from person to person. These memes influence behavior, not only on an individual level but also on a group,
or collective, level.
8

9

The flag icon only appears with posts on Politically Incorrect (/pol/). The flags represent from which country the
anons post from, making them the only design feature on 4chan that forces some form of individual identification.
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replies were posted. Because some users and websites maintain personal and public archives of
select 4chan posts, I conceal the post date (here, in blue). For the same reason, I also mask the
post numbers and direct-responses (here, in gray and black, respectively). I also color-code the
original poster’s (OP) post number and direct responses to it so conversations cannot be tracked
(here, in orange). Such methods ensure that, like Trammell (2014), I “maintain, and even slightly
exceed, the level of anonymity” characteristic of 4chan.

Figure 42. Example of altered screenshots from 4chan

As I write about 4chan and /b/, using pejorative terms and offensive language is
unavoidable. Echoing Phillips’ (2015) sentiment that “it would not be possible to write a PGrated history of trolling” (p. 3), I recognize that it would similarly be impossible to write about
4chan’s design and identity without quoting some of their hostile, often NSFW language. Like
Phillips (2015) and Ryan Milner (2013a), I also recognize that such recapitulation of derogatory
language, with its racist, sexist, homophobic, and ableist leanings, is potentially harmful—even
in the service of critical analysis—because it “may continue to normalize their antagonisms and
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marginalizations” (Milner, 2013a). Similarly, Judith Butler (1997) discusses how, regardless of
the intent of a speaker, hate speech holds power to wound no matter the context; she quotes Toni
Morrison: “Oppressive language… does more than represent violence; it is violence” (p. 6).
Butler (1997) argues that when we speak hate speech it rarely originates with us but is instead
part of a larger citational history of that hate speech: “responsibility is thus linked with speech as
repetition” (p. 39). With this in mind, I attempt to limit my replication of such language to only
when it is essential to discussions about the construction and performance of collective identity
on 4chan and /b/. However, there are some instances when employing this language is
unavoidable, regardless of its purpose.
4chan’s Design, Ethos, and Collective Identity
/b/’s collective identity is a product of identification and constitutive rhetoric. Kenneth
Burke (1973a, 1973b) argues that identification is how the self “becomes part of the collective
texture” (1973b, p. 265) and a method for “placing oneself in groups and movements” (1973a,
227). Stephanie Vie (2014) agrees, explaining, “Through the process of identification,
individuals become closer and align in groups with common interests.” Ratcliffe (2005) also
explains that identification is informed by how humans interact with “themselves and the world
in ways that form their identities” (p. 50) and that “identity is continually informed by, but not
totally determined by, each new identification” (p. 57). Through identification, users subsume
their individual identities into the collective identity of which they wish to be a part.
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However, when Burke (1973a, 1973b), Vie (2014), and Ratcliffe (2005) talk about
identification, they are largely referring to humans identifying with humans.10 In many digital
spaces, particularly social media, I have found that users do not identify only with each other
when creating a collective identity. Instead they also identify, as a collective, with the interface’s
design and ethos. Warnick and Heineman (2012) urge rhetoricians to “consider how users’
identity as social media users is determined in specific ways by the ‘text’—a social-networking
technology or Web site—that enables and constrains the ways in which they think of their
identity” (p. 104). An interface’s design and ethos, as well as the collective identity it houses, are
powerful identifiers. /b/’s interface enforces anonymity and ephemerality and provides little to
no moderation, all of which draw certain users and affect how they interact. Likewise, 4chan’s
ethos of lawlessness and unaccountability functions as both a product and regulator of
interactions on the site. Together, anonymity, ephemerality, and unaccountability reinforce each
other and create a collective identity, a recursively constructed product of design and ethos that
both controls and is controlled by the threads and posts.
/b’s Interface
Although 4chan’s public notoriety ranges from fun meme factory (Stryker, 2011) to the
“Internet Hate Machine” (2014), its actual interface is nothing more glamorous than a simple
imageboard. Bernstein et al. (2011) explain that “4chan’s aesthetic is simple, though it can
appear confusing and cluttered: Wall Street Journal describes it as ‘archaic […] a quaint
throwback to the earliest webpages’” (p. 3). 4chan’s old-school design replicates earlier Internet

10

Largely, but not totally. For instance, Burke has also criticized atomic scientists for refusing identification with
the results of the technology they develop.
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websites and their values. Its boards are reminiscent of John Barlow’s (1996) claims in “A
Declaration of the Independence of Cyberspace,” a mid-90s document that seeks to explain why
cyberspace cannot be governed and needs to remain open and free for all users. In particular,
4chan purports to be “a world where anyone, anywhere may express his or her beliefs, no matter
how singular, without fear of being coerced into silence or conformity” (Barlow, 1996). It is a
pre-Facebook social media site that epitomizes the philosophy behind The New Yorker’s famous
“On the Internet, nobody knows you’re a dog” cartoon (Figure 43). 4chan presents itself as a
lawless, borderless, utopian interface where anything is possible and a user can create a whole
new identity whenever s/he wants to.

Figure 43. “On the Internet,
nobody knows you’re a dog”

4chan’s design is, above all else, simplistic. Knutila (2011) explains that “4chan has three
possible actions: start a thread by posting an image; respond to a post with text or an image; and,
lastly to lurk just by reading text/posts.” Since Poole transferred the original code a dozen years
ago, he has performed few updates to it; the interface appears similarly now to how it did when it
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was first launched.11 One reason Poole may have refrained from updating the site’s code is
because he’s just not very good at coding: “I don’t count programming as one of my talents” (as
quoted in Larson, 2013). He explains that he taught himself how to code when he began working
on 4chan and oversaw all aspects of the site’s design, but he does not consider himself a coder.
Poole also admits that he was drawn to 4chan’s site design because the “image-based discussion
format was just new and interesting to [him]” (as quoted in Larson, 2013).
However, regardless of Poole’s skill or intentions, 4chan’s key design elements—
anonymity, ephemerality, and low moderation—help develop /b/’s ethos, and both the design
and ethos lead to /b’s collective identity. James J. Brown, Jr. (2015) and Cynthia Selfe and
Richard Selfe (1994) remind us that software, and by extension digital interfaces, are not neutral.
Brown (2015) explores how ethical programs, or “a set of steps taken to address an ethical
predicament” in the networked world, contribute to how users engage with interfaces. He points
to websites like Reddit that use an ethical program to enforce “rules, creating (or preventing)
certain kinds of relations between users and systems” (Brown, 2015). These programs dictate
how Redditors engage with the interface—through posting, commenting, upvoting or
downvoting, or any other action they can perform—while also controlling how Redditors interact
with each other through their profiles.
However, programs are not always intentionally developed to account for ethical
implications as part of their response to users. Brown (2015) explains that the “steps [taken by an
ethical program] are not necessarily arrived at rationally, and they are not always the result of
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This may soon change. Poole resigned from his position in January 2015 and handed 4chan to Hiroyuki
Nishimura (creator of 2chan, from which Poole adapted 4chan’s original code) in September 2015. Poole has no
intention of working with 4chan any longer, and Nishimura has already made a few minor changes, such as adding a
new board (/his/, or history and humanities) and reformatting how the “News” segment appears on 4chan.
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deliberation.” Humans design interfaces, so the actions users perform there become a reflection
of the designer’s values. In the case of 4chan, Poole has designed the interface to prevent or
allow certain actions while also triggering new actions based on previous ones. For instance, /b/
prevents anons from creating individual profiles that can connect with others (à la Facebook or
Twitter), but it allows anons to start new threads or post comments on existing ones. And when
anons create these posts, a dialog box pops up that requires them to click a button before posting
that says “I am not a robot” to prevent spam.
Brown’s (2015) research also points to the importance of design in identity construction
on digital social media. He explains that “software is both tool and interlocutor”; it not only
performs basic functions, but it is also part of a rhetorical dialogue or “argument about the best
way to keep the network… secure.” As a tool and an interlocutor, these ethical programs are an
aspect of design that both enable and constrain certain actions on the interface, determining what
kinds of identities are able to form there. Just as “networks are not free of hierarchies” (Brown,
2015), neither are digital interfaces. In the case of 4chan, the anonymous and ephemeral design
coupled with low moderation creates 4chan’s ethos of lawlessness. In turn, the design and ethos
offer anons the opportunity to post alienating and often shocking content that reflects a racist,
misogynistic, transphobic, and homophobic social hierarchy in which it appears to operate,
leading to a collective identity that centers on performances of an anti-politically-correct (antiPC) white heteronormative masculinity that excludes all other identity markers.

Anonymity, Ephemerality, and Moderation on /b/
Anonymity and ephemerality set 4chan’s interface apart from more widely-known digital
social media, such as Facebook or Reddit, that both require at least a pseudonym if not a full
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name and archive all of a user’s activity. 4chan does not support user registration, and /b/
requires users to post anonymously. At one point, users could choose pseudonyms for their posts,
but, because there is no central registration, they were not guaranteed to own it in the way users
own their unique Twitter handles. However, Poole ended this practice in February 2012 (Phillips,
2015, p. 146); every post since then has been credited to “Anonymous.” Bernstein et al. (2011)
claim that 4chan is “fully anonymous by default” (p. 1), but this is not technically true:
moderators can gain access to a user’s IP address, which has resulted in anons being banned—
both for short periods of time and for life (perma-banned)—usually for posting illegal content,
although such instances are rare.12 As Bernstein et al. (2011) point out, “posts on /b/ are
disconnected from any identity” (p. 3). Anons have no access to each other’s individual identity,
and it is technically against 4chan’s rules for users to reveal this information in a post (“Rules,”
2015).13 Bernstein et al. (2011) point out the negative and positive ways anonymity manifests on
/b/. On the one hand this collectivity can result in “de-individuation and mob behavior” as well
as socially offensive actions, but on the other hand conversations may be more “intimate and
open” while giving anons a place to fail socially with no consequences (Bernstein et al, 2011, p.
6). Certainly, both are possible on /b/.
Threads are also short-lived. Every board contains 10 pages with a limit of 15 threads on
each page, for a maximum of 150 active threads at a time. As a thread gains a new comment, it is
bumped to the first spot on the first page; after a thread makes it past the last spot on the tenth
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4chan has procedures for users who post illegal content. For example, child pornography sometimes appears on
the board. If a moderator is present and able to respond to it, s/he will send the IP address to the authorities and
report the instance to the National Center for Missing & Exploited Children’s CyberTipline.
13

Depending on the context, throwaway email addresses or usernames to other semi-anonymous social media are
acceptable, as is the occasional selfie (in R8 threads, for instance), but such instances are rare.
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page, it disappears from the site. Often, users archive threads by screencapping them so they can
keep a record of their favorites. It is not uncommon to find these screencaps on file sharing sites
like Imgur or other boards like the 4chan subreddit. Some sites like archive.moe14 preserve
noteworthy threads publicly, but some users prefer to keep their archives private or to only share
them on 4chan. Because /b/ is the busiest board on the site, its content turnover is huge and fast:
of the over 5 million posts they observed during their two-week study, Bernstein et al. (2011)
found that “the median life of a thread is just 3.9 minutes” (p. 4). The longest-lived thread I
witnessed while studying /b/ was 85 minutes, barely a blink of an eye when compared with
Facebook’s archiving capabilities. Bernstein et al (2011) think this ephemerality results in higher
rates of participation on /b/: users must engage with posts they like to keep them active (p. 6).
Because of this anonymity and ephemerality, individual users are unable to form specific,
lasting bonds with other individual users, develop a stable individual identity, or access previous
content. In particular, these design features create an anarchic culture that produces a wide range
of content. Anons can, and do, post offensive or derogatory content—particularly aimed toward
women and other marginalized identities. They can get away with this behavior because no one
knows who they are in real life and any potentially incriminating content vanishes so quickly.
Much of the content posted to /b/ is considered NSFW, and many anons even joke that some of it
is NSFL (not-safe-for-life). Indeed, much of the content on 4chan trends towards violence, gore,
and/or pornography. Stryker (2011) points out, “there’s a common joke on /b/, where someone
will find a photo of a crowd of people with faces contorted in horror, except for one guy who
bears a condescending smirk. ‘Spot the 4chan user,’ says the caption” (p. 68). But not everything

Although the main site is no longer operating, archive.moe’s more than 10 terabytes of stored 4chan content is has
purportedly been moved to https://archive.moe/dump/, although the site does not appear to be live.
14
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on /b/ is so shocking. /b/ offers a hodgepodge of content that ranges from innocent to criminal.
On the whole, this can make /b/ a dizzying experience, often not for the faint of heart. Some
common thread topics include
YLYL (you laugh you lose): users post their most hilarious content.
Rolls: users ask others to “roll,” or post, to try to attain a certain numerical
sequence as part of their post number. The OP usually has an objective to reach
(such as using the winning post as a text message to a friend).
R8: users post pictures—usually of themselves or their genitalia—requesting
others to rate them on a scale of 1-10.
Greentext: users post stories using a specific feature that turns the text green.
These stories typically follow a formulaic structure.
Cringe: users post photos of cringeworthy moments, typically showing someone
doing something socially awkward.
Porn: 4chan loves its pornography, particularly if it involves violence or BDSM.
Rekt: users post violence and gore, generally involving someone being beaten
and/or killed.
This is a limited list of the kinds of common topics posted to /b/, but it serves to show the wide
range of content anons use to begin conversations on 4chan. Much of this content would be
considered unacceptable in other digital social media that identifies users and archives their posts
because it would have implications for their real-world identity.
Because they contribute to a space “where nearly anything the human mind is capable of
conceiving is on display, for better or for worse” (Stryker, 2011, p. 11), not only does /b/’s
design enable this wide variety of content, but so too does its lax moderation and rules. On /b/,
there are two rules: 1) “ZOMG NONE!!!1 [sic],” and 2) 11 of 4chan’s 17 global rules (“Rules,”
2015). These supposedly enforced global rules explain that users should not post illegal content,
personal information (including avatars or signatures), ads or spamming, or topics that explicitly
belong on other boards. In addition, anons must be over the age of 18 and they must not abuse
the reporting system, evade their bans (doing so will result in a perma-ban), or impersonate
moderators. Most anons follow some of these rules, in part because they are so easy to follow;
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not much is off-limits to them. For instance, many are on 4chan because of the anonymous and
ephemeral design, so they easily refrain from posting personal information.
However, 4chan in general and /b/ in particular also have low moderation so it is easy for
anons to get away with posting rule-breaking content. 4chan uses two kinds of human
maintenance: moderators (mods) and janitors. Mods perform higher-level maintenance, such as
“delet[ing] posts globally, ban[ning] users,” and so on (“FAQ,” 2015). Janitors perform lowerlevel maintenance; they “are given access to the report system and may delete posts on their
assigned board(s), as well as submit ban requests” (“FAQ,” 2015). Importantly, moderators and
janitors are instructed to keep their positions hidden; revealing them to other anons on the board
can result in immediate termination (Phillips, 2015, p. 52). Not only are both employed on a
voluntary basis, but there are only a few of them. This means that a lot of rule-breaking content
slips through the cracks, especially on a busy board like /b/. There simply are not enough people
to watch every thread at every moment and, given the quick turnaround time for most threads, a
lot of rule-breaking content disappears before users have a chance to report it or mods and
janitors have a chance to catch it. Nevertheless, despite the general laxity in moderation, most
anons self-police and adhere to the rules. Those who do not are often ridiculed or ignored.
4chan’s anonymous and ephemeral design, coupled with its lax moderation, also have the
potential to create a space that can display the best and worst of the Internet. Indeed, 4chan is
home to both, often simultaneously. Within an hour, I witnessed two popular threads on opposite
ends of the 4chan spectrum, one displaying anons as kind and compassionate and the other as
bigoted and hateful. The first thread was started by a man who thanked his fellow anons for
helping him out of a bad financial situation (Figure 44). The night before, he vented on /b/ that,
because he and his girlfriend had recently broken up and she moved out, he was not going to be
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able to pay the rent that was due the next day and would likely be evicted from his home. He was
considering selling furniture to make his rent payment, but other anons sent him money through
Paypal. At the same time, another anon started a rekt thread with a webm15 of a large man
brutally beating a transwoman. Later in the comments, s/he clarifies that s/he wants to see “some
hate crime webms.” Taken together these opposing instances accurately illustrate what a typical
visit to /b/ is like. One the one hand, the users can be supportive of and caring toward each other.
On the other hand, anons can post truly disturbing content. Sometimes they even manage to do
both in the same thread.

Figure 44. 4chan thread asking for help from fellow anons

/b/’s Ethos of Lawlessness and Unaccountability

Although both extremes of the content spectrum are possible on 4chan, anons often tend
toward hostility, much of which stems from the ethos of lawlessness and unaccountability that is
built into /b/’s design. In “A Rape in Cyberspace,” an article from the mid-90s that examines the
repercussions of an incident in which a MOO16 avatar forced other avatars to perform illicit acts
15

A webm is a video file format that can be embedded easily on sites like 4chan. Starting in 2014, 4chan has
enabled webm embedding of video clips up to five minutes long (four megabytes). Only two boards support audio in
webms, but neither are /b/.
The M in MOO stands for “MUD” (Multi-User Dimension/Domain/Dungeon); the OO stands for “objectoriented.”
16
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against their will, Dibbell (1998) theorizes something similar. He explains that when newcomers
joined the MOO as anonymous users without a set identity, they often transgressed social norms.
However, those users who decided to become more permanent fixtures in the MOO realized that
the room was not a playground and that, just like in the real world, there were social norms that
must be followed.
[T]here were few MOOers who had not, upon their first visits as anonymous
“guest” characters, mistaken the place for a vast playpen in which they might act
out their wildest fantasies without fear of censure. Only with time and the
acquisition of a fixed character do players tend to make the critical passage from
anonymity to pseudonymity, developing the concern for their character’s
reputation that marks the attainment of virtual adulthood. (Dibbell, 1998)
Dibbell’s MOOers matured from virtual children to virtual adults because the ethos of the MOO
called for it. Long-time users were able to create and maintain an identity that may or may not
reflect their real-life one, but they were also expected to adhere to social constraints similar to
those in the real world.
4chan has developed a few social norms and regulations, but its design and ethos do not
encourage the same kind of maturity. In fact, /b/ appears to be stuck in the sort of childhood that
Dibbell (1998) describes, particularly because /b/ does not provide an option to progress from
anonymous to pseudonymous. Poole has also recognized that his site is unique from other social
media that forces users to assume responsibility for their actions: “online you have all these
social networks that are moving to a state of persistent identity, and in turn, we’re sacrificing the
ability to be youthful” (as quoted in Bilton, 2010). This sentiment echoes Jasmine Garsd’s (2015)
view that memes immortalize young people’s moments of failure and that their publication
makes their failure permanent and unescapable. Poole (2010, 2013, 2014) argues that because
sites like Facebook, Twitter, and Instagram archive users’ activities, even ones that show them
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“failing”—be it a joke that didn’t land, a selfie that didn’t turn out right, a socially objectionable
action, or even an old post resurfacing years later—users are forced into a virtual adulthood
where they may be wary of experimenting with the content they post.
However, /b/’s ethos relies on different values than do these social media sites where
users are identifiable. Its lawlessness and unaccountability remove the fear of failure. If someone
posts something that does not fit the collective identity, other anons may ridicule them briefly,
but that post will quickly disappear and be forgotten; moreover, no one will be able to link that
failing post to any kind of individual identity. /b/’s anonymity and ephemerality also encourage
anons to experiment with content and create new things, mostly memes. Poole sees 4chan’s
design and ethos as a kind of deliberate forgetfulness that allows anons to fail without
retribution. There is no “virtual adulthood” for /b/ as Dibbell (1998) conceives it. Instead, /b/’s
design and ethos create a collective identity that revels in the “vast playpen,” calling for anons to
engage in a subversive play that destabilizes the dominant social order.
/b/’s Collective Identity and Bakhtin’s Carnival
Even though 4chan is known for its antagonism and hostility, over one million17 anons
call it home each day (moot, 2015). Because /b/ enforces anonymity and ephemerality, users are
unable to maintain individual subject positions while participating on the board. Instead, they
incorporate their individual behaviors into a larger collective identity that maintains a dauntingly
large and varied subject position that, despite its many and almost innumerable facets, remains
relatively stable. Gabriella Coleman (2014) explains, “this subsumption of the individual identity

This figure represents the average number of daily visitors to all of 4chan’s boards as of January 26, 2015, not for
/b/ specifically.
17
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into collective identity is unusual in Western culture” (p. 46). According to Burke (1950) sees
this subsumption as a natural product of identification. However, although he expects
identification to lead to some kind of collectivity, Burke could not have imagined it happening
on such a large scale as it does on /b/. Because 4chan does not hold a central registration, pinning
down a collective identity on any of its boards is difficult; this issue is compounded on /b/
because of its fast pace and loose standards. /b/ rarely explicitly defines itself or its users as a
totality. However, its constitutive rhetoric reveals some key identity markers.
Maurice Charland (1987) explains that constitutive rhetoric is “the constitution of the
subject, where the subject is precisely he or she who simultaneously speaks and initiates action in
discourse… and in the world” (p. 133). As users identify with the design and ethos of /b/, their
language and behavior makes up, or constitutes, their social identity. Charland (1987) explains
that we must recognize that one’s subject position is rhetorical: it is both a product of rhetorical
discourse and able to enact it. The subject position of an anon is both an effect of discourse on
the board and a subject that holds the rhetorical power to dictate discourse. The collective
identity, formed through millions of users’ posts and threads, dictates what kind of content is
accepted and what responses are appropriate in certain situations. Rather than challenge /b/’s
norms and risk becoming objects of ridicule and trolling, anons usually opt to acquiesce to them.
At the same time that the collective identity appears to strip rhetorical power from individual
anons, it paradoxically also relies on them to exercise rhetorical power by enforcing and
reinforcing behaviors that fit with the collective identity. Identity formation on 4chan becomes
part of a recursive process where the individual identity submits to the collective identity while
the collective is informed by the individual actions of its users. Anons ridicule and troll those
who stray from /b/’s norms, but even these actions illustrate a subsumption into the collective
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identity. An analysis of some of the most frequent kinds of posts reveals that /b/’s collective
identity sees itself as an outsider from the mainstream; anons engage in performances of anti-PC
white, heteronormative masculinity that paradoxically pervert and subvert what it means to be
“white,” “heteronormative,” and “masculine” while also denigrating other outsider identities.
Many anons refer to themselves as “betas” while setting themselves apart from “alphas.”
An alpha is a person who fits the stereotype of the most perfect form of masculinity: he is
popular, fit, good-looking, and always has a beautiful girlfriend. An alpha gets everything he
wants—especially but not always limited to sexual desires—while the betas are left bitter and
downtrodden at their failed efforts to draw the attention of women.18 A classic alpha/beta
scenario involves an anon who is attracted to a platonic female friend (in some situations he
befriends her first then realizes he desires her, in others he befriends her just so he can find a way
to prove himself worthy of her; in all situations the beta relies on the female friend to initiate an
intimate relationship), but just before he can make his true feelings known he is usurped by an
alpha who sweeps her off her feet and leaves the beta in the “friendzone.”19 Such a construction
depicts anons as outsiders, or people who fall lower on the social hierarchy than the alphas.20
However, while this identity performance appears to be one of the most widespread on /b/, it is
not the only one. Plenty of anons on /b/ refer to themselves as alphas, and in some threads such
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Betas often refer to themselves as a male, but not always. Some female anons refer to themselves as betas, but the
sentiment behind the term remains the same: a girl who does not fit in with the popular crowd and cannot attract a
good-looking man as a mate.
In popular culture, the term “friendzone” is usually used when one platonic partner (usually a male) has sexual
inclinations for the other (usually a woman), but the other does not share the same affections. The term is
problematic because it suggests that the friendzoned person is somehow entitled to a sexual relationship and that
his/her position is unjust. In reality, the term unfairly puts the responsibility of one person’s rejection on the other.
19

20

Sometimes also referred to as Chads (for males) and Stacies (for women).
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distinction is unnecessary and other identity factors arise. One thing all of these identity
constructions share is some notion that anons are social outcasts. The identifying factors behind
this outsider status surface in a number of ways in the most frequent kinds of posts.
First, /b/ often defines itself negatively against other popular digital social media sites,
most frequently Tumblr, a blogging interface known for its inclusive community and support for
feminist, LGBTQ+, and other social justice issues as well as engagement with popular geek
fandoms. /b/ situates itself antithetically to it. In 2012, Tumblr and /b/ took turns raiding each
other’s sites—the former with Harry Potter images and other cutesy memes, the latter with gore
and pornography. The two communities have been at odds since, with 4chan deliberately
speaking out against anything Tumblr favors in a playfully antagonistic manner. For instance,
certain Tumblr users are cautious when discussing controversial issues and often give trigger
warnings: a user on Tumblr may alert potential readers that his/her post contains triggering
content for survivors of trauma. 4chan does not believe in triggers or trigger warnings, so they
make fun of this practice by trolling each other with memes making false declarations of having
been triggered. If a user posts gore to a thread on /b/, other users will playfully antagonize
Tumblr users—regardless if any are there to see it—by posting something like the meme
depicted in Figure 45. The woman pictured in this meme is Melody Hensley, who claims that she
suffers PTSD from content she read on Tumblr (Malm, 2014). Whether or not her testimony
from Daily Mail, a British tabloid, can be trusted, /b/ has appropriated and remixed her photo
into an image macro meme. The joke is that the anon who posts the meme has not been
“triggered”; s/he is not reliving a past trauma as a result of the gore content. The notions behind
these memes is that those dealing with trauma or who are sensitive to others’ trauma are weak
and worthy of ridicule. This is only one example of how /b/ takes an issue that some may
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consider serious and trivializes it through their playful subversions. Anons reinforce their
outsider status by alienating and distancing themselves from other popular social media sites.

Figure 45. Triggered meme

Such practices also reveal some key outsider aspects of /b/’s collective identity: it is
based in performances of anti-PC sentiment that manifests as misogynistic, racist, homophobic,
transphobic, and ableist behaviors. Such behavior is especially apparent in the derogatory terms
anons commonly use. In the span of one thread, pejorative terms like “faggot” or “nigger” can be
used as insults, flattery, or self-identification. Anons append the word “fag” to the ends of certain
words—for example, a “newfag” is a new anon and an “oldfag” is a seasoned veteran of 4chan—
and call anyone “nigger” regardless of race.21 Phillips (2012a) explains that these terms are
“what anons describe themselves as and as what anons distance themselves from.” Anons use
these and many other socially objectionable terms liberally and carelessly, engaging in a
wordplay that disregards the social norms that distinguish them as reprehensible. The terms can

21

Another term, “autist,” is used solely to insult another anon, usually for breaking from the collective identity.
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come to signify so many possible things in the course of one thread that it can be difficult to keep
track of what each means in a single instance. To a seasoned anon, these words are plastic; they
mean what they need to mean in the context of the conversation.22 To a non-anon, such language
is shocking, offensive, and potentially confusing. Coleman (2014) speculates that anons
intentionally use this kind of language, creating “a discursively constructed border fence meant
to keep the uninitiated” out of the discourse community (p. 42). Whether anons do it
intentionally or not, they use their offensive language as a tool to build a boundary between
themselves and non-anons; they work diligently to perpetuate their outsider status.
Poole defends these bigoted practices on 4chan. He argues that the freedom anonymity
and ephemerality provide is rare but important because they create a space where users can be
“wrong”; they can engage in a cathartic experience by posting things that are culturally or
socially objectionable without it impacting their real lives. Poole explains, “I get a lot of email
messages from people who say thanks for giving them a place to vent, an outlet to say what they
can’t say in real life with friends and work colleagues—things that they know are wrong but they
still want to say” (as quoted in Bilton, 2010). danah boyd’s (2014) study of teenagers’ uses of
digital social media supports Poole’s claims: “more often than not, teens talked about wanting to
have a space where they weren’t constantly scrutinized by adults and peers” and were able to
speak free from consequences (p. 43). Even journalists see the value of this digital anonymity
and ephemerality: “the frequency of offensive language and slurs… would seem to suggest users
just crave a place to shake off any and all social rules” (Dewey, 2014). From this perspective,

Interestingly, although anons liberally call themselves “fags” and “niggers” the tone changes depending on whom
they are describing. When they call themselves by these terms, it is rarely offensive; however, when they call others,
particularly those who identify outside of the term anon, by these terms it is meant as an insult.
22
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4chan appears to serve as a digital equivalent to Bakhtin’s (2009) carnival, a moment when the
line between individual and collective is erased and the collective engages in cathartic play and
consequence-free social transgression. Like the carnival, /b/ seems to be an opportunity for free
expression. But the behaviors on 4chan are not quite so innocent or simple. In Bakhtin’s (2009)
conception of the carnival, lower social orders subvert the dominant. Given /b/’s construction of
themselves as outsiders to mainstream society such a distinction appears fitting.
However, /b/’s usership does not appear to denote an oppressed minority. Phillips (2015)
determines a “number of basic demographic indicators” of 4chan trolls (p. 53), which comprise a
large subset of anons: 1) posts are written in English and engage with American culture; 2) users
need free time, money, and access to technology, which indicates some level of economic
privilege; and 3) based on “the proliferation of 1980s and early 1990s pop culture references,”
users are probably members of Generation Y (Phillips, 2015, p. 53-4). This assessment is backed
by 4chan’s own demographic data: their “Advertise” page estimates that around 70% of its users
are men, 47% are from the United States, and the largest age range is from 18-34 (“Advertise,”
2015).23 These demographic indicators show that the average anon is likely a young, middleclass, American man. Further, the term “anon” is steeped in assumptions of whiteness,
heteronormativity, and masculinity. “Anon” is the default moniker for anyone on 4chan, but
“femanon” demarcates woman-identifying anons. In addition, there is no distinction for other
sexualities,24 genders, races, or ethnicities. Instead, these identity markers are only identified by
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However, there are two things to note here: these statistics apply to all of 4chan, not just /b/, and it is not clear
how recent this information is, nor how 4chan performed these analytics in the absence of a central user database.
Although I will later use the term “transanon” to denote an anon who self-identifies as transgender, /b/ does not
use this word because they do not consider transpeople as part of their collective identity.
24
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derogatory terms such as “sand-nigger” (Muslims in particular, but anyone from the Middle East
generally fits into this category), “chink” (Asians), “Injun” (Native Americans), and “tranny”
(transpeople), to name only a very few. Many of these terms are common slang, and some have
fallen out of standard practice in mainstream society—occasionally “negro” appears—but /b/
uses them frequently. A broad umbrella term anons use for anyone who identifies as anything
other than white, heteronormative, or male is “degenerate”; they call the content these
“degenerates” post or the ideas they have “cancer.” The sentiment behind these two terms is that
anyone who does not fit some kind of white, heteronormative, masculine norm is an other—
sometimes even a “subhuman” (another anon favorite)—and the beliefs they hold are a disease
that corrupts and kills.
These constitutive terms and others show that anything other than identification with
some kind of anti-PC white masculinity results in exclusion from the term “anon.” Notably, the
ideals behind this performance do not reflect current, mainstream ideals of a white
heteronormative masculine identity. Instead, they fall somewhere between a kind of retro 1950s
ideology and the Nazism of World War II. Some anons make remarks such as “all women
belong in the kitchen” or “all black people belong on the back of the bus” that reflect the racism
and sexism of mid-twentieth-century America, and some use propagandistic language that often
just comes short of calling for the genocide of all non-Aryan races and queer sexualities. Perhaps
it goes without saying that, because many of his views align with this version of American
masculinity, Donald Trump’s 2016 presidential campaign appears to resonate quite strongly with
some anons. Through this language and these terms, anons appear to perform an extreme, toxic
form of this this anti-PC white heteronormative masculinity.
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On the one hand anons talk about themselves as betas who have been cast out by the
alphas, and on the other hand, their language and terms purposefully alienate others through a
denial of any identity that doesn’t fit an anti-PC white heteronormative masculinity. This
contradiction is demonstrated in the above examples of an anon who couldn’t make rent and an
anon who requested hate crime webms and gifs. The first displays characteristics that correspond
to /b/’s demographic identity—young, white, heteronormative, and male—while also matching
the beta mentality—down-on-his-luck and rejected by a woman. As such, other anons were keen
to help him. Had he described himself as a marginalized identity (non-white, queer-identifying,
or woman), they would have been much less likely to help him. Simultaneously, the second anon
asks of others, “Got any similar webms where gays/traps, jews, niggers or any other subhuman
scum gets rekt?” This statement positioned him/her as a typical anon while simultaneously
asserting his/her distance from so-called “subhumans” who do not fit this criterion. Such
seemingly contradictory identities are common on /b/, but they appear to serve a distinct purpose.
Both of these identity constructions are performances that allow them to subvert
dominant hierarchies in two ways. First, they shake off their beta-status through an identity
performance that situates them above all races, genders, and sexualities. They perform a
perverted version of white heteronormative masculinity that allows them to feel as though they
have gone from the bottom of the pecking order to the top. Then, once anons reach the top of the
social hierarchy, they use their newfound identity prowess to continue subverting mainstream
ideologies from a heightened position on the hierarchy. They use their constructed position of
authority to disrupt the mainstream and ostracize other outsiders. As a result, with the current
mainstream popularity of feminism and queer-positive social movements, 4chan sees those
modes as the dominant social order—a kind of authority—that must be toppled. Anons have
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taken it upon themselves to subvert and parody these social justice movements in a carnivalesque
manner with the goal of stripping them of authoritative power.
However, it is important to stress that all of this subversive power play on /b/ is just that:
play. This is illustrated in content like “The Internet is Serious Business” meme25 (“The
Internet,” 2010). This meme is a sarcastic comment aimed at people who take too seriously the
things they see or read online. It often juxtaposes a seriously dressed business person with the
caption declaring the seriousness of the Internet, or, in the case of Figure 46, it includes
something humorous to emphasize just how not-serious the Internet is. Such image macro
memes appear often in threads on /b/ that attempt to discuss a serious topic, particularly if one
anon is or acts offended by a post’s content. This meme is also convenient because if someone
accuses /b/ of being sexist, homophobic, or any other –ist or –phobic, they can use their playful
nature as a defense, claiming that they were just joking.

Figure 46. Serious Business
meme

25

Here and in the next paragraph, when I use “meme” I am referring to Internet memes such as image macros.
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The sentiments behind “The internet is serious business” carry over into many different
aspects of /b/’s behavior. One example of subversive play is anons’ aforementioned proclivity to
use memes to discount trigger warnings. Because these trigger warnings are backed by
movements and communities against which /b/ defines itself, and because they defy the cultural
norms on which /b/ is based, anons actively work to belittle these inclusive efforts. One common
way anons do this is by adding the word “muh”—meant to sound as if someone is
simultaneously saying “my” and sobbing like a child—before a word or two that represents what
they are making fun of. In the case of trigger warnings, it’s “muh triggers.” When added to an
image and made into a meme, such phrases become a playful derision meant to denigrate trigger
warnings and those who use them while also subverting dominant social norms (Figure 47).
Through this meme and other playful subversions like it, anons simultaneously grasp social
power by performing a perverted version of the alpha while also using their constructed alpha
stance to flip power dynamics. Instead of giving mainstream movements authority, they give
power to the anti-PC version of masculinity. Often it seems as though anons undermine
movements like the one calling for trigger warnings for no other reason than because they have
achieved mainstream popularity and some kind of social authority.

Figure 47. Muh Triggers meme
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As a carnivalesque reversal of a dominant social hierarchy, the subversion /b/’s collective
identity enacts has the potential for two possible outcomes: either /b/’s collective identity calls
attention to and critiques its dominant discourses and values or it reinforces them. Phillips argues
the former: she believes that the behaviors on /b/ take anti-PC ideals to a hostile extreme in order
to criticize them. However, when considering the effects of these playfully subversive behaviors
on /b/, it is important to consider how they are perceived. Many visitors—and likely even some
participating anons—do not see the performance aspect. They do not understand the irony behind
/b/’s behavior and instead assume that their behavior is a reflection of reality or an extension of
these anonymous people’s real-world identities. In light of the free-flowing racist and sexist slurs
on/b/ and their tendency to mock anyone who does not fit the retro-1950s/Nazi white
heteronormative masculine ideal, /b/’s behavior becomes problematic because anons base their
collective identity in often hostilely othering and marginalizing anyone who does not fit into a
young, white, heteronormative male identity. As such, rather than subverting the dominant social
order through their subversive play, as is the goal of Bakhtin’s (2009) carnival, /b/’s collective
identity instead reinforces it.
Gender and /b/’s Collective Identity

Behavior on 4chan also largely appears to be a recapitulation of how other anons have
historically behaved; anons copy or mimic what they think is the appropriate way to act on /b/.
When journalists or other popular media essayists write and talk about 4chan, they tend to center
on its negative qualities. New users who visit the board are generally influenced by stories of
4chan’s destructive language and disruptive meming. Before they even visit /b/ for the first time,
most users form an idea of how they are supposed to act based on what they already know about
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4chan. This idea is reinforced once they visit the board and witness the collective identity in
action. Michael Leff (2003) explains that individuals commonly submit to “tradition” when
joining a new community: “Inclusion within a tradition shapes the individual self” (p. 140). Part
of why anons behave the way they do is because they are expected to do so, thus subsuming their
individual identity into the collective identity. Anons establish new identifications with an
unchanging design and ethos and what they think 4chan is supposed to be more so than with
each other. Because collective identities “only exist through an ideological discourse that
constitutes them” (Charland, 1987, p. 139), and because users maintain 4chan’s ideology through
its design, ethos, and collective identity, /b/ has entered an identity stasis. The collective identity
is essentially stuck in a feedback loop of its own identity-constructing content; any changes are
small and take a long time to manifest. Thus, the same tired narratives appear uncritically over
and over again in thread after thread after thread.
I will use two examples to illustrate how /b/’s static collective identity performance
excludes and others marginalized identities. In the first example, I look at the demeaning “Tits or
GTFO” phenomenon (shorthand for “show your tits or get the fuck out”) and how anons’
responses to a self-identifying woman’s thread reveal the automatic and uncritical nature of their
behavior and collective identity. In the second, I examine a moment when a self-identifying
transgender woman uses constitutive rhetoric to defend her decision to transition. This discussion
ruptures the collective identity and exposes its performative nature. Both instances are
noteworthy—because anons are assumed male unless otherwise noted—the femanon and
transanon must each assert individual identities that are not part of the collective identity; one
decides to follow the standard behavior of the board, and the other chooses to challenge it. These
two instances are also significant because they come from threads grounded in sex and
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pornography: the femanon who started the Tits or GTFO thread asked for pornography
recommendations, and the thread to which the transanon responded was dedicated to a trans
pornstar who had recently overdosed. This sexualization of women is not uncommon on /b/. As
one might assume given the nature of /b/’s collective identity performance, anons generally treat
women as sexual objects over which males (particularly those on /b/) hold power, reinforcing
tired social hierarchies that place men above women.

Tits or GTFO and Memetic Behavior

In many Internet chat forums, including but not limited to 4chan, oftentimes when a
woman self-identifies, users command her to “Tits or GTFO.” Know Your Meme has traced this
meme’s origins back to 2006. Not only is it Rule 31 of 4chan’s “Rules of the Internet”26 (2015)
but it also stems from the implications of three other rules: Rule 30—the tired assumption that
“there are no girls on the Internet”—and Rules 28 and 29—suggestions that anyone claiming to
be a woman is lying (“Rules of the Internet,” 2015). Ironically, men first used it as a defense
mechanism against male trolls pretending to be women; these trolls were either trying to gain
advantages in MMORPGs27 or seeking to achieve general lulz28 at the unsuspecting man’s
expense. However, it quickly evolved into a form of antagonistic trolling against women in
digital spaces, particularly /b/. 4chan has even provided handy images to help women understand
how Tits or GTFO works (Figure 48).

26

The “Rules of the Internet” is an Internet meme. They are not actual rules to which users must adhere on 4chan.

27

MMORPG means Massive Multiplayer Online Role-Playing Game. IE: World of Warcraft, Runescape, Lord of
the Rings Online and Star Wars: The Old Republic.
Lulz, a bastardized form of “lol” (“laughing out loud”) that denotes a kind of schadenfreude, is “an aggressive
form of laughter derived from eliciting strong emotional reactions” (Phillips, “What an…”) from a target of trolling.
28
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Figure 48. Tits or
GTFO chart

In its early days, the meme was used specifically to limit women’s capacity for speech. In
the decade since its incarnation, it has become more elastic, often used as a general dismissal (ie:
“And if you don’t like it, Tits or GTFO,” “Tits or GTFO,” 2012). However, despite its newly
acquired meaning as a brush-off phrase, it remains a long-held rite of passage that femanons
must accomplish to be able to speak as self-identifying femanons on /b/ and other areas of 4chan.
As Milner explains (2013a), “A female wanting to make her gender identity salient during a
discussion must make it physically explicit” (p. 81). This is problematic because it puts the
responsibility of proving the accuracy of identity statements onto the woman who wishes to
identify as such, something male anons need not do because their maleness is accepted as a given
part of the collective identity. An examination of the Tits or GTFO meme on 4chan illustrates the
problematic nature of the behavior it engenders.
The original sentiment of Tits or GTFO was often malicious trolling where anons
harassed a self-identifying woman until she “left” (by posing as a new poster, remaining silent,
or actually leaving) or gave in and posted a photo revealing her breasts. Such actions were
simultaneously demeaning to femanons and the source of much virtual high-fiving and
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malevolent laughter among other anons. However, nearly a decade later almost no one is
laughing anymore. Instead, Tits or GTFO has become almost hollowly performative, a product
of 4chan’s design, ethos, and collective identity. Many self-identifying women who post on /b/
have taken to preempting the phrase by showing timestamped images29 of themselves shirtless in
their first posts. If a woman does not do so, she is met with a flood of “Tits or GTFO” responses,
to which she usually replies with a timestamped image. No matter which route she decides to
take, once the woman posts the image of herself, the thread generally returns to its primary
conversation topic. In the past, anons would often rate a woman’s photo on a scale of 1-10, judge
it (usually harshly, no matter what the woman looked like), laugh at it, or compliment it; they
would objectify and further silence the woman who wished to speak. Such behavior still exists,
but it happens far less frequently and with far less intensity. Most anons do not acknowledge the
photo once the woman has posted it.30
During the month I studied /b/, I witnessed the modern Tits or GTFO meme many times.
One notable instance was when a pregnant bisexual femanon started a thread in which she posted
a fully-clothed picture of herself along with a request for links to lesbian pornography. She was
immediately met with a chorus of “TITS OR GTFO!” from close to 30 anons. She resisted at
first, claiming that because she’s had children and breastfed them that her breasts are “nothing
special” and that no one would want to see them; she didn’t think they would be sexually
appealing to the other users. With each new post she included a different, fully-clothed selfie.

29

Accusations of Photoshopping or taking images from Google searches are rampant on 4chan, so users add a
timestamp to any photos they claim to take themselves. This includes but is not limited to the women who post
shirtless photos to fulfill the Tits or GTFO requirement.
30

However, we cannot account for lurkers—users who watch threads without participating—or even other anons
who may save the images to their hard drives. There is no way to measure how often either happens, but they
undoubtedly do.

119
During this exchange, more anons had stumbled upon the post and were adding to the
Tits or GTFO cacophony, but most were explaining that the meme has little to do with sexual
appeal. One anon greentexted “>thinking tits or gtfo is about getting us off” (Figure 49) while
another posted an image of the “4chan Guide for /b/itches” (Figure 50) with a bored looking
femanon, both of which reinforced this explanation. Both posts were thinly veiled admissions
that forcing a woman to post her breasts in a public forum has little to do with sex and everything
to do with asserting social dominance. Finally, the femanon obliged the anonymous masses and
posted a timestamped photo of her breasts. A few anons responded directly to the photo, saying
things like “that wasn’t so bad, was it?” and “nice. not too bad,” thus showing that the Tits or
GTFO meme still results in some femanon objectification. But notably most anons did not even
acknowledge the photo. Instead, they began answering her original question and continued the
conversation as if the exchange did not happen. It was only mentioned after the fact when new
anons joined the thread and continued to post “TITS OR GTFO!” even after she had done it. In
such instances, anons responded by explaining that she had already “paid her dues.”

Figure 49. Tits or GTFO greentext
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Figure 50. 4chan Guide for /b/itches

This instance illustrates the strength of /b/’s established collective identity. When anons
see a thread or post with a self-identifying woman, they pounce with the time honored “Tits or
GTFO!” The fact that so many fresh instances occurred after the femanon had completed her rite
of passage shows how much this behavior has been ingrained in them. Many anons did not read
the thread before clicking into it and posting and most of them did not participate in the main
conversation; only between five and nine anons out of close to 80 responded to her inquiry. After
the initial pornography conversation wrapped up and the main conversers, including the
femanon, had ostensibly left, the thread kept itself alive for an extra 10 minutes on new “Tits or
GTFO” posts alone. By the time the thread expired there were 86 occasions of the phrase.
Such an instance is remarkable because it shows how users behave the way the collective
identity expects them to and that they will act on that expectation almost automatically.
Interestingly, because the “Tits or GTFO” proclaimers were so fixated on commanding a woman
to show her breasts for the sake of performing the action, they spent virtually no time interacting
with each other—except for the occasional “fuck off” when telling others that the femanon had
already posted her photo. This shows a strong identification with 4chan’s design and ethos and
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/b/’s collective identity instead of with each other. But this kind of hostile identification through
silencing is dangerous, particularly because it is an act of some form of white heteronormative
masculinity silencing a bisexual woman of indiscernible race. Even though Tits or GTFO has
lost much of its trolling potency, it still remains a method of asserting social dominance over a
marginalized identity. Although few people are laughing and the women are not particularly
embarrassed anymore, it remains a roadblock to women exercising their voices in a digital space.
On 4chan, singling out women for this objectifying treatment—even if it is a
performance—reinforces a social hierarchy that considers women to be second-rate citizens at
best. According to Butler (1997), injurious utterances and hate speech, two categories to which
“Tits or GTFO” and its potentially disenfranchising implications belong, have the power to force
a user “to reoccupy a subordinate subject position” (p. 18). Thus, when anons use the phrase to
demand that a woman show her breasts before speaking in a public forum, they “wield sovereign
power, to do what he or she says when it is said” (Butler, 1997, p. 16). They empower
themselves on /b/ through their implied maleness while disempowering the woman who wishes
to speak. Certainly, the anons who exclaim “Tits or GTFO” every time a woman self-identifies
on /b/ act as though their performed masculinity puts them in a position of power unattainable by
women. This behavior indicates that such alienating language “does not merely reflect relations
of social domination …. [It] enacts domination, becoming the vehicle through which that social
structure is reinstated” (Butler, 1997, p. 18). Even if this behavior is a performance, it still results
in marginalization. Thus, self-identifying women are simultaneously a part of /b/’s collective
identity through playing their role in Tits or GTFO and apart from it because they are stripped of
the power to speak as themselves without being silenced. Spivak (1988) would go a step further
and argue that women are unable to join the collective identity because such instances afford
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them no rhetorical power: “the possibility of collectivity itself is persistently foreclosed through
the manipulation of female [power]” (p. 78). Regardless, the phrase “reifies the board as a male
space” (Milner, 2013a, p. 81). Even though few seem to be laughing or embarrassed, the
behavior surrounding this phrase makes it clear that there is no room for women in /b/’s
collective identity.

Transanons and Collective Identity Rupture

As the Tits or GTFO example shows, once a collective identity is created, like the one on
/b/, it exists pre-communication and the user must adhere to it before speaking. Charland (1987)
explains that the constitutive rhetoric that drives it “is part of the discursive background of social
life…. [It is] the con-text, the pre-rhetoric that is necessary to any successful interpellation” into
a social group (p. 147). This “interpellation occurs at the very moment one enters a rhetorical
situation [… and] participates in the discourse that addresses him [or her]” (Charland, 1987, p.
138). In other words, an anon is interpellated into the collective identity when they participate in
a thread according to the rules of the collective identity. The word “interpellation” works to
describe initiation into 4chan’s collective identity for a couple of reasons. First, Charland (1987)
uses the term in the Althusserian sense, referring to “the process of inscribing subjects into an
ideology” (p. 138). To successfully participate on /b/, anons must identify—or at least
convincingly perform identification—with the anarchic and antagonistic culture behind the
interface’s ethos. Second, “interpellate” denotes a relationship with power. Those who
successfully identify with and interpellate to the design and ethos hold power on 4chan, while
those who refuse to do not.
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Interpellation explains why the collective identity holds so much more power than the
individual anons on /b/. As Charland (1987) explains, “the identifications of social identity [that
result in interpellation…] are discursive effects that induce human cooperation” (p. 133).
According to Charland (1987), there would be no room for dissent in a collective identity. Burke
(1950) notes that identification implies the need to overcome a division from other humans.
Thus, a collective identity must exist at the level of pure identification and show no dysfunction.
Ratcliffe believes that when differences arise in identification, the differing parties “learn to
submit” to the power in charge, or to the collective identity (p. 60). On 4chan, this would mean
that anyone who conflicts with the collective identity either learns to behave as expected or at
least refrains from openly dissenting. Generally, this is true; new anons often seem to go through
an assimilation period where they make obvious newbie mistakes31 and are ridiculed for them.
The users then change their behavior to fit with the collective identity; they “learn to submit” to
it. This seems to contradict Poole’s (2010, 2013, 2014) assertion for 4chan’s value: he argues
that it is a place where users are supposed to be able to assume any identity they want to without
consequence. But this is not how identity manifests on /b/. Instead, anons have developed a mob
mentality and are subsumed into something that looks like a monolithic whole. Rather than
creating a utopic identity-haven where users can fully explore all of the fragments of their
identities, anons must instead conform to a single collective identity.
Thus, when an anon self-identifies with something other than an anti-PC white,
heteronormative masculinity, /b/’s collective identity chooses from a range of memetic responses
to punish them and correct their behavior. For women, this is where anons use the Tits or GTFO

31

Such as responding to something humorous with “lol” instead of the 4chan variants “lel” or “kek.”
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meme to police behavior according to the collective identity’s expectations. However, for
transpeople the memetic response is not quite so overtly formulaic. Instead, it is openly hostile
and violent and it refuses transanons the ability to eventually speak even in the limited way Tits
or GTFO eventually does for women. Transpeople are quite possibly the identity that /b/’s
collective identity performance marginalizes the most savagely and intensely. In general, anons
disparage and openly mock the idea that people can identify as another gender or sex than what
they were biologically born as. They appear to be even more outraged that these individuals are
allowed to choose to transform their bodies to more closely fit their identification. This sentiment
is seen in more lighthearted posts like “I identify as Bill Gates. I must be given his bank account
or I’ll sue” and “I sexually identify as an attack helicopter” (Figure 51).

Figure 51. Anon mocks transpeople

But such mellow joking is not the norm. It is far more common to see anons performing
aggressive antagonism toward transpeople on 4chan (recall also the previously discussed
“#transage” movement). If anons hostilely discourage women’s self-identification on /b/, they
appear to be even less tolerant of transpeople’s self-identification. Regardless, some transanons
are unwilling to fully interpellate to and identify with the collective identity’s disavowal of their
subject position. An examination of two instances where transwomen self-identify reveals
4chan’s reaction to trans self-disclosure. In particular, the transwoman in the second example
employs constitutive rhetoric to self-disclose within the constraints of the collective identity; as a
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result, she exposes the performance behind these memetic responses and shows that, once
ruptured, the fabric holding together the collective identity is quite fragile.
During some preliminary research on /b/ in April 2015, I followed a thread that began
with a transwoman discussing why she identifies as trans. She explained, “I am not defined by
what’s between my legs. I am nether [sic] a boy or a girl, yet I am both. I will not allow you to
put a label on me.” She explains that she is a gender fluid transwoman: some days she identifies
and presents as a man, but on most she identifies and presents as a woman. On this day, she
explained that she was a woman, which is why I refer to her as a transwoman. She accompanied
each post with a photo, possibly of herself. Her posts were met with a flurry of vitriol that equate
sex with gender, problematically considering them as binaries instead of recognizing that they
are separate and exist on their own continuums. This discussion illustrated that anons appear to
believe there are only men and women with nothing in between. In response to a comment about
how she does not let chromosomes dictate her identity, one anon replied, “Actually that’s exactly
what it means… unless you’re someone with an xy chromosome and a vagina.. in that case you
should probably just kill yourself you mutant freak.” Another responded, “I hope this thing
fucking drops dead.” Figure 52 presents another example of this hate speech. These replies are a
small sample of 4chan’s memetic responses to trans identities and self-disclosing transpeople.
My knowledge of 4chan’s trolling practices require me to acknowledge that the
transwoman original poster (OP) may have been a trolling anon attempting to get a rise out of
his/her fellow anons, which would explain not only the lack of timestamped images—all were of
the same person, but may not have been of herself—but also his/her persistence in continuing to
reply despite the fact that his/her arguments were clearly not making any headway on the issue of
trans acceptance. Nonetheless, the vehemence of the anons’ responses, which are by no means an
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Figure 52. Anon derides transpeople

isolated occurrence, reveals that /b/’s memetic response to transpeople is characterized by hatred,
intolerance, threats of violence, and other prejudiced sentiments. /b/’s collective identity has
firmly placed transpeople on the outside. Whereas women are allowed to speak after performing
a rite of passage, anons deny transpeople the right to their identity no matter what they try to say.
However, another instance where a self-identifying transwoman engaged in a
conversation about what it means to be trans constitutes a rupture in these memetic responses
and in the collective identity. The thread began with an announcement that a famous
transgendered pornstar had recently died from a drug overdose; as with the first trans thread, the
OP could have been either a genuine sympathizer or a troll looking to antagonize his/her fellow
anons. The first half of the thread was a combination of a few sympathizers who expressed their
regret at the untimely death of a young person and the same kinds of intolerant sentiments
expressed in the previous trans thread. In particular, the anti-trans anons focused on pronouns,
preferring to intentionally mislabel the deceased transwoman as “he/him” or “it” instead of
“she/her”; the post beginning the thread also used the incorrect pronoun. About halfway into the
thread, a self-disclosing, post-op transwoman joined the conversation. As with the first
transanon, her self-identification constitutes a break from the collective identity. Anons are not
supposed to identify outside of the collective identity, so identifying as trans is certainly
considered an unacceptable breach of the collective. She began by expressing her disdain for
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popular transwomen, referring in particular to Caitlyn Jenner and Laverne Cox, who she claimed
are only concerned with money and popularity. She accompanied her original post with a photo
of herself in a dress; subsequent posts included images of her both wearing a bra (twice because
she forgot to timestamp the first one) and topless.
Amazingly, although she openly identified as trans and posted photos to prove it, she
garnered little negative attention from the other anons. According to the memetic formula for
responding to self-identifying transanons, the other anons should have ridiculed her beliefs and
decisions in vehemently aggressive terms. But they didn’t. There were some who called her a
hypocrite for disliking popular transwomen because they want attention when that’s exactly what
she was doing, and a few others criticized her for the list of admittedly stereotypical feminine
activities she claimed to enjoy doing. She was also objectified by a few anons—two asked for
nude pictures and one requested she write his name on her chest and post another photo—but
surprisingly few, considering the board. Instead, most of the anti-trans comments were directed
at the OP and the transwoman who overdosed, not the self-identifying transanon. This example
displays a rupture in the collective identity’s memetic behavior: the anons did not behave in the
way they were expected to, showing a disavowal for their identification to the interface’s design,
ethos, and collective identity.
Part of the disparity between responses to the first transwoman and the second involves
how each either identified or refused to identify with /b/’s collective identity. The first made no
such attempts. Seasoned anons recognized her rhetoric immediately: to them, she looked and
sounded like a typical Tumblr SJW.32 She posted images of her face, although she is looking

An “SJW” is a “social justice warrior,” a term 4chan coined to refer to anyone who speaks up for a social justice
cause (ie: feminism, LGBTQ+ rights, issues of race, etc). Anons believe that people who do so are insincere
32
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away from the camera (Figure 53). These, coupled with her non-binary definitions of sex and
gender and her beliefs that identity is fluid, immediately set her apart from /b/’s collective
identity. Moreover, although she was open to using profanity in her posts, she did not use the
same harshly disparaging tone that most anons do. In one comment, she exclaims,
honestly i cant control how much i dislike people who are racist or homophobic or
transphobic i used to be polite in my arguments so that whoever i was arguing
against would take me seriously but that never got me very far. fuck you for
bringing harm to innocent people and then hiding behind “it’s just MY opinion!!”
yeah it’s JUST your opinion? well your opinions have death tolls and body
counts, shut the fuck up [sic, all errors].
Such a comment was not well-received by the anons, in large part because her outraged tone set
herself outside of the collective identity. Although anons often express anger in bitter tones, it is
rarely in defense of an SJW issue like arguing against racism, homophobia, and transphobia.
This transwoman reveals that she is not part of the collective identity because she operates
outside of the discursive barrier the collective identity has constructed.

Figure 53. First transanon

keyboard activists who are looking for positive attention from others instead of actual social change (“Social
Justice”). On 4chan, calling someone an SJW is meant to be an insult.
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On the other hand, the second transgender woman employed constitutive rhetoric that
immediately told other anons that, despite her individual identification as a transwoman, she
nonetheless considers herself a member of /b/’s collective identity. Her first post took steps
toward this by setting herself apart from other transpeople and Tumblr SJWs through maligning
famous transwomen American society has recently praised, thus signaling to other anons that she
would not take a traditional SJW approach toward the conversation. She also demonstrated
extensive knowledge of 4chan’s norms. The photos she posted follow 4chan’s unspoken
guidelines for composition: she only included the necessary details and notably, because this was
not a R8 thread, she kept her face out of frame and her identity anonymous (Figure 54).

Figure 54. Second
transanon

Similarly, although she was defending what an anon would consider to be a classic SJW
stance, she did so according to 4chan’s terms. One anon told her, “If you have a Y chromosomes
[sic], you are a male. You are one dumb mother fucker if you think otherwise.” She replied by
explaining, “I didn’t say I was a real girl though. I said I live my life as one. Are you that autistic
to not understand the difference?” She did a couple important things here to show identification
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with the collective identity. First, she negated her individual identity by saying that she only
“live[s her] life as [a woman].” However, in earlier posts she explained that she has undergone
full transition surgery and in later posts she said she takes hormones to increase her estrogen; she
does more to maintain her individual identity than her casual dismissal lets on. Second, she
employed one of 4chan’s favorite pejorative terms: “autistic,” often used as a more offensive
version of the already offensive term “retarded,” usually meaning stupid but sometimes taking on
a more hostile connotation.33 /b/ in particular employs this term to insult anons who do not
follow the collective identity’s norms, so when the transgender woman uses it to dismiss the
anon’s remarks about chromosomes she simultaneously firmly affixes herself within the
collective identity while setting the other anon outside of it.
At the same time, the transanon’s display of rhetorical power reveals a rupture in the
collective identity. The first trans example aligns with the collective identity’s sentiment toward
transpeople: hatred and intentional misunderstanding and mislabeling. However, after the second
transwoman uses constitutive rhetoric to self-disclose and assert power, she opens the possibility
for rational discourse about transpeople. The first few responses follow the typical memetic
formula, such as the one in the previous paragraph and a few others that express similar
sentiments. But after the transwoman uses constitutive rhetoric to respond to these attacks, the
nature of the responses shifts. First, another trans person speaks up briefly to self-identify and
agree that s/he also “hate[s] Bruce Jenner” (Figure 55). Then, the transanon takes questions about
her transition (how it worked, what they did with/to her genitalia) and why she has little respect

The Encyclopedia Dramatica, a collection of 4chan terminology and expressions, uses the word “autist” to
describe someone who is “devoid of empathy, social reasoning, social context, or self-awareness” (“Asperger’s
Syndrome,” 2015).
33
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for publicly-visible transpeople. Another anon even states that s/he thinks his/her friend is in
“trans-denial” and asks for advice on how to broach the subject with him/her. This type of civil
discourse about transpeople and trans identity is practically unheard-of in this corner of 4chan;
other boards, like /lgbt/ or /soc/ might be more open to such topics, but /b/’s collective identity
has repeatedly illustrated its hostility toward them.

Figure 55. Another self-identifying transwoman

Much of this openness could stem from the fact that the thread began as a
commemoration for a recently deceased transwoman; it was a sympathy thread. The collective
identity manifested in full force in the beginning of the thread through its characteristic contempt
toward transpeople, but one transwoman’s refusal to completely identify with /b/’s collective
identity provided a small enough rupture that shaped the discourse around transpeople, even if
only for a short time. Other posts on /b/, both at the same time and recently, have reverted to
their standard anti-trans sentiments. Although the collective identity’s performance ruptured, it
was only temporary. Still, this rupture shows the collective identity’s fragility. In the fifteen or so
minutes during which this conversation happened, transanons on this thread were able to
simultaneously assert their individuality while remaining part of the collective identity.
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The Problem with Constitutive Rhetoric on /b/
The transanon’s constitutive rhetoric was effective in providing a small window of trans
acceptance on /b/; however, its social and cultural implications are complex. What follows her
explanation is a relatively civil discussion—by 4chan standards—of transgender lifestyle during
which the anon concerned with chromosomes admits, “I’m fine with calling you a grill, but not
female.” However, to engage in this discussion, the transanon not only denies her individual
identity, but also agrees to a term that denigrates all woman identities: “grill.” Anons often use
the term “grill” in lieu of “girl.” As Redditor AndySipherBull (2014) explains, this term is a
typologism akin to “pwn”34 that was invented when an anon misspelled “girl” as “gril” while
discussing his relationship. He said something akin to “he’d never love again, he would never
find another gril like her” (AndySipherBull, 2014). Since then, “grill” has typically been used as
“a joke which equates women with cheap, easily replaced, mostly superfluous lawn ornaments”
(AndySipherBull, 2014). The connotations of this word, while expressing identification with
/b/’s collective identity, become another way to denigrate women and, by extension,
transwomen. Although the transanon does not use the term “grill” herself, she acquiesces to
being called one. This, coupled with her identification with /b/’s collective identity in a way that
demeans her individual identity and engages in their discourse, is problematic.
The transanon’s self-disclosure—and the subsequent rupture in the collective identity—
leads to questions about how much power she really holds or gains in this conversation. In “Can
the Subaltern Speak?,” Spivak (1988) talks about the colonized subaltern, particularly Indian

“Pwn” is a typologism that occurred when someone meant to type “own” (as in, “my team totally owned [beat]
your team”) but hit the “p” instead of the “o.” Pwn is pronounced the same as “own,” but with a “p” as the initial
sound.
34
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women who perform ritualistic suicide after their husbands die. However, a more generalized
notion of “subaltern” includes any person who is considered to be of a lower social status.
Spivak (1988) explains that the identity of a “true subaltern group” is defined through “its
difference” from the privileged group, or the collective identity (p. 80). On 4chan, such a
description matches the treatment of women, transpeople, and any other minority identity that
does not fit the toxic white heteronormative masculinity standard. Spivak (1988) repeatedly
stresses that, contrary to what Foucault and Deleuze think, “there is no space from which the
sexed subaltern can truly speak” (p. 103). She argues that any marginalized identity who wishes
to join or disrupt privileged discourse can only do so in the language of their oppressors. The
transwoman does this when she uses constitutive rhetoric to assert her position in /b/’s collective
identity: she adopts the language, tone, and behavior of a typical anon. To be able to speak in a
privileged space like 4chan, the transanon must deny her own trans identity to join the collective
identity. However, because she cannot speak from her own subject position, Spivak (1988)
would argue that she does not speak at all.
Phillips (2015) make a similar claim when discussing the potential of “deploy[ing]
trolling rhetoric against trolls” (p. 167). She is troubled by the notion that the “solution to the
problem contains a trace of the problem” (Phillips, 2015, p. 167), thus recapitulating it while
simultaneously trying to undo it. Referencing Lorde’s statement that “The master’s tools will
never dismantle the master’s house,” Phillips (2015) asserts, “Just as Audre Lorde warned
against using patriarchal rhetoric… I too am reluctant to wholeheartedly claim for the feminist
cause a rhetorical mode so thoroughly steeped in male domination” (p. 168). Understandably,
Phillips is wary that employing the discourse of privilege will help elevate the social status of
marginalized identities.

134
Like Phillips (2015), I am cautious of hailing this instance of a self-disclosing
transwoman engaging in relatively open-minded—again, by 4chan’s standards—discourse about
trans identity as an unadulterated victory for transpeople on /b/. But I am reminded of a MOO
character description Dibbell (1998) discusses in “A Rape in Cyberspace” that also references
Lorde: “Even if you can’t tear down the master’s house with the master’s tools…it is a damned
good place to start.” I find it remarkable that, although the transanon used the language of the
dominant social group, she directly opposed /b/’s usually closed-minded stance on trans
acceptance and opened a trans-friendly (or at least trans-tolerant or trans-curious) dialogue that is
incredibly rare on /b/. And because she conformed to the collective identity’s discursive norms,
she and her ideas were more or less accepted, even if only for a short time. Her rupture even
provided a platform for more transanons to self-identify. Moreover, it is also worth noting that
the transwoman does not see herself as subaltern or marginalized. She identifies with /b/’s
collective identity. When she uses their language, she is also using her own; when she performs
/b/’s constitutive rhetoric, she is making a conscious choice to engage in their discourse. Despite
the fact that the collective identity actively excludes her individual identity, her refusal to allow
herself to be marginalized constitutes an act of power.
Such a refusal also reveals that 4chan’s behavior is a performance, not necessarily a
reflection of reality. Anons usually perform a collective identity that identifies with /b/’s
anonymous and ephemeral design as well as its ethos of lawlessness and unaccountability.
However, when the collective was confronted with an instance where a transwoman member of
the collective identity self-disclosed—an act that would typically result in outright exclusion
from speaking—while also asserting her belonging to it, the collective broke down for a brief
moment. Furthermore, the real-world failure of the feminazi and #transage movements reinforce
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the notion that the collective identity is performance: for most anons it only lasts as long as they
are on the board. Both movements appeared to gain support from several anons when the threads
were active, but very little came of either. As the examples have shown, performances of antifeminist, anti-woman, and anti-trans sentiments are part of the collective identity, but the
“feminazi” and “#transage” movements died quickly when they tried to move beyond 4chan,
despite their fervent support on-board. The petition never even got close to 1000 signatures (the
necessary amount to move to the next level on Change.org), and the #transage takeover never
began even though the anons hatched elaborate plans to move forward.
There are a couple of reasons why anons may be wary of backing the movements
anywhere but on /b/, and both stem from the nature of the collective identity. First, signing a
Change.org petition or tweeting from a Twitter account requires anons to give up the anonymous
and ephemeral privileges they enjoy on 4chan. Both sites require identity representation
(usernames, profile pictures, etc), keep records of user accounts, and track their users on the site.
Second, it shows that the collective identity is as ephemeral as the threads anons post to /b/.
Anons willingly acquiesce to the collective identity when they are on /b/, but that subsumption
only lasts as long as they are on 4chan. Backing these movements off-board would require anons
to abandon the collective identity while also surrendering the protection it gives them to speak as
freely as they do without the potential for retribution. It is possible—inevitable, even—that for
some anons the bigotry exhibited on /b/ is a reflection of their real-world identities, but they
appear to be more of a minority than the collective identity behaviors would let on. Thus, like
Bakhtin’s (2009) carnival, /b/’s collective identity is an end in and of itself—a performance.
However, unlike the carnival, which is based in creating equality for all levels of the social
echelons, /b/’s collective identity is a performance that explicitly outs specific identities and
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reinforces anti-PC white heteronormative masculinity. This performance happens on many
levels. As the examples above show, anons perform the collective identity while on /b/ and do
not necessarily adhere to it while offline; they engage in an identity performance based in playful
subversion of marginalized identities.
At the same time the examples in this chapter make it clear that more than only young,
white males constitute the collective identity: many women, transwomen, and other marginalized
identities also choose to visit 4chan and /b/ on a regular enough basis that they have become part
of the collective. As such, these marginalized identities also engage in a kind of performance by
denying key characteristics of their individual identities—such as their sex and gender
identification or even race and ethnicity—and instead donning the identity markers of /b/’s
playfully subversive collective identity. This behavior is curious. Rather than fight against or
deny a culture steeped in bigotry and exclusion of their identities, they instead embrace and
adopt it. It is worthwhile to remember that the anons with these identities are the true betas; they
often face hatred and bigotry in the real world and may be looking to release some of that
through a cathartic performance. Perhaps such identity performances are empowering. Instead of
falling victim to the social order, female, LGBTQ+, and non-white anons instead adopt the
dominant characteristics and, like the carnival, turn the social order on its head by acting in a
position of social power.

Conclusion: Performance and Collective Identity

Theoretically, anons have more identity freedom on 4chan than they do on other sites.
However, in practice this autonomy does not seem to manifest. All of the examples highlight the
coerciveness behind /b/’s collective identity. The Tits or GTFO example shows how some
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behaviors on 4chan are almost automatic. The transanon examples illustrate that the only way
non-male and non-heteronormative anons can successfully express any rhetorical power is if they
maintain identification with the collective identity while they do so. Furthermore, the feminazi
and #transage movements also indicate that—for most anons—the collective identity only exists
within the confines of the site and that users are unwilling to engage with it off-board. These
examples demonstrate that the recursively constructed design and ethos control anons’ behavior,
but only while they are on /b/. Because of these regulatory practices, /b/ is also paradoxically
neither anonymous nor ephemeral.
Stryker (2011) and Knutila (2011) believe that because /b/’s posts are deleted so quickly
it has no “memory.” Stryker (2011) explains that other digital social media “focus on…
rewarding people with points, badges, and other accolades” (p. 276), all of which accumulate on
a profile and reveal aspects of an individual identity. But, he argues, on /b/ it is the opposite: “On
4chan, you’re only as respected as your latest post” (Stryker, 2011, p. 277). Knutila (2011)
similarly notes that users cannot accrue cultural capital through their posts. However, despite the
fact that no tangible accolades are available to users who post quality content, Trammell has
found users still police each other’s behavior in ways similar to other digital social media that
offer such lasting praise. Users also reward the best content by repurposing or remixing it, thus
showing that /b/ does, in fact, have a memory; it just isn’t archived. Coleman (2014) explains
that even though “a person [does not] accrue status or reputation” on /b/ (pp. 43-4), identity
markers persist as part of the collective identity’s memory. These identity markers manifest
through some of its most popular remixed content and identity memes: not only the Tits or
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GTFO phenomenon, but also the “Rare Pepe” meme35 (2015) and the Navy Seal Copypasta36
(2015), to name only a few. To be accepted as insiders, anons must understand references to
hundreds (possibly thousands) of these remixed identity markers. This appropriated and
repurposed content is part of what creates the collective identity, and it appears everywhere on
/b/. Stryker (2011) and Knutila (2011) argue that /b/ doesn’t have a memory, but I have found
that the board is constantly saturated in lasting identity markers, most of which are memes.
/b/ is also not anonymous. If being “anonymous” means being without an identity, then
/b/ does not fit that description. /b/’s identity has developed through users’ behaviors that mark
the interface as an identity-saturated text. The collective identity dictates how anons are expected
to behave and has adopted several responses to police any behavior that strays from these norms.
Therefore, the collective identity is a performance. Those who demand “Tits or GTFO” and
ridicule transgender people may actually be anti-woman and anti-trans, but they may also be
only performing these sentiments to identify with the collective identity. Poole thinks that
“anonymity is authenticity” (as quoted in Stryker, 2011, p. 275), but because the identity on /b/ is
a performance, it cannot be wholly authentic. Some anons may relinquish more identity
characteristics than others when they visit the site—as in, some anons may inherently identify
more genuinely and strongly with the design, ethos, and collective identity than others—but all
anons must surrender some part of themselves to fully identify with the collective.

35

Rare Pepes are memes of a frog that anons joke are like trading cards. Some even have watermarks (“Rare Pepe”).

Copypasta is a bastardization of “copy and paste.” It is used to denote blocks of text (sometimes a short phrase,
but usually longer) that an anon decides is worth copying to repost later. When the anon deems it appropriate, s/he
will post the text, sometimes altering words to fit the new context but leaving enough of the original so other anons
will recognize the copypasta. In the Navy Seal Copypasta the author, ostensibly a Navy Seal, makes exaggerated
claims about how he is angered by a particular comment and, because of his training, knows multiple ways of killing
the other anons. The hyperbolic paragraph ends with the signature phrase, “You’re fucking dead, kiddo.”
36
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4chan’s brand of anonymity also neglects to grant users the equality it seems to promise.
Stryker (2011) argues that anonymity leads to equality for all users because everyone has the
same opportunity to participate and have their voices heard. He explains that other social media
sites’ users “develop strong hierarchies” (p. 276) because they are nonymous or pseudonymous;
he implies that 4chan’s anonymity prevents this from happening. However, this response points
to a problematic implication of /b/’s performative identity: as a white heterosexual man, Stryker
(2011) identifies on a basic level with the collective identity (whether or not he identifies with
the “anti-PC” portion of the identity is unclear), which means that he was able to participate in
the performance on /b/ without significantly altering his identity. In turn, his participation
appears to be uncritical of the effect of /b/’s collective identity and constitutive rhetoric on
marginalized identities. He does not understand the problem behind identity performances that
denigrate others. Siegel (2015) points out that “4chan… has long maintained that much of its
racism is really just a performance designed to rattle the mainstream.” But it seems as though
this performance functions as more than simply an affront to mainstream culture; it is a total
reversal of that which the mainstream considers good. This chapter’s examples illustrate that,
despite its anonymity, /b/ still develops and enforces dominant social hierarchies that place
whiteness, heteronormativity, and masculinity on top and other non-dominant identity markers
on the bottom. This makes /b/’s collective identity dangerous because it normalizes denigrating
words and actions that continue to oppress women and other minorities.
However, this chapter’s findings also provide some hope for how to resist these negative
discourses on spaces like 4chan. The examples reveal that /b/’s collective identity is diverse
performing monolithic: it consists of far more identities than the collective’s focus on anti-PC
white heteronormative masculinity would let on. We tend to vilify spaces like this and assume
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that the users who visit them are awful bigots, but this example shows that 4chan’s memetic
behavior is a performance, not necessarily a reflection of reality. When the collective was
confronted with an instance where a trans member self-disclosed while also asserting her right to
belong, it broke down. Most importantly, to effectively rupture a collective identity centered on
negative cultural assumptions, an individual must perform constitutive rhetoric to establish
identification with it. Like the case study of Fake Geek Girl in the previous chapter, the
transwoman’s collective identity rupture also has implications for how to fight against
destructive discourses. Because performative responses like “Tits or GTFO” and demeaning
insults directed at transpeople are the result of an influential although ultimately fragile identity
performance, they can be countered through identification and constitutive rhetoric.

CHAPTER 4
READING MEAN COMMENTS: USING PARODY TO SUBVERT YOUTUBE’S HATERS

Introduction: What Is YouTube?

Founded in 2005 by Chad Hurley, Steve Chen, and Jawed Karim, YouTube began as a
file storage site where people could easily share videos with friends and family without
sophisticated technical skill. Rather than email a video file, users could upload the video to
YouTube, which would generate a unique URL they could send to their audience of viewers
(usually people they knew personally offline). But shortly after its introduction, users—
particularly bloggers—began to recognize the value of YouTube’s easy shareability. YouTube’s
rapid evolution from file repository to revolutionary social media is a result of viral videos and
YouTube users—usually called YouTubers—sharing content beyond their real-life networks and
aiming videos at a larger public audience. Several developments over the last decade, including
monetizing the site and getting involved in the 2008 presidential election, resulted in a huge
influx of new traffic that is largely responsible for its current popularity.
However, some of YouTube’s biggest growth has resulted from their increasing focus on
encouraging its users to produce and share original content. In May 2007, YouTube began to
reward these efforts by launching its Partner Program, which allowed YouTubers to receive
payment for their viral videos; by 2008, some YouTubers were earning incomes in the six-figure
range (Dickey, 2013). In 2011, YouTube began enlisting talent to create content solely for
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YouTube, what YouTube called its “original channels”: “Google paid more than $100 million to
content creators to make videos exclusively for YouTube” (Dickey, 2013). Most recently, in
2015 Google launched YouTube Red, a paid subscription service that allows users to stream
videos without ads, gives access to premium original content that cannot be found anywhere else,
and enables offline viewing (Mitroff, 2016).
Now that YouTube has been mainstreamed and monetized, “great strides have been made
in legitimizing the kind of content you see on… YouTube” (Bhagat, 2016). As Amy O’Leary
(2013) explains, “A few years ago, YouTube stars were one-hit wonders, viral accidents whose
fame came and went like a passing storm.” However, now successful YouTubers can build a
career on their original content. YouTubers can even win awards; the YouTube Awards and the
Streamys are dedicated solely to YouTubers, and other popular award shows like the Teen
Choice Awards and the Shorty Award offer at least one category for YouTubers. Now that
YouTube and YouTubers are making a concerted effort to encourage and sustain original content
creation on the site, YouTube is more popular with young people than television shows. Aaron
Elliott (2014) details the results of a survey that shows that 68% of participants watch more
content on YouTube than anywhere else. Chris Palermino (2015) highlights another survey that
explains why so many more people are turning away from television and toward YouTube: “62
percent of respondents said digital content makes them ‘feel good’ about themselves, as opposed
to just 40 percent for TV. More millennials also felt that digital content is more relatable than TV
(67 percent for digital content versus 41 percent for TV).” As a result, YouTube content creators’
videos are being seen as valid avenues of creativity.
Native YouTube video productions—that is, videos produced solely for streaming on
YouTube—are typically low-tech and intimate, factors which are largely responsible for drawing
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so many viewers. Anne Helen Peterson (2015) explains that “The appeal of television stars was
rooted in the feeling of immediacy…, intimacy…, and authenticity….” However, she also points
out that one of the key differences between TV and YouTube is that YouTube takes these three
factors to a new level “and magnifies it” (Peterson, 2015). YouTube videos seem spontaneous
and sometimes chaotic. The majority are shot in kitchens, bedrooms, living rooms, home offices,
and other areas of a house that make viewers feel less like they are watching a scripted sitcom
(because they aren’t) and more like they are Skyping with the YouTuber. This feeling is
amplified by the fact that YouTubers generally record with a webcam or another amateur-level
digital camera and strategic lighting, and that most YouTubers often write, shoot, direct, and edit
videos entirely on their own. Peterson (2015) explains, “Those aesthetics of intimacy contribute
to the feeling of authenticity: The more lo-fi the production seems—the less mediated—the
easier it is to believe that you are accessing the ‘real’ star.” These videos make it seem as if the
YouTuber is a friend instead of a celebrity, even though many YouTubers have reached celebrity
status. For some, YouTubers like PewDiePie, Smosh, NigaHiga, and JennaMarbles—a few of
the top YouTube channels that produce original content—have become household names.
Because it is so easy to upload videos and participate on the site, YouTube has become
practically synonymous with the terms “Web 2.0” and “participatory media.” In many ways, it is
the social networking site that has defined how online users communicate with each other
(YouTube videos are posted to Facebook and Twitter after all, not the other way around).
Burgess and Green (2009) agree, stating that the “shift from the idea of the website as a personal
storage facility for video content to a platform for public self-expression matches YouTube to the
ideas about a user-led revolution that characterizes rhetoric around ‘Web 2.0’” (p. 4). Each
channel serves a unique purpose (even if that purpose is to imitate another channel) and indulges
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a variety of interests. People can create content that makes people laugh, cry, or think; they can
educate, ridicule, rant, or joke. YouTube seems to be haven of democratic participatory culture
for anyone to express themselves online in whatever way they see fit while also housing enough
content to appeal to wide audiences.

Haters, Mean Comments, and Why They Must Be Stopped

However, like all things on the Internet, YouTube is not always the perfectly democratic
participatory space it purports to be. While there are many YouTubers using the space to voice
alternative viewpoints that can’t always find a place in mainstream and traditional media, there
are just as many “haters” posting “mean comments” on those videos in attempts to silence both
the YouTuber and the conversations they could initiate. Patricia Lange (2016) interviewed
several vloggers,1 one of which defines a “hater” as “someone who posts a negative comment
that doesn't offer any [criticism] or any helpful information…. [They] insult you and offer no
suggestions on [improvements]” (as quoted in Lange, 2016). “Mean comments,” then, are the
comments they post. Lange gives several instances of kinds of mean comments:
Examples of comments are ‘Wow this sucks,’ and may involve metaphors of
violence such as ‘You’re a waste of brain matter. Go jump off a cliff’ or ‘This
sucks. Go die.’ Interviewees report that often the phrases haters use are repetitive,
unimaginative, and similar to those of other haters. They are unable to offer
‘legitimate’ arguments about why they hate something (Lange, 2016).
However, as is apparent from Lange’s examples above, the terms “haters” and “mean” insinuate
a certain innocence that rarely characterizes some of these comments. In fact, “mean comments”
tend to align more closely with the legal definition of “hate speech”: “It is an incitement to

1

A vlogger is someone who blogs through video. Video + blog = vlog.
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hatred primarily against a group of persons defined in terms of race, ethnicity, national origin,
gender, religion, sexual orientation, and the like” (“Hate Speech Law,” 2016). A large portion of
mean comments are based in discourses that support socially hegemonic ideals of racism,
misogyny, and LGBTQ+-phobias, and they can be as serious as rape or death threats. As Burgess
and Green (2009) explain, YouTube is reputed for these comments, which is “exacerbated by
anonymity (so that there are few disincentives to behave badly) and scale (so that it becomes
difficult to keep up with policing and moderating comments)” (p. 96). All YouTubers receive
some level of hate no matter how well they conform to societal expectations, but women and
people of color receive disproportionately more.
This chapter will focus on gender and mean comments on YouTube. Joseph M. Reagle
(2015) has pointed out that gendered harassment online is so pervasive that “sexually violent
comments, especially toward women, are an established genre of comment… characterized by
profanity, ad hominem invective, stereotype, and hyperbolic imagery of graphic (and often
sexualized) violence that manifests as a threat or wishful thinking” (p. 106). Judith Butler (1997)
would add that not only are the comments a threat, but they are a forceful action: “Although the
threat is not quite the act that it portends, it is still an act, a speech act, one that not only
announces the act to come, but registers a certain force in language, a force that both presages
and inaugurates a subsequent force” (p. 9). What’s more, Lindsey Wotanis and Laurie McMillan
(2014) explain that these kinds of abusive comments are so prevalent on YouTube that they “are
a part of YouTube culture” (p. 914). In her interviews with several vloggers, Lange (2007)
sought the opinions of women who had received comments that veered close to cyberstalking:
Interviewee: This creep keeps leaving comments on [my blog]. It's been
happening since [last year]. Like really, really nasty comments….
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Interviewee: Well he isn't directly threatening, but he says like you should kill
yourself. I posted something about getting a [sports car] and he's like oh, I'd buy
that [sports car] for you just to see your face smash into your windshield. I'm like
yeah….
Interviewee: It sucks. (Lange, 2007)
Below, I will present a larger analysis of some of the gendered aggression that YouTubers
receive in comments on their videos, but Lange’s example illustrates the violence that some
female YouTubers face.
What’s more, YouTube and YouTubers are essentially powerless to stop these haters.
Danielle Keats Citron (2014) notes that YouTube tries to keep the space abuse-free. She explains
that YouTube does “not view free expression as a license to harass, stalk, or threaten. For
business and ethical reasons, they are working to prevent abuse from happening and to diminish
its impact when it occurs. Through user agreements and software design, these Internet
companies are encouraging norms of equality and respect” (Citron, 2014, p. 226). Further, “In its
community guidelines, YouTube advises, ‘We want you to use YouTube without fear of being
subjected to malicious harassment. In cases where harassment crosses the line into malicious
attack it can be reported and will be removed’” (Citron, 2014, p. 230). These efforts seem
promising, but with over one billion users—which YouTube contextualizes as “almost one-third
of all people on the Internet” (“Statistics,” 2016)—the large scale of YouTube makes it difficult
for them to effectively prevent mean comments. Citron (2014) explains, “YouTube’s staff has
difficulty keeping up with complaints because over seventy-two hours of videos are uploaded
every minute” (p. 233). Understandably, despite all of its promises to stop hate on its site, the
overwhelming amount of content—both videos and comments—that is constantly uploaded
means that their power is ultimately quite limited.
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As a result, it falls on individual YouTubers to moderate their channels and decide how to
handle abuse and hate. Two resources YouTube has made available to YouTubers is the Creator
Academy (2016) and the Creator Hub (2016), both of which Wotanis & McMillan (2014) refer
to collectively as the Creator Playbook.2 YouTubers may consult either or both of these
resources to find “strategies connected with channel success” (Wotanis & McMillan, 2014, p.
915). However, one of their major shortcomings is that “it does not provide suggestions for
content creators who are subjected to a hostile or threatening reception through viewer
comments” (Wotanis & McMillan, 2014, p. 915). Moreover, as Wotanis and McMillan (2014)
point out, the guides also fail to “acknowledge that women or members of other social groups
facing offline social injustices may need advice about handling online interactions where such
injustices may be mirrored or exacerbated. In other words, the Creator Playbook treats YouTube
performers as if they all have equal opportunities for success” (Wotanis & McMillan, 2014, p.
915). YouTubers, especially those potentially most vulnerable to haters and mean comments,
must learn to navigate the already difficult subject of online aggression without any help from
the website that houses their videos and purports to help them build their brand.
Some think haters and mean comments are part of the culture of YouTube; that is, they
think such hostile interactions should be expected as a result of participation in the space. These
users believe that even if something could be done to stop them, it shouldn’t be. Lange (2016)
explains that some of her interviewees said that “posting on YouTube requires a certain amount
of maturity to handle the criticism and feedback that will likely result by publicly posting one’s

2

Unsurprisingly, the Creator Playbook has undergone some large changes in the two years since Wotanis and
McMillan wrote their article, including a complete rebranding and redesign. However, materials dealing with online
aggression still appear to be lacking.
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work.” She cites one of her interviewees in particular: “As Liam, a boy in his early teens also
pointed out, trying to create an environment in which only positive comments are allowed
represents an unrealistic need for insulation from critical feedback” (Lange, 2016). She also said
that some of her interviewees thought haters should just be ignored or that their comments
should be deleted. However, Burgess and Green (2009) report that “Many prominent YouTubers
express reluctance to moderate or ban comments because those kinds of controls are counter to
the ethos of openness that supposedly distinguishes participatory culture” (p. 96). However,
Lange (2016) and Burgess and Green (2009) do not appear to address the kinds of “mean
comments” that can be characterized as hate speech and online aggression. It is unclear why they
would leave their comments unmoderated. Regardless of the explanation, many YouTubers are
against regulating the comments sections. Some are able to deal with negative comments they
receive on their videos, but not everyone is able to shake off the haters’ impact so easily.
In fact, research shows that some talented people may be dissuaded from sharing their
work with the world (or from producing it in the first place) because they fear the repercussions
they may receive in the comments. Wotanis and McMillan (2014) explain how gendered cyber
harassment affects some women who want to use the Internet to build careers for themselves:
“[It] discourages them from writing and earning a living online…. The harassment causes
considerable emotional distress. Some women have committed suicide” (p. 915). For some
women who have put themselves publicly online and faced a deluge of negative responses, the
repercussions have gone far beyond what can be simply ignored or accepted as part of YouTube
culture. Ultimately, because some women are intimidated out of producing content for YouTube,
they are silenced. Whatever voice they could give to topics they may choose to present does not
get heard, and those who could benefit from hearing their perspectives do not get access to them.
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Therefore, it seems imperative to find ways to resist haters and mean comments.
However, YouTubers are right to be wary of any method that may limit free speech. As Lange
(2016) has pointed out:
Despite the pain that hating causes for many people in the YouTube community,
participants are often wary of implementing corrective mechanisms because they
may complicate free speech and limit access to desired critical feedback. For
many YouTube participants, certain regulatory mechanisms for ensuring cordial
video reception and commentary are not perceived as effective or universally
desired.
YouTubers are concerned that censoring comments or disallowing certain users to post limits
free speech, and many of them join YouTube and post videos precisely because they believe
anyone should be able to express themselves in whatever way they see fit. As such, any method
for resisting haters and their mean comments must not limit free speech or prohibit the abusive
comments. Instead, it must find ways to reduce the power of mean comments and instead bring
fans together to work toward creating inclusive communities.
Parody has shown itself to be an effective method for resisting aggressive comments on
YouTube by stripping them of their abusive power. Parody is a rhetorical form that, as Simon
Dentith (2000) explains, helps us “respond evaluatively to what is said to us” (p. 3). This
evaluation is carried out through a satirical re-invention or imitation of a prior text that Joel
Penney (2015) explains results in its “active transformation” (p. 226). Penney (2015) gives an
example of a parody that demonstrates its transformative power, particularly in relation to
offensive material. First, he illustrates that GLAAD’s typical response to offensive antiLGBTQ+ content is censorship: “To ensure that such content never reaches the audiences, the
organization employs a variety of strategies to influence the way that LGBTQ+ persons and
stories are portrayed in film and television” (p. 220). However, Penney (2105) explains that this
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method is ineffective because it relies on the overly simplistic claim that such media may (not
will) cause harm; he shows that “the rhetoric of imminent harm in these campaigns leaves no
room for such nuance, making hard and fast claims about the inevitability of widespread
deleterious effects without substantiation” (Penney, 2015, p. 225).
Instead, Penney (2015) urges people to engage in parodic transformation. He points to a
parody video called The Gaythering Storm that was made in response to an anti-LGBTQ+ video
by a similar name. It “uses comic exaggeration to not only poke fun at the preposterousness of
the NOM ad itself but also to mock the political perspective it promulgates” (Penney, 2015, p.
230). He argues that while censorship risks sending the message that LGBTQ+ people are
“passive victims of a bigoted majority” (Penney, 2015, p. 227), parody as an active
transformation of the original message is therefore more effective. Rather than shut down
opportunities for dialog about LGBTQ+ representation, parody strips offensive or abusive
representations of their power while opening avenues for further discussion.
Like the video Penney (2015) analyzes, mean comments on YouTube are generally
characterized as offensive texts. Rather than censor these comments, parody could be an
effective method for YouTubers to employ against their haters and aggressors. Jimmy Kimmel
popularized the fad of reading mean tweets on his show Jimmy Kimmel Live!, but several
YouTubers have also adopted this parodic method for resisting haters. On YouTube, this parody
manifests through reading the mean comments aloud and transforming their meaning through a
variety of techniques, such as intentional shifts in vocal tone or mocking mannerisms. In
particular, parody’s power comes from its capacity to inspire critical analysis. Dentith (2000)
explains, “parody can invite the reader to examine, evaluate and re-situate” the original text (p.
16). As such, parody’s power comes not only from the parodist’s ability to actively transform a

151
text, but also from the readers’, listeners’, or—in the case of YouTube—viewers’ ability to
realize the parodic function of the text and re-situate the original text’s meaning. In this regard,
parody has the capacity to initiate sophisticated cultural critique against systems of power.
In this chapter, I examine eight videos from six YouTube celebrities who use parody to
both strip their aggressors of power and to create an atmosphere that is conducive to an inclusive
community. I explore how Jenna Mourey, Grace Helbig, Hannah Hart, Lilly Singh, Colleen
Ballinger, and Mamrie Hart have employed this relatively new genre on their channels. What
follows is an exploration of my research methods and descriptions of each of the six YouTubers
as well as explanations of how they act as role models for young teenage females. Next, I use
Wotanis and McMillan’s (2014) study of gender and YouTube as a paradigm for my own
content analysis of the mean comments each YouTuber receives on her videos. Finally, I explore
reading mean comments as a new genre of parody that may be effective for subverting haters on
YouTube. Notably, I explain how parodying haters and mean comments is not aimed at the
actual haters; instead, the intended audience of these videos is the YouTubers’ fans. These videos
are meant to bring them together as a more cohesive community through a shared adversary. I
end with a cautionary note on the negative effects the reading mean comments parody could
have, acknowledging the ways it may recapitulate and normalize haters’ comments.

Research Methods and Data Attribution

Research Methods

In November 2016, I selected eight YouTube videos for analysis (Table 1). Four of these
videos are typical of the reading mean comments genre. Briefly, these are videos that feature a
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YouTuber, usually alone but sometimes with a partner, reading and commenting on mean
comments that they have received on their videos. Two more videos are a new take on the genre
that features the YouTuber singing her mean comments. Another video is presented in the typical
reading mean comments format, but instead of reading actual comments, the YouTuber presents
general types of mean comments she receives on her videos. The final video is a deviation from
the other seven. This video features a YouTuber during a segment of her live stage show in
which she reads and responds to mean comments on both her channel and her two co-stars’
channels. What makes this video stand out from the others is that it was not recorded and
uploaded by the YouTuber it features but by another YouTuber with a separate channel.
However, I have decided to include it for the additional insight it provides into the kinds of mean
comments YouTubers receive on their channels and how YouTubers respond to them.
I chose all female YouTube celebrities3 because, as I mentioned above, women generally
receive not only more aggressive comments on their videos but they also receive different kinds
of online aggression, including sexual, violent, and sexually violent comments. Below I will
categorize the kinds of comments each female YouTuber typically receives. I selected these six
YouTubers for two reasons. First, I have been a fan of their channels for several years, so I am
well-versed in their video styles and fan communities. This insider knowledge is important to the
study at hand because it precludes the need for extensive participant-observation or ethnographic
research (á la the previous chapter on 4chan); I understand how the communities function and
the role of the YouTuber in building her fanbase.

For the purposes of this chapter, a “YouTube celebrity” is a YouTuber who has made a successful career creating
content for YouTube. These celebrities do not hold any other jobs, often earn six figures annually, sell merchandise
and engage in branding, and often hire publicists or other help to manage their public personas. Some YouTube
celebrities also star in, produce, or are otherwise involved in movies and television.
3
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Table 1
YouTube Videos Analyzed

Second, as I will explain below, all six YouTubers are leaders in what is being dubbed
the “awkward older sister” movement (Peterson, 2015; Framke, 2015); that is, they are public
female presences serving as role models to younger (mostly teenage) girls. In particular, many
sources refer to Grace when referencing this movement—in large part because she was the first
to dub herself an “awkward older sister”—but as close friends who rose to popularity around the
same time and have also dedicated themselves to supporting young women, Hannah, Jenna,
Mamrie, Lilly, and Colleen are also considered forerunners. All six women embrace their
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weirdness and aim to show their mostly female audiences the importance of being authentic and
focusing on their own happiness.
The method of analysis is mostly content analysis. In particular, I focused on two kinds
of content: the mean comments that each YouTuber reads and the YouTubers’ responses to the
comments. As I explain in depth later in the chapter, the YouTubers I study generally receive
mostly positive or neutral feedback, so finding instances of mean comments proved difficult.4 As
such I relied on the comments and kinds of comments each YouTuber chooses to display in her
videos. Given my knowledge of the YouTubers and their communities, these comments are an
accurate representation of the kinds of mean comments they typically receive.
I transcribed and analyzed key parts of all ten videos; that is, I transcribed only the
YouTubers reading the comments and their relevant responses to them. For instance, in Lilly
Singh’s video “What YouTube Comments Really Mean,” she starts off her exploration of the
typical kinds of comments she sees on her channel with the “first” and “second” phenomenon.
This is where someone watches a video shortly after it has been posted, then comments “first” to
signify that they are the first to watch and comment, when in reality several others have likely
done so during the time they were watching the video. Similarly, often someone will see one
comment below the video and comment “second” when actually several people have commented
in the short span between the “first” and “second” comments. While this is an annoying aspect of
Internet culture, it certainly does not constitute the aggressive nature of haters, so I did not

4

Although certainly not impossible. The mean comments are there, but they are most likely to appear shortly after a
video is posted; the longer a video is up on YouTube, the more fans and other community members will continue to
comment, but haters tend to move on and stick to fresher videos. As such, most mean comments are buried so far
down in the comments section that it can take a considerable amount of time to reach them. YouTube does not
provide an easy way to navigate to older comments.
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transcribe those aspects of Lilly’s video. I made similar decisions in other videos as well. For
instance, often in the collaborative videos the YouTubers hold tangential conversations for brief
periods of time; because these are generally irrelevant to parodying haters, I have not included
them in the analysis.

Data Attribution

Throughout this chapter, I will display screenshots from the YouTube videos that contain
mean comments. All of the videos display the mean comment on the bottom while the YouTuber
reacts to it above, except for Grace who briefly covers almost the entire screen with her mean
comment. Typically, while watching a YouTube video the progress bar (the red line that moves
from left to right as the video progresses) and timer (which lets the viewer know how much time
has passed and how much is left) will disappear, but I have included them in all screencaps for
two reasons: 1) I wanted both visible for potential reference and citation purposes, and 2) I had to
pause the videos to take screenshots at certain moments, and pausing results in the progress bar
and timer appearing. However, a downside to this decision is that the progress bar may occlude
some or all of the mean comment displayed at the bottom of the video. As a result, I have
included the full, unedited text of each comment in the caption below the image. In addition,
some of the YouTubers opted to blur out the profile names or pictures of the haters on the
comments, but others did not. I have not altered the images of the mean comments in any way.
These videos are available to the public and have been seen by thousands and in some cases
millions of viewers, so my attempts to hide any haters’ identities if the YouTuber did not already
do so would be fruitless. If the YouTuber hid the name of the hater, it remains hidden; if she did
not, it remains visible.
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Finally, YouTube’s rewind and fast-forward function is relatively unsophisticated
(compared to professional video editing software or even iMovie), so it was difficult to find the
right moment for a screenshot that would capture not only the mean comment, but also a
comprehensive still shot of the YouTuber’s reaction to it. As a result, some of the images may
have caught YouTubers at unflattering or unappealing moments. Any instance where this has
happened is unintentional. All images are intended to convey only the sentiment behind the
YouTubers’ reaction, which can be difficult when choosing one frame from a moving picture. I
also encourage readers to search for the videos on YouTube and use the information from the
progress bar and timer to view the clips in their entirety to gain a fuller understanding of the
YouTubers’ reaction as they read the mean comments.
The Internet’s Awkward Older Sisters (and Mom)

In this chapter, I examine videos from six YouTubers: Jenna Mourey, Hannah Hart,
Mamrie Hart, Grace Helbig, Lilly Singh, and Colleen Ballinger. Each YouTuber typically
produces videos alone, which means they have to come up with enough content to entertain fans
for an average of five to eight minutes for each video. However, occasionally, they collaborate
with each other (all six YouTubers are friends and many have appeared in each other’s videos),
other YouTubers (Tyler Oakley and Flula Borg are friends many of them share), and sometimes
significant others (Jenna often features her boyfriend Julien, and Hannah featured her exgirlfriend Ingrid, both of whom are also YouTubers although with smaller fanbases). I selected
these six YouTubers because they represent leaders5 of what has been dubbed the “awkward

Anne Helen Peterson (2015) and Caroline Framke (2015) both discuss Grace Helbig as the leader of the “awkward
older sisters,” but they also acknowledge that, as members of what their fandom dubs the “Holy Trinity,” Hannah
5
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older sister” movement—except for Mamrie, who has said that her fans often refer to her as
“mom,” likely because she is the oldest YouTuber of the six (Mametown, 2014). In other words,
these YouTubers deliberately produce relatable content aimed at building up and authenticating
their young—often teenage—female viewers.6
Grace coined the term “awkward older sister” to describe herself and her videos. Grace
says she “doesn't know what she's doing but is trying to help you figure it out while she does
too” (as quoted in Framke, 2015). The movement appears to have started with Grace, but as
Caroline Framke (2015) notes, it is rapidly spreading outward as other YouTubers, including the
ones I analyze here, have also started acting in the awkward older sister role. Framke (2015)
explains, “[Grace’s] warmth and inclusiveness are characteristic of a burgeoning movement of
online female stars offering advice and mentorship to teens with compassion and honesty.”
Peterson specifies that part of what makes Grace so appealing is that she represents the
stereotypical “Cool Girl” who is traditionally beautiful and feminine, but is also able to hang out
as “one of the guys” through cursing and reveling in bodily functions generally deemed unfeminine. However, “All of her Cool Girl components… are never wielded to turn her into a sex
object” (Peterson, 2015). Peterson (2015) points out that this refusal to objectify herself
conceptualizes her as “a different type of idol, one whose values and priorities are in stark
contrast those proffered by teen idol factories like Disney and Nickelodeon.” Instead, Grace and
others in her YouTuber clique send the positive message to young teenagers: “Performing for

and Mamrie are also key leaders in this movement. I add Lilly, Jenna, and Colleen to this list because not only are
they friends with the first three, but they also produce similar content aimed at the same audience.
6

Although all six YouTubers are in their late 20s and early 30s, their fanbases consist largely of female teenagers
and young adults. They look to these YouTubers as role models who show them the important but often hidden
aspects of identity-building: staying true to yourself, making good friends who build you up, and having fun.
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boys matters for [sic] less, ultimately, than cultivating your own self” (Peterson, 2015).
Similarly, Jenna, Hannah, Mamrie, Lilly, and Colleen embody the “cool girl” persona that has
become an ideal for many female teenagers: look pretty, act weird, and cultivate friendships
instead of romantic relationships (or, put your sisters before your misters).
Part of this awkward older sister persona also involves accessibility. Peterson (2015)
notes, “[Grace] regularly hosts Q&As on her Facebook page; she constantly answers reader
questions in her videos…. She talks back on Twitter. She poses for countless selfies with readers,
who then make those selfies their Twitter avatars, like hundreds of visual testimonies to her
accessibility.” Jenna, Hannah, Mamrie, Lilly, and Colleen do the same. All six YouTubers seem
to be constantly on their social media, tweeting, posting to Facebook or Snapchat, and always
talking to their fans. Peterson (2015) also notes that the large number of videos Grace has
produced further disrupts the boundary between Grace and her fans: “You don’t just feel like you
know Grace; through hundreds of hours of footage and text, you know Grace.” It’s the same with
the other five YouTubers: the sheer volume of video footage of them taken from their own
homes make Grace, Jenna, Hannah, Mamrie, Lilly, and Colleen seem less like “celebrities” in a
traditional sense and more like friends that viewers visit once or twice a week.

Jenna Mourey (aka JennaMarbles)

Jenna Mourey has had an active YouTube channel since 2010, and she has uploaded 331
videos to her channel7; she generally uploads at least one every week (see Table 2 for statistics
on all six YouTubers). At over 16 million subscribers, Jenna stand as the most popular female

7

All numbers and statistics provided for all six YouTubers are from December 29, 2016.
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and one of the most overall popular YouTube celebrities on the site. VidStatsX 8 ranks her
channel at 24th for most subscribers (“JennaMarbles,” 2016). Jenna’s videos cover a range of
topics, from the silly to the serious, such as her How Guys [do X] and How Girls [do X]
videos—among others—provide cultural commentary on gender roles. Her most popular video,
“How to trick people into thinking you’re good looking” (2010), has over 65 million views
(“JennaMarbles,” 2016). Jenna shows her audience that even the most perfectly styled female
has flaws and reassures them that there is nothing wrong with that.

Table 2
YouTuber Statistics as of 29 December 2016 (“YouTube Top,” 2016)

8

VidStatsX ranks YouTube channels by subscribers and numbers of views. It also includes statistics for several
other factors, including number of subscribers, number of videos posted, how many subscribers are gained or lost in
24-hour and 7-day periods. It can also show a list of a channel’s top videos (sorted by number of views). VidStatsX
appears to update in real time.
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Grace Helbig (aka Grace Helbig)

Since 2006, Grace Helbig has been an active presence on YouTube. She has uploaded
nearly 650 videos and adds more each week. With over three million subscribers, VidStatsX
ranks Grace as the 641st most subscribed-to channel on YouTube (“Grace Helbig,” 2016). Her
second most-viewed video, “Grace Helbig on YouTube: Redefine grace” (2015a) has over three
million views and highlights her typical video behavior. At one point, she says “[close up]
You’re probably like ‘whoa that girl’s cool, I wanna be her friend, and I’m like” [Cut to wide
angle. She is awkwardly dancing, then she dance/walks through an open door and closet door
falls off its hinges. Cut back to close-up] “I love you, I mean, watch my channel. I get those
mixed up all the time” (Grace Helbig, 2015a). Grace’s demeanor is awkward and at times
childlike, but overall charming and relatable to her audience of young females.

Hannah Hart (aka MyHarto)
In March 2011, Hannah Hart posted her first video—called “Butter Yo Shit” (MyHarto,
2011), which also became the first in a long-running weekly series called My Drunk Kitchen, or
MDK to fans. Since then, she has produced over 550 videos (not including others on YourHarto,
her vlog channel) and her channel has over 2.5 million subscribers. VidStatsX ranks her as the
861st most subscribed-to channel on YouTube (“MyHarto,” 2016). In addition to her MDK
series, Hannah also uses her channel to promote her charity project Have a Heart Day, which is
an initiative that mobilizes Hartosexuals—the name her fanbase has given themselves—to
volunteer in the name of spreading love and “reckless optimism.” Hannah often uses the term
“reckless optimism” in her videos as a way to characterize “accepting the reality of situations as
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they are, but still believing that something good will come of it” (as quoted in Steinbach, 2015).
She urges her viewers to “practice reckless optimism,” or to make the most out of bad situations.

Colleen Ballinger (aka PsychoSoprano)

Colleen Ballinger, a comedian, actress, and singer/songwriter, is best known for her
channel Miranda Sings, which features her talentless but narcissistic character by the same name.
This channel has over seven million subscribers and ranks 154th (“Miranda Sings,” 2016). As
Miranda, Colleen has gained notoriety both on and off of YouTube, making appearances on The
Tonight Show and Jerry Seinfeld’s Comedians in Cars Getting Coffee. In 2016, she launched her
own Netflix series called Haters Back Off, a fictional sitcom that depicts Miranda’s tumultuous
but hilarious rise to fame. Despite Miranda’s undeniable popularity, I will instead focus on
Colleen’s personal channel, PsychoSoprano because this is where she most frequently discusses
her personal life and addresses her haters. With 752 videos, Colleen’s PsychoSoprano channel
has over 4.8 million subscribers and ranks 307th (“PsychoSoprano,” 2016). One characteristic of
her videos is that she is not ashamed of her bodily functions; she often belches in her videos, and
sometimes proudly tells horrifying stories related to defecation and menstruation. Her videos
show her young female audience that men aren’t the only ones who can be gross and crude to
gain a laugh; even beautiful women can display these stereotypically masculine attributes.

Lilly Singh (aka IISuperwomanII)

Lilly Singh joined YouTube in 2011. With 543 uploads, over 10 million subscribers, and
over 1.6 billion views, she ranks as the 68th most subscribed-to YouTuber (“IISuperwomanII,
2016). She is one of an elite group of YouTubers who have received the Diamond Play Button,
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an accolade YouTube gives to its creators who reach 10 million subscribers.9 Lilly has explained
that she also draws from her Indian heritage to reach out to teenagers of color—particularly
Indian teenagers “who live outside the subcontinent” (Bhagat, 2016)—whose representations are
often lacking in other popular media. Many of her videos are based in what Bhagat (2016) calls
“her ‘Asian-ness,’” such as ones that playfully parody her Punjabi parents to show that Indian
parents are just like everyone else’s: every teenager, no matter his or her cultural background,
can relate to a nagging parent who doesn’t understand pop culture. Through these videos and
others, Lilly promotes love and understanding of everyone, regardless of race, ethnicity, gender,
or other cultural and identity markers.

Mamrie Hart (aka MamrieHart and Mametown)

Mamrie Hart (no relation to Hannah Hart) has been producing YouTube content since
2011. Although Mamrie ranks quite low compared to others on this list, I include her because she
is close friends with Grace and Hannah, often appearing in their videos or featuring them in hers;
in the context of this study, she appears in Hannah’s “Reading Mean Tweets!” (MyHarto, 2015)
video and in the live performance recording. Ranking at 2469th for most subscribers, Mamrie has
uploaded 202 videos and has acquired over one million subscribers (“Mamrie Hart,” 2016)
through her Mamrie Hart channel.10 This channel is home to her long-running series You
Deserve a Drink—or YDAD to fans. On YDAD, Mamrie invents a punny alcoholic beverage and

9

The trophy is square-shaped with YouTube signature play button design; Jenna also has one. Other Play Button
awards are given at lower and higher levels: Silver for 100,000 subscribers, Gold for 1,000,000 million subscribers,
and Ruby for 50,000,000 million subscribers.
10

She also produces content—although far less frequently—on her Mametown channel, which ranks 7403rd and has
71 uploads.
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dedicates it to a public figure. For instance, in July 2016, Mamrie asks “who do I think most
deserves a drink this week?... Zac Efron, everybody” (Mamrie Hart, 2016). Then she concocts a
drink called “Zac Efron Smokin’ Hot Bod” margarita.

Jenna, Grace, Hannah, Colleen, Lilly, and Mamrie as Role Models
Framke (2015) notes that the term “awkward” doesn’t quite fit the awkward older sister
movement: “As surrogate older sisters, they aren’t awkward so much as approachable. They talk
about their flaws rather than try to cover them up, and embrace their quirks rather than feel
ashamed of them. They speak to their younger counterparts from a genuine place of
understanding, aiming to inspire rather than intimidate” (Framke, 2015). Whether it’s
awkwardness or approachableness, viewers cannot deny the magnetism that Grace, Hannah,
Mamrie, Jenna, Colleen, and Lilly embody simply because they are relatable.11 Teenagers and
young adults often feel stuck while they are trying to develop their own identities, forge
friendships, and develop budding romantic relationships; for some, balancing the intricate and
always moving parts of this journey is difficult and can lead to self-destruction. But these
YouTubers are showing young girls the value of self-care in identity formation. As Framke
(2015) explains, “After years of being derided as silly, teenage girls are not only being taken
seriously, but are openly, collectively being looked out for.” These teenagers and young women
can see Grace, Hannah, Mamrie, Jenna, Colleen, and Lilly as mentors who show rather than

11

Because all six women are college-educated, middle-class females, they also tend to draw fans from similar
demographics. Lilly tends to appeal more to women of color, and Hannah tend to appeal more to lesbians and other
LGBTQ+ people.
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preach how to be happy and survive teenagehood. In particular, it is powerful for these young
girls to see how all six stand up to and resist haters on their channels.

Female YouTubers and Mean Comments
As part of Hannah’s “Reading Mean Tweets!” (MyHarto, 2015) video, she asks her
guests—Jenna, Colleen, Lilly, and Mamrie—to talk about the kinds of mean comments they
receive on their videos. Hannah has obviously edited their responses for time (and Hannah does
not chime in with her own thoughts), but all four agree that they receive hateful comments.
Jenna: “I receive an awful lot of negative comments on my videos”
Colleen: “I receive so much hate on my videos!” (MyHarto, 2015)
Lilly gives the most detail about the kinds of mean comments she receives. Perhaps
unsurprisingly, the majority of her hateful comments reference not only her gender but also, as a
Canadian-born Punjabi Indian, her race and ethnicity:
“I get a lot of racist comments [points to face] I don’t know why”
“I receive a lot of sexist comments [points to breasts] I don’t know why.”
“‘Cut your hair you witch’ [grabs long black hair] I don’t know why.” (MyHarto,
2015)
Jenna, Grace, Mamrie, Hannah, Colleen, and Lilly receive a variety of comments on their videos,
ranging from error-laden comments that are barely readable to violent comments that are
unnerving to read.
Many of these YouTubers also acknowledge that they receive more supportive comments
than hateful ones on a regular basis. Colleen makes this statement in both of her singing mean
comments videos (PsychoSoprano, 2015; PsychoSoprano 2016), Lilly expresses her appreciation
for supportive comments (IISuperwomanII, 2015), and Jenna describes what these comments
mean to her (JennaMarbles, 2015). But Hannah describes the powerful impact of even just one
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hateful comment: “To be totally honest and truthful, you can get 99 positive comments, but if
you get that one negative comment it really just sticks out like a sore thumb. Mainly because I
suck my thumb so hard as I gently weep over my laptop” (MyHarto, 2015). However, because
mean comments are more scarce than supportive ones on these YouTubers’ pages—which is
likely not only a result of their large fanbases showing support and drowning out the negative
comments, but also of their fanbases flagging, downvoting, and reporting them—my data for
analyzing the kinds of mean comments each YouTuber receives will consist of the mean
comments they have chosen to read or sing in their videos. Because each YouTuber chooses
which comments to represent—or which ones not to represent—this approach is limited;
however, it still yields valuable data about the number and type of mean comments each
commonly receives.
Wotanis & McMillan’s Study of Gender, YouTube, and JennaMarbles

Wotanis & McMillan (2014) provide a paradigm for this content analysis. They
compared comments from Jenna Mourey and Ryan Higa (channel name: NigaHiga), the top male
and female YouTuber accounts in 2012. They determined that while both received more positive
feedback than negative, Jenna not only received more critical or hostile comments than Ryan, but
she also received 90% more sexist and sexually aggressive responses; as a YouTuber of mixed
race, Ryan received some racist comments, but not nearly as many sexist and sexually aggressive
ones. Jenna also received fewer supportive comments than Ryan. Of these comments, she
received less overall constructive feedback on the content of her videos or her personality, while
she also received more attention for her physical appearance (Table 3).
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Table 3
Types of Comments Jenna and Ryan Receive (from Wotanis & McMillan, 2014, p. 919)

Wotanis & McMillan (2014) detail the content of the comments. They explain that in the
category labelled “sexist/racist or sexually aggressive,” they analyzed the sexist and sexually
aggressive comments Jenna received together with the racist ones Ryan got. They specify that
Jenna did not receive racist comments and Ryan did not receive sexist or sexually aggressive
comments. However, “While it might be argued that the racist comments directed at Higa are
similar to the sexual comments responding to Mourey’s videos, the numbers are much greater for
Mourey, signaling a more hostile reception” (Wotanis & McMillan, 2014, p. 921). Wotanis &
McMillan (2014) also explain that the nature of Jenna’s sexist and sexually aggressive comments
“suggests that the value of the performer is in her status as a sexual object or potential sexual
partner for the viewer, effectively ignoring the content of the video performance and the
personality of the YouTube performer” (p. 920). They conclude, “Evidence of misogyny directed
toward Mourey, the most successful female YouTube performer, suggests the seriousness of
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hostility toward women on video-sharing sites” (Wotanis & McMillan, 2014, p. 913). They
elaborate:
The fact that her [Jenna’s] videos receive more sexually-explicit comments than
those of Higa suggests that many viewers watch her videos simply to gaze…. This
suggests that women on YouTube are treated in much the same way as women in
other media platforms…, raising the question of whether YouTube is suited to
women seeking to have their voices heard. (Wotanis & McMillan, 2014, p. 923)
Indeed, this exploration of the gendered difference between mean comments reveals that
females’ presence on YouTube is marked by more hate and more sexually aggressive
comments—and thus greater objectification and depersonalization—than men receive. However,
I do not agree with Wotanis & McMillan’s (2014) pessimistic question of whether or not
YouTube is a suitable digital space for females to speak. Not only can female YouTubers make it
a “suitable space” by being aware of and ready to subvert the kinds of online aggression and hate
they may face there, but they may have a responsibility to address it and make YouTube a safer
space for all identities.
Jenna, Lilly, Hannah, Grace, Mamrie, and Colleen’s Mean Comments

Like Wotanis & McMillan (2014), I examined critical/hostile comments and divided
them into categories by type: Appearance, Intelligence, Sexual, Quality, Violent, General Hate,
Sexually Violent, and Other. Importantly, although Wotanis & McMillan (2014) mined several
hundred comments from Jenna’s and Ryan’s comments sections, I am focusing solely on
comments the YouTubers read in their videos. To qualify for this part of the analysis, these
comments must be accompanied by a screenshot as the YouTuber reads them. For instance,
when Mamrie reads “what the hell was that giant bug with a blond wig you were holding?” in
Hannah’s “Reading Mean Tweets!” (MyHarto, 2015) video, a screenshot of the comment is
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displayed on the bottom of the screen (Figure 56). I make this distinction because some of the
YouTubers also talk about general kinds of comments instead of reading actual ones. For
instance, Jenna explains in “Reading Mean Tweets!” “I think some of the worst comments I’ve
ever received are things like ‘I bet your dad hates you!’” (MyHarto, 2015). She may be referring
to a specific comment, but a screenshot of the comment is not displayed as proof of its existence.
As such, I have classified those separately under similar categories: Appearance, Intelligence,
Sexual, Racist, Quality, Violent, Sexually violent, Sexist, Intelligence/Appearance/Quality, and
General Hate. Among the six YouTubers, I analyzed a total of 112 actual mean comments and 16
general kinds of mean comments (Tables 4 and 5). Although Wotanis & McMillan (2014)
studied supportive comments as well, for the purposes of this chapter I did not.

Figure 56. “what the hell was that giant bug with a blond
wig you were holding?” (MyHarto, 2015)
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Table 4
Actual Mean Comments by Type

Table 5
General Kinds of Mean Comments by Type
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Of the 112 actual comments I examined, 37 (33%) criticized the YouTuber’s physical
appearance; these comments consisted the majority of the sample. They generally make
statements about the YouTuber being unattractive (Figure 57). Others border on classification
under “sexual,” but I ultimately decided to keep them under “appearance” because the focus was
so strongly on how the YouTuber looks (Figure 58). On some level, one could make the
argument that nearly all comments about the females’ appearance is sexual because they are
ultimately deciding whether or not she is attractive enough to engage in sexual relations. Instead,
I reserve the classification “sexual” (11 comments, 9.8%) for comments that make explicit
references to genitalia, sexuality, or sexual intercourse (Figure 59). I have also distinguished
“sexually violent” (3 comments, 2.7%) from “sexual” because these are comments that
specifically focus on raping, beating, or killing the YouTuber (Figure 60). Comments in the
“violent” (6 comments, 5.4%) category focus solely on causing the YouTuber harm or
fantasizing about her death (Figure 61). Tables 6 and 7 also contain representative samples of
each type of comment.

Figure 57. “Your not atriative ur very agly”
(PsychoSoprano, 2015)
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Figure 58. “She's pretty near to the 10/10 body in my
books. Tight ass, big teddies, nice shape, good legs. Too
bad about the face but you can't have it all. That's why god
invented paper bags.” (JennaMarbles, 2015)

Figure 59: “roses are red violets are blue pornhubs is down
psychosoprano will do” (PsychoSoprano, 2016)
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Figure 60: “I just hope you die. So your saying no makeup
no sucky cocky and with lip stick swallow spit or gargle”
(JennaMarbles, 2015)

Figure 61: “youre a dumb stupid slut and i hope you die”
(Grace Helbig, 2015b)
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Table 6
Actual Mean Comments (Representative Samples)
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Table 7
General Types of Mean Comments (Representative Samples)

Table 8 details how many and what kinds of comments each YouTuber received across
the videos I analyzed. Unsurprisingly, nearly half of the comments were posted on Jenna’s
videos (48 comments, 42.9%). As the most popular of the six (based on her VidstatsX statistics
and subscriber rankings), it seems natural that she would not only receive more comments in
general, but also more mean comments in particular. Colleen received the second most (43
comments, 38.4%). Surprisingly, Hannah and Lilly received very few comments (3 comments,
2.7%; and 1 comment, .9%; respectively), despite both uploading mean comments videos to their
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YouTube channels. However, in Hannah’s “Reading Mean Tweets!” (2015) video, she only has
Jenna, Lilly, Colleen, and Mamrie read mean comments; she does not read any herself. Instead,
the only time Hannah reads mean comments is in Lyndsay K’s upload “Hannah Hart Comments
On Your Comments at the #NoFilter Show” (2013), where three of the 11 comments are from
her page. Similarly, Lilly uploads a video responding to general kinds of mean comments but
only reads one actual mean comment during Hannah’s “Reading Mean Tweets!” video.

Table 8
Actual Mean Comments by YouTuber

In addition, YouTubers are free to decide how many comments they will read. This also
likely accounts for much of the disparity between YouTubers’ total number of comments as well
as types of comments. For instance, although Grace and Colleen have both uploaded two videos
addressing mean comments—and although Grace’s videos were both longer—Colleen’s goal for
both was to pack as many mean comments as she could into songs while Grace spent more time
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making fun of the few comments she pulled out. Further, the YouTubers’ may also choose which
comments to focus on. I have been following Hannah, Grace, and Mamrie’s channels as an avid
fan for several years, and I have seen several comments that fall into some of the more unsavory
categories, such as “sexual,” “violent,” and even “sexually violent”; and because Hannah is an
openly out lesbian, she has garnered many comments that would fall into the “homophobic”
category. But it should come as no surprise that some YouTubers may not want to display or
even read those comments: doing so may be too difficult or traumatic.
Alternatively, displaying or reading those comments may defy the brands they have built
as YouTubers. For instance, viewers watch Hannah’s channel for encouragement to practice
reckless optimism, so she could decide that making a video displaying violent and homophobic
comments would damage her reputation. Finally, all six YouTubers are known for their humor,
and reading fantasies involving your own rape or death are understandably difficult to make
funny. As I will explain in further detail later, although Jenna opts into reading three sexually
violent comments (and is the only one of the six to do so), the overall tone of her video is darker
than the others’ videos.
Lilly is an interesting case as well because she opted not to read any actual comments in
her video “What YouTube Comments Really Mean” (IISuperwomanII, 2015). She instead offers
several different kinds of comments she has received without showing any actual comments.
Table 9 shows that a few other YouTubers opted for this method as well, although only offering
one apiece. Jenna, Colleen, and Mamrie each mentioned one general kind of comment they
receive in Hannah’s “Reading Mean Tweets!” (MyHarto, 2015) video; Lilly offers three
examples in the same video. Unsurprisingly, Lilly’s mean comments are the only ones that focus
on race. The other five YouTubers are white, but Lilly is of Indian descent and is often
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mistakenly construed in her comments as being Muslim or middle-Eastern. As a result, along
with more typical comments that offer general hate, she also discusses comments that label her
as a terrorist or that ridicule her for her skin color and hair type.

Table 9
General Kinds of Mean Comments by YouTuber

Overall, this collection of 112 actual mean comments and 16 general kinds of mean
comments points to a trend in negative comments posted to female YouTubers’ videos:
appearance, sex, and violence. The data from my analysis supports Wotanis & McMillan’s
(2014) findings on gender and YouTube. In addition to generally hateful comments, women tend
to receive comments that focus on critiquing their bodies—whether they be about physical
appearance (especially in connection to being deemed acceptable to have intercourse with), their

178
availability for sex, and their genitalia and breasts—in addition to comments that reveal a desire
to control, damage, or destroy female bodies through rape, assault, and murder.
Kerry Ferris’s (2001) research on fans and celebrities points to why people may be
inclined to post these mean comments on YouTubers’ channels. Ferris shows that fans will often
go to great lengths to get the attention of their favorite TV show stars and that not all of their
efforts are in the best interest of the celebrities. Similarly, YouTube commenters could make
outrageous and seemingly harmful comments on YouTube celebrities’ pages in a desperate effort
to get their attention and be recognized by the celebrity via having their mean comments read in
a video. However, this does not seem to be the case with the six YouTubers I have studied. With
the exceptions of Colleen and Grace, each YouTuber has only made one reading mean comments
style video. None of them announced their intentions to do so beforehand, so viewers would not
have known that their comments could appear in this format. As such, it seems reasonably safe to
say that these comments are organic; that is, they are not constructions by fans seeking the
YouTubers’ attention.
These comments are also clearly more than just “mean”: they are malicious attempts to
silence women’s’ voices and perpetuate hatred toward certain identity groups. Jenna, Grace,
Colleen, Lilly, Mamrie, and Hannah seem determined to continue making videos and acting as
“awkward older sister” role models for young teenagers, but not every female YouTuber or
aspiring YouTuber is likely as capable of continuing in the face of malicious comments like
these. Unfortunately, we have no way of determining how many women have been discouraged
from starting or maintaining their own channels; there are no interviews with former YouTubers
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who quit because of harassment, and many who may have done so were never popular enough to
be widely visible.12
This analysis also reveals that the fears voiced by Lange’s (2016) vlogger interviewees
are largely unfounded and that methods are needed to reduce the numbers of mean comments
posted to YouTubers’ videos. Lange’s (2016) interviewees expressed concern that finding a way
to reduce hateful comments on YouTube videos may also limit the amount of useful feedback
they could receive. But as both my analysis and Wotanis & McMillan’s (2014) shows, very few
comments are focused on providing feedback on the quality of the video. Granted, my study was
limited because I only looked at comments presented by the YouTubers themselves, but so few
comments fell into the “quality” category (7 actual, 6.3% of 112; 2 general kinds, 12.5% of 16),
that the potential for positive impact is negligible. Of the nine actual and general kinds of
comments classified as “quality,” only one proved to be constructive. Lilly explained a certain
kind of comment that she finds beneficial: “I wasn’t particularly fond of this video because of
‘xyz’” (IISuperwomanII, 2015). She responds by explaining that this kind of commenter is “an
adult who has an opinion” and she implies that such comments are favorable over ones that do
not provide justification. However, as the data above shows, these productively negative

Lest I be accused of employing the “rhetoric of imminent harm” Penney (2015) warns us to avoid when
discussing the potential harm of negative media, I want to distinguish that I am not using it to justify censorship.
Penney (2015) explains, “When justifying the need to remove an offending image from circulation in the public
sphere, activists… often invoke the threat of imminent harm. The idea here is that the media content will not only
upset members of the minority community but also endanger their material well-being as viewers are persuaded to
act discriminatorily or even violently toward them” (p. 223). As Penney (2015) points out, this rhetoric can be
dangerous because it assumes that certain groups are definitely in danger when in fact there is very little evidence to
support such claims; as a result, the targeted groups appear weak or powerless in the face of the malicious media that
is removed from circulation, when this is not the case. However, while my warning above comes close to using
Penney’s “rhetoric of imminent harm” I want to clarify that there are real—mostly anecdotal and unpublished—
instances of women being discouraged from participating on YouTube, and I am suggesting that rather than
censorship we need to find methods to reduce occurrences of mean comments without violating free speech.
12
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comments are rare. Instead, the majority of comments about “quality” provide generally hateful
statements (Figure 62).

Figure 62: “This video is not funny at all” (MyHarto, 2015)

Reading Mean Comments: A New Form of Parody

As a result, it has become increasingly clear that a method is needed to acknowledge,
confront, and fight against these kinds of comments that serve only to ridicule and objectify
women without offering anything productive. One method that may serve to subvert haters is
reading mean comments. Jimmy Kimmel created this video genre in 2012 when he debuted a
segment called “Celebrities Read Mean Tweets” on his show Jimmy Kimmel Live! Over the last
four years, Kimmel has aired this popular segment 24 times, including two featuring President
Obama. The premise is simple: a few celebrities read aloud one mean tweet they have received
and then respond to it briefly either verbally or nonverbally while REM’s “Everybody Hurts”
plays softly in the background. Some celebrities laugh partway through, while others keep a
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straight face the whole time or look confused. Some choose to crack a joke at the hater or the
tweet; others jokingly agree with them. The goal seems to be to ridicule the haters while
simultaneously subverting the power of their mean tweet. The segment takes a sort of “sticks and
stones”13 approach to online aggression: the haters can say what they want, but at the end of the
day, the celebrity is still going to be a celebrity and continue making music or starring in movies
regardless of what a mean tweet says about them.
Over the last four years, the reading mean tweets sensation has made its way to YouTube
as reading mean comments. A YouTube search for “reading mean comments” on December 30,
2016, yields over one billion results, most of which had been uploaded within the last two years
but a few of which had been uploaded within the hour. It seems nearly every YouTuber has
adopted this video genre for at least one upload, so the question remains: why is this genre so
appealing to YouTubers? Part of it may be that Jimmy Kimmel has popularized it in mainstream
and traditional media and top YouTubers like NigaHiga, PewDiePie, and JennaMarbles have
adapted it for digital media, so other savvy YouTubers have figured out that adapting it for
themselves can earn them more views and YouTuber popularity. But I think its appeal goes
deeper than that for serious YouTubers.
The reading mean comments genre has evolved into a complex form of parody. Part of
this parodic method’s appeal stems from the fact that, as Tom Ballard (2016) points out, “the
typical primary rhetorical purpose of a parody… is usually to mock that which is being imitated”
(10). Dentith (2000) explains that parody is “playful” (p. 11), and Hutcheon (1989) notes that it
is “always critical” (p. 93). Put together, this means that parody must playfully yet critically

13

From the old childhood adage “sticks and stones may break my bones, but words will never hurt me.”
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mock a text through imitation. This is similar to what happens when YouTubers read their mean
comments. They do not necessarily reinvent the text—the comments—to the degree to which the
term “parody” generally implies, but they alter their meaning through reiteration. In other words,
the YouTubers “participate in the construction of their [the mean comments’] meaning through
practices of active transformation” (Penney, 2015, p. 226). In particular, they reveal the
comments as hate speech while critiquing the larger cultural assumptions behind it.
The reading mean comments genre is particularly well-suited for this kind of parody
because it has the potential to enact this resistance and subversion through acknowledging “mean
comments” as hate speech. When a user reads only one mean comment or even a few, it can be
difficult to understand the larger picture of the kinds of online aggression female YouTubers
face. However, when users are faced with a cluster of mean comments in a five-minute video, it
becomes clear that such vitriol is more than just “mean”: it is hate speech aimed at specific
identities. As this study has shown, the majority of mean comments fixate on the YouTubers’
appearances or sexualize them in violent and nonviolent ways, revealing that YouTube remains a
space where female bodies are controlled and destroyed, even if only in fantasy.
At the same time, the parody has the power to not only evaluate the original text, but it
can also critique the larger cultural assumptions behind it. Dentith (2000) explains that “many
parodies draw on the authority of precursor texts to attack, satirise, or just playfully to refer to
elements of the contemporary world” (p. 9). In the case of mean comments and haters, the
alleged authority is the haters, their hate speech, and their hierarchical worldview that presumes
power over women’s bodies. However, through using parody to develop their own, YouTubers
resist and subvert the haters’ presumed authority. Rather than allow the hate speech to silence
them, female YouTubers are speaking out even louder against such oppressive power. They are
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actively working against the idea that YouTube is a space where they are not allowed and instead
attempting to open it up as a space for productive discourse about this kind of prejudice. Through
reading them aloud, the YouTubers actively transform malicious comments intended to offend or
silence into new texts that do the opposite.
These new texts unify YouTubers and their fans through laughter. The haters are not the
primary audience of the reading mean comments genre; the fans are. Although the YouTubers
read mean comments and sometimes respond briefly to them, they have also set up a framing
device that clarifies the fans as primary audience. This frame is important because most of their
fans are young, teenage girls, and the YouTubers act as role models for them; as such, by
directing the videos to fans instead of haters, they are fulfilling an ethical responsibility to their
fans.
Nearly every YouTuber begins by candidly addressing her fans and explaining why they
are reading mean comments or what reading mean comments is. In “Reading mean comments”
and “Reading mean tweets!” Colleen (PsychoSoprano, 2015) and Hannah (MyHarto, 2015),
respectively, both open with “Hey guys!” This is a typical salutation used by many YouTubers
and usually addresses their fans. Sometimes Hannah will have an aside that welcomes new
viewers, but even this is with the assumption that the new viewer will become a fan, not a hater.
Jenna (JennaMarbles, 2015) begins with “Hi friends” before explaining that the reason she has
decided to read mean comments is because her fans asked her to: “So I asked you yesterday on
my Facebook what you guys wanted to see, and overwhelmingly you guys want me to read mean
comments.” Lilly (IISuperwomanII, 2015) welcomes both fans and new viewers before thanking
both fans and haters “for their time and effort” and explaining that the over three million
comments she has received makes her an authority on what comments mean. And Grace
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(DailyYou, 2013; Grace Helbig, 2015b) begins both videos with clips of her joking around with
her guests, Pete Holmes and James Corden, before looking at the camera and acknowledging her
viewers. However, any fan who is familiar with Grace’s videos knows that this is the way she
begins most of her videos, even ones where she appears alone; as such, this technique establishes
a clear connection to her fans, not her haters. The only exception to this opening frame is Colleen
(PsychoSoprano, 2016) in “Mean comments – an original song” where she launches right into
her song; however, she has written at least two other mean comments songs,14 so her fans likely
knew what was coming without an introduction. Hannah also does not do a special intro in
Lyndsay K’s (2013) upload of “Hannah Hart comments on your comments at the #NoFilter
show” because this was a segment from a live performance and presumably the only attendees
would be fans of Hannah, Grace, and Mamrie.
Similarly, each video ends with a framing device that re-establishes the fans as primary
audience. Colleen and Lilly both end their videos by thanking fans for the larger number of
positive comments that they generally receive: “I do get a lot of hate comments, but not even
close to the amount of wonderful, sweet, loving comments you guys send me. So thank you so
much for always being so supportive and being nice and pleasant on the Internet”
(PsychoSoprano, 2016). Hannah (MyHarto, 2015) refers directly to her fans when she reveals
how staying positive is an active choice she makes every day and encourages her fans to make as
well. Jenna (JennaMarbles, 2015) refers back to the beginning by reminding her fans that they
requested this video: “So yeah, I hope that this video made you happy because it’s what you guys
wanted to see this week.” And Grace ends both of her videos with more witty banter with her

14

One of which, “CHRISTMAS HATERS (Original song),” is not included for analysis in this chapter.
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guests before encouraging her fans to watch their shows. Again, while she does not directly
address the audience in a familiar way—such as when most of the other YouTubers refer to “you
guys” to signify talking to the audience—this is typical of Grace’s videos and so signals a
concrete call to her audience.
While each YouTuber frames her videos to signify that her fans are the main audience,
each also employs a unique parody technique. The basic concept of the parody is the same—read
or sing the mean comments while briefly responding to some of them—but each YouTuber adds
her own modification to the genre. For instance, Grace has men present in both of her videos,
Lilly unapologetically derides the haters, Colleen exaggerates the comments (especially grammar
errors) while singing them, Hannah ends on a positive note, and Jenna takes a serious turn. These
distinctions are important because they not only reveal something about the fanbase toward
which they are directing these parodies, but they also demonstrate Penney’s (2015) “active
transformation” of parody. No one parody technique will work for every YouTuber; instead, she
must read her audience and actively demonstrate an understanding of their needs and
expectations by tweaking the genre as they transform the power of mean comments.

Grace and the Presence of a Male Authority

Grace has posted two reading mean comments videos to her channel. Both are unique
from other YouTubers’ similar videos in that she invites guests to help her read and respond to
comments: the first video features Pete Holmes (DailyYou, 2013), and the second one features
James Corden (Grace Helbig, 2015b), both of whom are male television actors and performers.15

Although Hannah featured other YouTubers reading mean comments in her “Reading Mean Tweets!” video,
Grace’s is distinct from hers in a few key ways. First, Grace’s guests are not YouTubers, while Hannah’s are;
15
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Both videos follow the “You’ve been prazed” format, which is a style of video Grace developed
when she was YouTubing on Daily You, a channel that she no longer uses (which is also where
“Pete Holmes compliments the sh*t out of you” is hosted). In this segment, she “hazes” her new
viewers with praise. The format itself is a parody of the mean comment genre; Grace invents
silly and weird comments instead of mean ones to make her fans laugh. Usually, Grace thinks of
something goofy and weird to say about the user, often using their username as fodder for a joke.
In both videos, Grace takes the concept of this segment and remixes it: she reads mean
comments and her guests respond to them by offering praise or providing a far-fetched
explanation for why the mean comment was actually a compliment. Grace’s videos are also
unique in that although her video is longer than most16, she reads the fewest comments per video
than the other YouTubers’; instead, the she and her guests spend more time parodying and
bantering about the comments than reading them.
In “Pete Holmes compliments the sh*t out of you,” Grace presents five different types of
comments for Pete Holmes to respond to (Table 10). The distinctive feature of this video is how
Pete responds to the mean comments; his responses are the only instances in this study of a
responder outright insulting a hater by name.17 For instance, in response to the comment “You’re

second, Hannah asked her guests to read and respond to their own mean comments, while Grace reads her own and
has her guests respond to them; third, Grace’s guests are male, while Hannah’s are female.
Grace’s two videos are 5:02 (“Pete Holmes Compliments”) and 5:21 (“Reading Mean Comments”). By
comparison, Lilly’s is 4:52 (“What Mean Comments”), Colleen’s are 3:27 (“Reading Mean Comments”) and 2:47
(“Mean Comments”), Hannah’s is 4:24 (“Reading Mean Tweets!”), and Jenna’s is 7:50 (“Reading Mean
Comments”).
16

17

As will be demonstrated below, Lilly makes fun of kinds of haters, but she does not call out any specific users by
their username. Pete does.
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a f*cking sl*t Grace; you africa me so much. You are so NOT interesting! BITCH F*** YOU!”
(Figure 63), Pete offers a lengthy rebuttal that ends in an insult:
wafa haj ali, I will say your name sounds like a planet system in the new Star
Wars movies. Also, I appreciate that you wrote ‘bitch’ and then you bleeped out
‘fuck.’ Bitch is okay, but fuck is a little over the line for the ‘ol w.h.a. So thanks
for africa-ing us you fucking dick. (DailyYou, 2013)
Pete’s response begins similarly to other YouTubers’ in this study; that is, he provides some
snarky commentary on the comment, specifically pointing out the haters’ inconsistent selfcensorship. However, he differs in that he responds directly to the hater, first addressing him/her
by username (and implying that it is a silly username; references to the new Star Wars franchise
are rarely a compliment), and ending by calling him/her a “fucking dick.” This is a level of
hostility to which the other YouTubers do not resort. However, this hostility also serves as
parody. Although Grace tells him that the goal is to respond to the haters with kindness, he often
insults them with their own words (ie: “you africa me so much” and “africa-ing,” which is
probably a typo that gives few clues as to the intended word).

Table 10
Actual Comments by Type: Grace Helbig “Pete Holmes compliments the sh*t out of you”
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Figure 63: “You’re a f*ckng sl*t Grace; you Africa me so much.
You are so NOT interesting! BITCH F*** YOU!” (Daily You,
2013)

James Corden takes a different approach in “Reading mean comments” that more closely
mirrors the other YouTubers’ responses in this study. The overall tone of the video seems
intentionally more playful than the previous one, which may have something to do with it being
produced more recently. Grace posted “Reading mean comments” in 2015, when her brand had
been more firmly established and when she had begun to emerge as the leader of the “awkward
older sister” movement, so perhaps James’s responses are tamer in part because of that.
Similarly, Grace selected mean comments that are more innocuous than the previous video’s:
three of them are categorized as General Hate and only one is Violent (Table 11). She chose
short, mostly silly comments like “f***, dis bich gon get rich,” “i h@ you,” and “Bitch” [sic, all
errors] (Grace Helbig, 2015). And, whereas the previous video largely featured Pete responding
to the comments with little input from Grace, this video features witty banter between Grace and
James that allows for an equal amount of time for each to respond to the comment.
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Table 11
Actual Comments by Type: Grace Helbig “Reading mean comments”

Interestingly, Grace puts most of the work of responding to the comments on the men she
features in these videos. She chooses and reads the comments, but leaves it to Pete and James to
formulate a response. Even in the case of the second video where she is more involved in the
response, James almost always initiates it with his own reaction. Further, when Grace displays
the comments she reads, she enlarges and superimposes them over the majority of the screen in
both videos. This serves the dual purpose of making the comment clearly visible and obscuring
Grace’s face so viewers cannot see her reaction when she reads the comment—whether
intentionally or not is unclear (Figure 64). In many ways, then, Grace removes the agency of
responding to these comments from herself and instead puts the impetus on her male guests. I
can only speculate on why this might be, but if Grace is an awkward older sister, then both men
seem to be filling the role of an older brother. As older brother figures, they step in to stick up for
their younger sister and protect her from bullies.
As a result, Pete and James represent a male authority that deconstructs some of the
gendered hate Grace receives. One example comes from “Pete Holmes compliments,” which
includes a wider range of mean comments: “she’s gay! the damn bull dykes seduced her from us.
grab ur children, especially the girls.. I heard, ‘they are recruiting em’” (DailyYou, 2013). Pete
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Figure 64: “i h@ you” (Grace Helbing, 2015)

responds by both mocking the user and making it clear that homophobia is not welcome on
Grace’s page:
David1002a, because David1002 was taken, I do want to say thanks for keeping it
really closed-minded and reinforcing the idea that lesbian women are all
pedophiles and out to recruit them also into dykehood? And you spelled dyke
correctly? What did ya Google it? I like that you painted such a vivid picture.
You’re like our JRR Tolkien, if he were a big bag of cocks. (DailyYou, 2013)
As shown above, one of the main reasons women receive so much hate on YouTube is because
they are exercising their voices in a public space. Haters post mean comments in an attempt to
silence these female YouTubers. However, Grace has invited men to respond to and parody these
comments in a move that paradoxically silences and empowers her. She allows the men to speak
for her, but doing so proves significant. She seems to recognize that—as white, heterosexual
men—their voices afford Pete and James a level of authority that is recognized by the haters,
which may give her more authority when speaking out against them. Because two figures of
normalized masculinity have aligned themselves with her and against female-identity-based hate
speech, Grace enacts powerful parody that subverts her haters.
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Lilly and Unapologetic Derision
Lilly’s video, “What YouTube comments really mean” (2015), is distinct from the others
in that it focuses only on various types of comments she has received; she does not read or
display any of her actual comments.18 In fact, she has never produced a video in which she reads
her mean comments. The only instance of her reading an actual mean comment is in Hannah’s
(MyHarto, 2015) “Reading Mean Tweets!” video. As I mention above, she tends to receive a lot
of racist and sometimes violent comments. As a result, she may not want to read some of these
comments in a public venue. Regardless of why she chooses to only focus on general kinds of
mean comments (Table 12), her take on the genre is unique. When parodying each of the general
kinds of comments she receives, she juxtaposes her reading with derisively mocking the hater.
To emphasize her disdain for the haters, she also uses a camera technique to physically separate
them from her on screen.
While reading each comment, Lilly mocks typing as she makes silly facial expressions
that illustrate her low opinions of commenters. For instance, when she says, “You’re a terrorist,”
she appears on the left side of the screen (Figure 65). Then for her response, she moves to the
right side of the shot (Figure 66). This move serves two purposes. First, it helps viewers to easily
understand when she is acting as a hater or responding to mean comments. But most importantly,
it creates a boundary between her and her haters and the malicious rhetoric they use.

18

Recall that I left some comments out of this analysis that are irrelevant to this study of online aggression.
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Table 12
General Kinds of Comments by Type: IISuperwomanII’s “What YouTube comments really
mean”

Figure 65: “You’re a terrorist” (IISuperwomanII, 2015)
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Figure 66: Response to “You’re a terrorist”: “My brain is
controlled by the media and I blindly accept information. Now I’d
love to stay and chat, but I have to forward this scary email to 70
people in the next seven minutes or a ghost is going to kill me”
(IISuperwomanII, 2015)

Lilly’s responses are also unique from the other female YouTubers’. Often the others will
casually make fun of the comments themselves or laugh at their ridiculousness, but few
reciprocate their haters’ mocking derision (apart from Pete, above). However, Lilly often
responds with sarcastic contempt for her haters. Figure 66’s response above to the “You’re a
terrorist” comment provides one example where Lilly portrays the hater as an unintelligent but
gullible person who doesn’t think for him/herself but still naively believes that chain emails need
to be forwarded. Another example is her response to the type of comment “You’re not funny and
you suck and I hate you and you’re dumb and you’re ugly” (IISuperwomanII, 2015). This
comment earns one of Lilly’s snarkier responses: “I like run-on sentences. Also, I wish they
would invent this button on my Internet window that like closed it, you know, so I [wouldn’t]
have to watch these videos against my will” (IISuperwomanII, 2015). In addition to ridiculing
haters’ general bad grammar, this remark also points to the futility of mean comments. As Lilly
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implies, haters do not need to watch the videos they hate on; ultimately, posting a mean comment
constitutes a waste of their time.
Through these and other responses, Lilly parodies her haters with unapologetic derision.
She doesn’t quite stoop to their level by perpetuating racism, making fun of their appearance,
threatening them in any way, or repeating many of the same themes haters tend to, but she does
mock their intelligence in nearly every response. Importantly, because she is resisting prejudice
and closed-mindedness, she is not re-enacting hate speech but instead parodying it. Finally, she
also rewards good comments. She ends her video by thanking her fans for their positive
comments and explains that she is “going to take some time right now and respond to as many as
I can”; she encourages her fans to “take a second and comment below” (IISuperwomanII, 2015).
Lilly shows that she values comments from her supporters but thinks very little of her haters.

Colleen and Exaggerating Mean Comments through Song

Colleen (PschoSoprano, 2013; 2015) adds a unique twist to the reading mean comments
genre by using negative comments as fodder for song lyrics. She has two videos, “Reading mean
comments” and “Mean comments – an original song” where she plays her ukulele and sings the
comments in a comical manner. This is not a new type of video for her fans: she often writes and
sings original songs as part of her YouTube channel. These two videos are remarkable because
of their tendency toward parodic exaggeration. Colleen uses both songs to emphasize her haters’
grammatical errors and ridicule their intelligence. She also uses both choruses to highlight the
power she has as a monetized YouTube channel; she makes money from the haters who
comment on her videos.
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Both songs place strong emphasis on the fact that so many of the mean comments she
receives are riddled with errors. At the end of “Reading mean comments,” Colleen says, “let’s be
honest, anyone who has grammar that terrible, um, is very uneducated and is probably living in
their parents’ garage or basement at age 42. And yes, I’m assuming they’re all male”
(PsychoSoprano, 2015). Similarly, in “Mean comments,” the main chorus includes the lines “So
keep the comments coming, but here’s some help: before you go insulting people maybe learn
how to spell. Dumb da-dumb, dumb da-dumb, you sound so dumb, dumb, dumb, you sound so
dumb” (PsychoSoprano, 2016). Colleen admits in the first video that her approach to receiving
mean comments is to retaliate publicly rather than passively accepting them: “I choose to sing
about them and poke fun right at them right back” (PsychoSoprano, 2015).
Her method for retaliation largely consists of allowing the haters to speak for themselves.
Colleen shows their comments while she sings them; at times these videos seem like a dark singalong. An important aspect of her parody is how she exaggerates her haters’ many spelling
errors. Dentith (2000) explains how this exaggeration enhances parody:
One way in which parody works is to seize on particular aspects of a manner or a
style and exaggerate it to ludicrous effect. There is an evident critical function in
this, as the act of parody must first involve identifying a characteristic stylistic
habit or mannerism and then making it comically visible. (p. 32)
When singing and critiquing the comments in both videos, she mostly focuses on comments with
one or more errors, often exaggerating a spelling mistake by over emphasizing it. For instance, in
“Reading mean comments,” the first three comments she sings have egregious errors that she
over-pronounces:
“First of all, you are haribile” [she pronounces the last word “hair-i-bile”]
“Ew wat was that ungly thing it looks like fat nolife” [she hits the “n” in “ungly”]
“Your not atriative yur very agly” [she pronounces “atriative” as “uh-try-uh-tive”
and stresses the “a” in “agly”] [sic, all errors]
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(PsychoSoprano, 2015)
She continues this tradition in “Mean comments” when she over-pronounces the “l” in the
comment that calls her “toltoly stupid” (PsychoSoprano, 2016). Figure 67 shows her sticking out
her rolled tongue as she exaggerates the misspelling. Of the 42 comments Colleen sings in both
videos, 32 contain misspellings or other errors that she makes fun of. In fact, the first half of
“Reading mean comments” focuses solely on exaggerating comments that contain egregious
errors, while almost every comment in “Mean comments” does the same. These comments also
tend to be the ones to which Colleen directly responds during her songs. For instance, one nearly
unreadable comment says “Yo lips fat den a bitch yo shit look like 2 salmon patties” to which
Colleen theatrically mouths “What?” (PsychoSoprano, 2016). Through this exaggerated attention
to the haters’ grammatical errors, Colleen’s videos act as light-hearted and humorous backlash
against mean comments.

Figure 67: “Toltoly Stupid” (PsychoSoprano, 2016)
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However, one of the drawbacks of Colleen’s sing-along parody method is that the happy
tune of both of her songs belie the serious nature of some of these comments. For instance, the
fifth comment in “Mean comments” contains a reference to masturbation: “roses are red violets
are blue pornhub is down psychosoprano will do” (PsychoSoprano, 2016). The comment is
sandwiched between a lengthy and confusing one that Colleen reads dramatically and another
short but silly one. This placement and her silly singing downplays the fact that one of her haters
openly admitted that the only reason s/he visits her channel is to sexually objectify her, not to
view and enjoy her content; the viewer does not take Colleen seriously as a YouTuber or content
creator, but instead uses her channel as an alternative to his or her standard pornography venues.
This comment is not the only one that objectifies Colleen. Of the 42 total comments, 12 critique
her appearance, three make sexual comments or advances, and two are violent. See Tables 13
and 14 for a detailed breakdown of the kinds of comments Colleen sings in both videos.

Table 13
Actual Comments by Type: PsychoSoprano “Reading mean comments”
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Table 14
Actual Comments by Type: PsychoSoprano “Mean comments – an original song”

However, despite this risk of downplaying the mean comments, Colleen also makes an
important move by stressing how much power she has even in the face of mean comments from
haters. Both videos emphasize that making YouTube videos is Colleen’s primary source of
income. She has enabled monetization on her channel, so she makes money when people watch
her videos. In “Reading mean comments,” she sings “But the joke’s on you, so keep saying ‘I
want you killsd,’ cuz your comments make me money and you’re paying my bills”
(PsychoSoprano, 2015). In “Mean comments,” she sings “You might think that I’m hurt or I’m
feeling abused, but I’m not. I’m getting paid from your comments and views” (PsychoSoprano,
2016). In both cases, she emphasizes the fact that she makes money for every mean comment
that gets posted to her channel. In “Mean comments,” she even encourages it: “So keep the
comments coming” (PsychoSoprano, 2016). This rhetorical move shows any haters or potential
haters who may be watching that their negative comments are powerless over her. If she is
bothered by any of these malicious comments, she does not show it in these videos.
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Hannah and Ending on a Positive Note

Hannah is known for her optimistic and positive YouTube videos, so her producing a
reading mean comments video seems strange at first to fans. She acknowledges this in her intro
to “Reading Mean Tweets! #MakeItHappy ft. Jenna Marbles, Colleen Ballinger, Lilly Singh, and
Mamrie Hart!”:
Hey guys, it’s Thursday, and usually on Thursdays we talk about our feelings
slash news items slash things I learned about that day. But today I just wanna talk
about some things that really suck. So recently I got together with some of my
best friends to sit around and talk about our feelings while recording them straight
to camera. Why, you may ask? Frankly because we’re YouTubers and that’s just
how we’ve trained ourselves to cope. Sometimes it’s a little difficult because of
comments that are negative in the comments section. (MyHarto, 2015)
Interestingly, although this is Hannah’s video, she does not read any of her own mean comments.
Instead, she asks—as the title implies—Jenna, Colleen, Lilly, and Mamrie to read comments that
she has selected. Although the main video begins with the four YouTubers talking about the
kinds of comments they receive and reading a few negative comments, Hannah’s take on the
genre is unique in that she quickly steers the video away from the mean comments and instead
focuses on how to make a positive impact using the hashtag “#MakeItHappy.” Her method is
complicated by the fact that the video also serves as a commercial promotion for Coca Cola, but
it is overall effective in resisting haters through parody.
The main video opens with a montage of Jenna, Colleen, Lilly, and Mamrie talking about
the general kinds of mean comments they receive. Jenna notes that she is no stranger to mean
comments. Colleen speculates that “people just like to hate” while explaining that her negative
comments tend to focus on her intelligence: “they say that they hate me and I’m just, you know,
dumbing myself down to try to get famous or try to get views” (MyHarto, 2015). Lilly explains
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that she receives a lot of racist and sexist comments on her videos. And Mamrie explains that “I
think I get more upset when people just say things aren’t funny rather than when they say
something about, like ‘I could drive a train through her two front teeth’” (MyHarto, 2015). Table
15 contains a classification of the general kinds of comments each says they receive.

Table 15
General Kinds of Comments by Type and YouTuber: MyHarto “Reading mean tweets!”

Next, the camera cuts back to a nervous-looking Jenna; off-camera, Hannah says, “I’m
going to have you read some negative comments okay?” (MyHarto, 2015). Jenna responds with
“‘Kay” and makes funny faces at the camera until she is handed a laptop, presumably by
Hannah. Jenna’s facial expressions and vocal tone are noteworthy. She is known for being goofy
and playful, but here she seems almost childish. She appears nervous about the comments she is
about to read, which suggests that unlike most versions of the reading mean comments genre,
Jenna has not read her own comments beforehand. Typically, the YouTuber is responsible for
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choosing his or her own comments and deciding to read them, but it appears as though Hannah
may be surprising her YouTuber friends for her version.
Jenna reads and responds to two comments while Lilly, Mamrie, and Colleen read and
respond to one apiece. Table 16 details the kinds of comments each YouTuber reads. Each
YouTuber also responds jokingly to her comment. In particular, Lilly’s and one of Jenna’s
responses deflate any power the comments may have had by agreeing with the haters.
Jenna: [reading] “you are so uneducated and stupid cussing don’t make you cool!”
[pause] “Oh it says ‘doesn’t.’ Apparently I’m not educated cuz I can’t even read.
Alright [hater’s screenname], you get a point for that.”
Lilly: [reading] “This video is not funny at all.” [Pause, looks at camera] “You’re
Probably right.” [laughs]
(MyHarto, 2015)
The others respond similarly by downplaying the comment through sarcasm and playful derision.
Jenna’s second comment is “dont rise up your chin all the time” to which she responds by
looking up and apparently “ris[ing] up her chin” (MyHarto, 2015). Colleen’s comment says,
“coleen needs to contour her makeup,” to which she jokingly replies, “Alright, well that’s not
how you spell my name. How rude!” (MyHarto, 2015). Mamrie’s response is the most sarcastic.
The commenter insulted her dog, Beanz (a Mexican hairless xolo), by calling him a “bug,” to
which Mamrie replied:
Mamrie: [sounding genuinely angry] “Are they talking about my dog? Are they
talking about Beanz? If you could train a bug to wear a wig and grow to be five
pounds and also pull of any type of hat.” [pause, voice changes to complimentary]
“You got yourself a great bug.” (MyHarto, 2015)
Up to this point, Hannah’s video has focused on the negative impact of haters and mean
comments without taking it very seriously. The comments are not representative of the kinds of
hate the YouTubers typically receive on their videos. Perhaps this is because Hannah does not
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want to upset her fanbase—who are used to happy and positive videos and often remark that
such content is why they watch her—or perhaps she does not want to upset her best friends.
Whatever the reason, Hannah is taking it easy on them.

Table 16
Actual Comments by Type and YouTuber: MyHarto “Reading mean tweets!”

Around the 1:50 mark, less than halfway through the video, Hannah backpedals and
admits that reading mean comments can be tough: “Now, I have to interrupt myself because I’m
not a total sadist and after making people read negative comments about themselves, I just had to
surprise them by putting in a positive comment too” (MyHarto, 2015). As the YouTubers begin
to read positive comments about themselves and react to them, the real purpose of the video
becomes clearer: in addition to condemning and deriding haters and mean comments, Hannah
contrasts the vitriol of the mean comments with the community-building of the positive ones.
This method allows Hannah to highlight and discourage the hate speech. At the same time,
Hannah reconstructs the discursive space on YouTube; she shows that it has the potential to be a
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space that supports females and inspires productive discourse instead of one that derides nonhegemonic identities and closes off dialog.
With the introduction of positive comments, the demeanor of the video changes from
apprehension and playful defensiveness to warmth and happiness. Take for instance the
difference between Mamrie reading her negative comment and her positive one. She takes the
negative one in stride and turns it into a joke, but her initial response as she is reading the
comment is to frown while reading it from the laptop (Figure 68); her reading pace is also
slower, signaling discomfort or unease. But for the positive comment she turns to look at the
camera for the final phrase “just gorgeous!” and her facial expression signals her delight at the
comment (Figure 69); likewise, her vocal tone rises, signaling that she is happy and surprised by
the kind remark. Through framing her video as a journey from mean comment to positive
comment, Hannah illustrates for her fans the power of positive commenting.

Figure 68: “what the hell was that giant bug with a blond wig you
were holding?” (MyHarto, 2015)

204

Figure 69: “Mamrie, you are looking INCREDIBLY Healthy and
skin-glowy! Just gorgeous!” (MyHarto, 2015)

Although Hannah’s unique spin on the reading mean comments genre has the potential to
encourage her fans to spread love by leaving more kind comments on YouTube videos, this
video is also sponsored content from Coca Cola. After Jenna, Mamrie, Colleen, and Lilly read
their positive comments, Hannah appears to begin to wrap up the video by explaining how
staying positive isn’t always easy:
Hannah: In fact, it’s an active choice I make each and every day. You guys
always ask me, ‘Hannah, how do you stay so positive? How do you stay so
optimistic?’ Well here’s the big secret, here’s the big reveal: I choose to. And not
in like a weird repressive sort of way, but by trying to find what shred of
positivity there is. Usually you can find it. (MyHarto, 2015)
Typically, this is where her videos would end. However, she surprises her viewers with her next
line: “So together with Coca Cola, we’re trying to make the Internet into a happier place. And
you can participate too!” (MyHarto, 2015). She explains #MakeItHappy as an initiative to turn
negative things into positive. Sometimes her fans have mixed reactions when Hannah posts

205
sponsored content, but here they are supportive, filling the comments section with
“#MakeItHappy and compliments for Hannah, Jenna, Colleen, Mamrie, and Lilly.

Jenna and Turning to the Serious
As Jenna states in the intro and outro of “Reading Mean Comments” (JennaMarbles,
2015), she decided to produce this video because her fans requested it. She explains why she has
resisted doing it for so long: “So yeah, I’ve been putting off making this video because it’s a
downer, it’s fucking sad…. So I’ve sorta been hesitant to do this, but I know that you guys really
want to see it, so I wanted to make you guys laugh this week by trashing Jenna” (JennaMarbles,
2015). She also explains that she has gone beyond YouTube to find these comments; some are
from Twitter, Facebook, and other “deep corners of the Internet forums” (JennaMarbles, 2015).
Unlike some of the other YouTubers, Jenna does not begin lightheartedly; instead, she launches
into malicious comments aimed mostly at her appearance. Table 17 details the kinds of
comments Jenna reads during the video. Although Jenna begins reading the comments
lightheartedly, her video is remarkable because she is the only one who chooses to read not just
one, but three sexually violent comments; reading these comments signifies a significant shift in
the overall tone of the video.
Even though many of these comments are negative, Jenna spends the first part of the
video laughing at and responding to some of them. Importantly, her laughter functions as a
response to the common criticism of feminists that they “can’t take a joke”; Jenna shows that she
can. One comment reads, “Ugly slut you are” and Jenna responds by smiling and saying
“Thanks, Yoda” (JennaMarbles, 2015). Another comment from a Facebook page shows a picture
of her and simply displays the word “Idiot” (Figure 70). Jenna responds with seven seconds of
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Table 17
Actual Mean Comments by Type JennaMarbles “Reading mean comments”

laughter and the admission “That’s one’s actually funny”; she’s still laughing at it when she
begins to read the next one (JennaMarbles, 2015). Even if she doesn’t respond to the comments
directly, her tone of voice toward the beginning does the work for her. For instance, she reads
“without make up on she looks like a guy” nearly tonelessly (Figure 71), but as she translates the
emojis at the end of the comment, she pauses sarcastically between them to emphasize her
derision—“Blushing face. One-hundred”—then looks into the camera to underscore her
contempt (Jenna Marbles, 2015).
However, as the video goes on, Jenna’s tone quickly begins to shift and reveals that she is
weary of reading repetitive insults. The shift begins most noticeably around the 3:50 mark when
she reads the first sexually violent comment. The comment is a strange blend of sexual violence
and illiteracy: “I just hope you die. So your saying no makeup no sucky cocky and with lip stick
swallow spit or gargle” (JennaMarbles, 2015). Jenna half-laughs through it because she appears
to have a hard time reading the nearly unreadable comment, but after she finishes she repeats
while shaking her head, “I just hope you die” (JennaMarbles, 2015). Her shift in tone is
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Figure 70: “Idiot” (JennaMarbles, 2015)

Figure 71: “Without Make up on she looks like a guy [blushing
face emoji] [100 emoji]” (JennaMarbles, 2015)

solidified around the 5:15 mark when she reads the second of three sexually violent comments:
“I hate that unfunny kunt [cunt] sloot [slut]. I would fuk [fuck] her but only if I can brutally
murder her afterwards” (JennaMarbles, 2015). The look on her face signals that this is not funny;
Jenna does not laugh at this one (Figure 72). In fact, Jenna’s facial expression shows that this is
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not the first comment she has read fantasizing about raping and murdering her, and that she
knows it will not be the last.

Figure 72: “I hate that unfunny kunt sloot. I would fuk her but
only if I can brutally murder her afterwards” (JennaMarbles,
2015)

Next, she reads a more lighthearted comment in a similar vein to some of the ones she
laughed at earlier: “she looks like she was born in a windtunnel” (JennaMarbles, 2015). She even
repeats this comment at the end of the video as an example after admitting “some of these were
fucking funny” (JennaMarbles, 2015). However, when Jenna originally reads this comment, it is
followed by the third sexually violent comment around the 5:29 mark: “I would destroy her vag
and dump her in the lake back there…” (JennaMarbles, 2015). Her facial expression mirrors the
one from Figure 70 (Figure 73). This comment finalizes the shift in tone and signals an end to
the video’s humor. Jenna doesn’t laugh at any more comments until the last one (“You look like
a rodent” JennaMarbles, 2015), which she may have strategically placed there so she could end
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on a laugh. Jenna looks and sounds tired, even though she slogs through two more minutes of
reading mean comments.

Figure 73: “I would destroy her vag and dump her in the lake
back there…” (JennaMarbles, 2015)

Of the six YouTubers, Jenna is the only one who reads sexually violent comments and
shifts the tone from humorous to serious. Although this shift defies her typical video style (goofy
and silly humor), it is an important rhetorical move for a couple of reasons. First, any of her
haters who may be watching can see her reading and reacting to their comments. These haters
have the opportunity to see that she is a real person who is being negatively impacted by their
online aggression, and that may deter them from writing more mean comments on her or
someone else’s channel.
Second, the video further unifies her and her fans while mobilizing her fanbase against
haters and mean comments. Many of the video’s comments commiserate with Jenna and reassure
her that the mean comments are untrue or that the haters are not worth listening to. A few even
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say that they will be vigilant and thumbs-down any mean comments they see on Jenna’s videos.
Several more of her commenters are confused; they say they’ve seen other YouTubers read mean
comments and found the videos funny: “Normally I love people reading hate comments, but this
is sad. Like I literally started to tear up...” (Forest of Shadows, 2017). Perhaps inspiring this
cognitive dissonance was intentional: people request these videos because they see the most
popular YouTubers, most of which are male, read mean comments, so they want to see the top
female YouTuber do it too. But what it seems many fans learned from Jenna’s video is that mean
comments on female YouTubers’ videos are not like they are on PewDiePie’s or NigaHiga’s.
Instead, they are, as Wotanis & McMillan (2014) have shown, largely based in criticizing their
appearance or invoking rape and death, all of which are a unique result of their gender.

Parodying the Hate Speech

In all of these videos, the parodic moment happens when the YouTuber reads the mean
comments. During this process, they actively transform the meaning of the comments through
their method for reading. Through their derisive and sing-song tones, Lilly and Colleen strip the
original comments of their power by making it clear that they think very little of these haters.
The same goes with Mamrie when she reads a comment in Hannah’s video. Jenna’s active
transformation differs in that her tone reveals just how much these mean comments have affected
her; through using a solemn and weary tone, she shows her viewers that mean comments can
have a negative impact on even the most successful of YouTubers. Even the way the YouTubers
or their guests respond to the comments becomes a way to parody the haters. For instance, when
Pete Holmes “prazes” Grace’s haters he reenacts the mean comment genre by mirroring their
derision in his responses. However, despite the fact that parody could be an effective method for
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resisting haters and mean comments on YouTube, the repetitive nature of this rhetorical
maneuver could also prove dangerous if it is not used carefully.
Conclusion: The Problem with Parody and Why It’s Worth It
Parody is most effective when its “implicit criticism” is obvious (Dentith, 2000, p. 16).
As Judith Butler (1990) explains, “Parody by itself is not subversive, and there must be a way to
understand what makes certain kinds of parodic repetitions effectively disruptive, truly troubling,
and which repetitions become domesticated and recirculated as instruments of cultural
hegemony” (p. 189). If the parodist does not draw a sharp line between his/her critique and the
original text, then the parody could be mistaken for sincerity. In all of the videos analyzed above,
the YouTubers make this distinction by explaining their general thoughts about mean comments
and/or by calling out the haters and making fun of them in some way. After watching these eight
videos, most viewers would likely understand their parodic elements and see them as clear
attempts to resist being silenced by online aggression. In particular, the YouTubers who preclude
this legitimization most effectively may be Hannah and Jenna; they are the two who most
strongly set themselves in opposition to the mean comments they present. All six YouTubers are
clear about their disapproval of haters and mean comments, but Hannah outright addresses the
negative impact of the mean comments when she explains what one hater in a sea of supporters
can do, while Jenna actively displays it through her tone and facial expressions.
However, another danger of parody is that its inherently repetitive nature can also
accidentally legitimize the online aggression it seeks to resist. One particular instance comes
from Colleen’s live show where she performs her reading mean comments songs before fans. In
one video, captured by YouTuber 138riley138 (2016), Colleen sings “Reading mean comments”
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before a live audience. The most notable aspect of this video is the fan involvement. I noted
earlier how the sing-along format may undermine the seriousness of the mean comments that she
receives. In this live segment, as she sings the mean comments, several audience members can be
heard singing along with her. In addition, they often cheer loudly during some of the more
unsavory comments. Part of this enthusiasm likely stems from support; they are cheering her on
as she faces down the haters and refuses to be silenced by their aggression. Nonetheless, it is
disturbing to watch a lone woman play the ukulele on stage while her fans scream insults at her,
even if she is singing along and instigated the event.
This video also does not contain context, which Butler (1997) has identified as important
to understanding the difference between injurious and non-injurious speech (p. 13). Two things
complicate the context of this video, and both of them are connected to audience. First, the
recording does not show if Colleen addressed the nature of mean comments during the
performance to frame it as a parody. Second, the uploaded video does not contain any context or
explanation of what the video is or of its parodic intent. As such, any viewers unfamiliar with
Colleen or her videos may not understand the song’s parodic nature. Dietel-McLaughlin (2009)
explains that audience awareness is a key part of the subversive power of parody: “audience
members must draw from their knowledge of previous cultural texts and rely on multiple
intelligences to inform their understanding.” As such, if Colleen is not careful to frame these
performances in terms of her parody, she risks perpetuating the very hate she is trying to subvert
through audience members who do not understand her purpose.
In addition, repeating these comments even in the service of parody can serve to
perpetuate them. Even though the YouTubers all clarify the difference between mean comments
and good ones, reading mean comments can still be normalizing. The mean comments are meant
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to be laughed at, but the problem is where the laughter comes from. If someone laughs at the
parody while recognizing its evaluative function, then the chance of normalizing and valorizing
the hate speech is reduced. However, if someone laughs at the parody without an awareness of or
appreciation for its critique, the hate speech has a higher risk of being normalized and rewarded
in much the same way that trolling can be on 4chan.
In addition, as I mentioned in the previous chapter, many scholars—including Milner
(2013a), Phillips (2015), and Butler (1997)—recognize that repeating harmful language, even if
for the purpose of criticism or to provide an example, is harmful and could work to normalize
injurious speech. In addition, the fact that these videos were created for humor is problematic. In
an exploration of how mainstream comedy enabled Trump’s 2016 election (even though video
evidence showed him admitting to sexual assault, Deni Ellis Béchard (2017) explains, “Humor,
while a tonic…, can have a powerful normalizing effect. Studies have shown it to increase social
acceptance of discrimination and sexism.” As such the reading mean comments genre has the
potential to perpetuate the hate its users seek to resist. The YouTubers invite us to laugh at the
ridiculous things haters say, in part because they are ridiculous and in part because they are so
futile, but doing so may normalize their mean comments.
However, even though the reading mean comments genre risks normalizing hate, its
potential as a method for subverting online aggression is still promising. In the face of haters
trying to silence their voices in a public place, these six female YouTubers refuse to be silenced.
Rather than ignore the online aggression, they fight back by showing that the mean comments
will not stop them from making their videos and spreading their “awkward older sister”
messages. Most importantly, this resistance has the potential to maintain their comments sections
as spaces for free and open discourse; rather than allowing haters to overrun the comments
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sections, Grace, Hannah, Lilly, Jenna, Colleen, and Mamrie fight to keep the space available for
their fans to feel comfortable to speak and express themselves as well. Each of these YouTubers
regularly demonstrates a commitment to their fans, and their decision to try to keep the comment
section free from haters and mean comments is part of that. Parody is key to this action because
it evaluates and critiques the hate speech while subverting its authority and power.
The comments sections of these videos are full of supportive comments from fans.
Remarkably, although these videos are quite old in the grand scheme of YouTube content—the
newest is from September 2016, the oldest from October 2013—most of them are still garnering
new comments in February 2017. Notably, these new comments are supportive. Comments on
Colleen’s videos emphasize how happy viewers are to comment on and watch her videos so they
can help her make more money: “when she said the comments make her money I just want to
spam her with comments!!!” (AlexisHappySnuggle Raby, 2016). Comments on others’ videos
open up about their experiences with bullying and start commiseration threads: “If I got 20
dollars for every time someone bullied me I would be one of the most richest people in the
world.....people bully me a lot and say that I'm ugly” (Stephanie Saldivar, 2017). Still more offer
praise for specific YouTubers and attempt to bolster them: “Really? Rape and murder
comments? Whoever made those comments, I hope you know you're fucking disgusting. I feel as
if those comments affected Jenna the most. I myself would feel disgusted and shocked. This
makes me so angry” (Miekel, 2017). I cannot make any assumptions that these parody videos
have resulted in the YouTubers receiving fewer mean comments. However, these positive
comments and others like them show that the videos can strengthen the community each
YouTuber has built from her fanbase. These parody videos subvert the haters by empowering
each YouTuber’s community to engage with each other in supportive dialog.

CHAPTER 5
CONCLUSION: LEARNING TO FEED THE TROLLS

This dissertation has shown that not only do we need to feed the trolls—or more precisely
to engage with them—but we need to learn to do so without amplifying their online aggression. I
have examined three sites and contexts that are conducive to online aggression—particularly
directed at females, the LGBTQ+ community, and people of color—while offering and analyzing
three methods for resistance that we can use to feed the trolls. Image macro memes can look like
harmless jokes, but in reality can perpetuate histories of gendered and racial oppression when
they exploit stereotypes for a cheap laugh. However, counter-meming can reverse the negative
messages and affirm identities instead of challenging them. 4chan’s /b/ board can be a place full
of gendered insults and racial slurs, proving itself a hostile environment for anyone who does not
fit into the anti-PC collective identity it has created. However, using identity rhetoric to rupture
the collective identity while still asserting a right to belong can create small windows for open
dialog. Finally, haters post mean comments on female YouTubers’ videos, thus attempting to
silence female voices on the site. However, the reading mean comments genre can serve as an
effective method of parody that strengthens the bond between YouTubers and their fans.
Although these three methods may serve to subvert and resist online aggression in these spaces,
they are only the beginning. To see a dramatic decrease in online aggression on a large scale,
these methods and others need to be taught in university classrooms, these spaces and others
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need to be studied more extensively, and we need to be aware of our ethical obligations as global
digital citizens.

Pedagogical Implications and Learning Outcomes

The findings in this dissertation have implications for how we address technological
literacy in the classroom to help students become informed and engaged digital citizens. Cynthia
Selfe (1999b) explains that technological literacy is more than the ability to use computers; it is
also “a complex set of socially and culturally situated values, practices, and skills involved in
operating linguistically within the context of electronic environments, including reading, writing,
and communicating” (p. 11). In the early 2000s, scholarship conceived of students as “digital
natives,” or people who had grown up surrounded by technology and so were naturally more
capable of using it. However, this conception has largely been proven a myth: despite being
inundated by technology, students still struggle to use it to produce and consume content
critically. Selfe (1999b) explains that “teachers need to recognize that they can no longer simply
educate students to become technology consumers without also helping them to learn how to
think critically about the technology and social issues surrounding its use (p. 152). A decade
later, Stephanie Vie (2008) repeats this call, noting that “students possess technological knowhow and access to computers but lack critical technological awareness skills.” Another decade
later, the trend of students acting as tech-savvy yet uncritical producers continues, demonstrating
the continued need for technological literacy education in writing courses.
Jesse Gainer (2012) has also shown that technological literacy is linked to engaged
citizenship and democracy:
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A healthy and vibrant democracy requires an engaged citizenry who think
critically, take positions on complicated issues, and work collaboratively to solve
problems. These qualities parallel demands for 21st-century literacies that deal
with the sociological nature of reading and writing multimodally in an
increasingly globally connected world. (Gainer, 2012, p. 14)
If we consider that one of our obligations as teachers and scholars is to help students engage with
their world as ethical global citizens who are conscious of the implications of both their formal
and informal writing—and I think we as scholars and teacher-scholars do (DeLuca, 2015; Duffy,
2014; Frost, 2011; Tryon, 2006; Carlacio & Gillam, 2002)—it seems imperative that we teach
students how to read, write, and interact in anonymous spaces as digital citizens. Sameer Hinduja
& Justin W. Patchin (2015) have developed digital citizenship pedagogical resources aimed at
middle and high school students. However, not only do they omit the role of anonymity and
pseudonymity in online aggression, but a PEW survey showing that most online abuse is directed
at people in the 18-29 age range (Duggan, 2014) also suggests that such instruction needs to
extend in some meaningful way into post-secondary education. Our students are the ones most
commonly being harassed and doing the harassing online. Through adding anonymous and
pseudonymous social media to all levels of our writing classroom curricula, we can begin to help
students be critical consumers and producers of the content they post online.
Many teacher-scholars already use digital social media in some form in their writing
classrooms. Ryan P. Shepherd (2015) shows how Facebook helps knowledge transfer from the
first-year composition classroom, and Bay VanWagenen (2015) and Samuel L. Head (2016) each
link the use of social media to students’ understanding of key rhetoric concepts like audience and
author, rhetorical situation, genre, and Burkean identification. David T. Coad (2013) explains
that he communicates with his composition students via Facebook instead of a course
management system because such a space is “closer to the future of communicative
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environments” than something like Blackboard or D2L; Stephanie Vie (2008) also notes that
students use social media to connect with each other about their education, sharing notes and
asking questions. Erin A. Frost (2011) illustrates the connection students can see between their
online identities and their offline lives by guiding students through a rhetorical analysis of
Facebook that leads them to understand how the site shapes their interactions and identities.
These examples show that digital social media has the capacity to help students make
meaningful connections between their academic and informal writing, with students and
instructors, and to their own digital identities. However, much of this work centers on Facebook,
a nonymous space. As the examples from this study have shown, a critical awareness of
anonymous and pseudonymous spaces is necessary to work against online aggression. In other
words, learning how to “feed the trolls” is a crucial component of technological literacy and
engaged digital citizenship. The important task at hand for writing teachers and rhetoric scholars
is to engage with anonymous and pseudonymous digital social media—particularly the more
hostile communities—in a way that will reveal opportunities to inspire the kinds of democratic
participation so often lacking in these spaces.
Some may be opposed to this notion, believing that we have an obligation to protect
students from the kinds of online aggression that manifest in these spaces. However, such a
standpoint is naïve. Our students visit these spaces on a regular basis and are often confronted
with online aggression. I implore those who are opposed to incorporating such social media into
their courses to talk to their students: ask them how often they see online aggression and hostility
in their daily lives. We do our students a great disservice to pretend that anonymous and
pseudonymous digital spaces are peripheral to teaching them technological literacy.
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As this research shows, we must teach our students not just how to consume and produce
content for nonymous social media, we must also teach them to critically engage with
anonymous and pseudonymous digital spaces. Erin A. Frost (2011) and Cynthia Selfe and Gail
Hawisher (2004) have pointed out that students often have difficulty “seeing” computers and
technologies—that is, fully understanding the impact they can have on us, even when we are
offline—because they have become so embedded in our lives as to seem virtually invisible.
Therefore, our task is to help students “see” the technology and understand how it works with
and against them to enact or resist online aggression. When teaching all levels of writing classes,
I suggest designing projects that provide opportunities for revealing the discursive power of
anonymous and pseudonymous writing. However, they should go beyond analysis. While it is a
useful starting point, Bruce McComiskey (2000) points out that focusing only on analysis can
leave students feeling helpless; analysis points out problems but does not always offer solutions.
As such, production is an essential next step. Students must not only critique digital texts, they
must also critically engage in their creation. Importantly, these projects should also be
incorporated at all levels of writing instruction, from first-year composition and other service
writing courses to technical communication and digital writing courses and even to graduate
level digital rhetoric courses.

General Learning Outcomes

Below are some suggestions for general learning outcomes for students in all levels of writing
courses, followed by sections with more specific pedagogical goals and approaches and activities
for how we can incorporate anonymous and pseudonymous social media into our classrooms.
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•

Gain awareness of the power of mundane digital discourses and texts

•

Develop technoliteracy that includes awareness of social and cultural forces behind
digital texts

•

Engage in critical digital and multimodal consumption and production that demonstrates
awareness of and sensitivity to the varied identities of potential viewers

First-Year Composition

First-year composition (FYC) and other service learning courses are key areas where we
can begin to teach students about critically engaging with anonymous and pseudonymous social
media spaces. Many FYC courses already ask students to perform visual and rhetorical analyses
of texts, so teachers may be able to adapt projects like these to anonymous and pseudonymous
digital social media. One method for doing so could involve teaching students to meme and
counter-meme (although it is certainly not the only method).
For example, I recently guest taught a class for a FYC course and used the Idiot College
Freshman meme to talk about the rhetorical power of memes in a way that the students—most of
whom were college freshman—could relate. Idiot College Freshman (Figure 74) perpetuates the
stereotype that college freshmen are naïve or unskilled and unable to take care of themselves
while away from home for the first time. I used this meme as a platform to introduce the
rhetorical conventions of memes, and to encourage discussion on the larger effects negative
memes can have. Students discussed how Idiot College Freshman normalizes the trope of upperlevel college students treating freshmen poorly or not valuing them. Then, at the end of class I
asked them to go to ImgFlip and create their own counter-memes. Only a few completed it by the
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end of the class period, but those who did remixed the message to defy stereotypes about college
freshmen (Figure 75). This is only one way to approach anonymous and pseudonymous social
media in a FYC course, but it was effective. Not only did these students become more aware of
memes—mundane digital texts that they uncritically consume and sometimes produce daily—as
digital texts that carry a large amount of social and cultural power, but they also had fun while
doing it. Table 18 details some broader pedagogical goals adapted from the WPA outcomes
statement (CWPA, 2014) that could be used when creating similar projects for FYC courses.

Figure 74. Idiot College Freshman
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Figure 75. Idiot College Freshman remix

Table 18. Learning Objectives for First-Year Composition Courses
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Technical Communication and Digital Writing
The ability to engage with anonymous and pseudonymous social media in professions
that require technical and digital writing is becoming increasingly important. An example of this
comes from a January KitKat advertisement on Twitter that used the Evil Kermit meme. This
meme depicts Kermit the Frog facing another Kermit wearing a dark hood. The text illustrates
the double-sidedness of personality, juxtaposing Kermit’s goodness with Evil Kermit’s evilness
(Figure 76). KitKat takes the same memetic concept and remixes it into an advertisement on
Twitter (Figure 77), to the delight of many customers. Similarly, Success Kid and the Y U NO
Rage Face have been spotted on billboards advertising for Hipchat and Virgin Mobile (Figures
78 and 79). These memes have gone from digital to analog. Thus, being able to create, remix,
and counter memes—and in particular possessing working knowledge of the five aspects of
rhetorical meme literacy discussed in Chapter 2—could be valuable knowledge for students who
will be expected to work extensively with digital texts once they graduate.

Figure 76. Evil Kermit

Figure 77. Evil KitKat
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Figure 78. Y U NO Guy on billboard

Figure 79. Success Kid on billboard

Since KitKat disseminated this advertisement through Twitter, this example points to
another key skill that technical and digital writers need to develop: composing in and engaging
with users of anonymous and pseudonymous digital social media. Twitter is a dynamic and
active space; any social media marketer or digital content creator needs to be able to not only
provide useful content for this and similar spaces, but they also need to be able to do so with a
critical awareness of and a social and cultural sensitivity to all potential users. Finally, spaces
like Twitter are rife with online aggression. Twitter is actively attempting to curb some of its
users more unsavory behaviors (Ingram, 2017), but in the meantime it remains a space where any
users—even, and perhaps especially, those who represent companies or other commercial
enterprises—need to effectively resist online aggression that could damage their reputation.
I suggest designing projects that enable students to both discover how social media
influences the way we behave and communicate with each other and empower them to critically
produce content. Such activities and assignments would not only reveal to students how the
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social media they use every day regulates their thoughts and digital behaviors, but it would also
show them how to resist those regulations. In other words, students would begin to understand
how social media sites impact the ways they craft their digital identities and understand how to
take more control of them. In a digital writing course, I have developed a project (heavily
inspired by Frost, 2011)1 that enables students to analyze social media interfaces similarly to
how I did in Chapter 3: They explore an interface’s technological design and ethos to help them
understand how both limit or promote certain user interactions while determining the inherent
values behind the interface. To build on this project and address online aggression in anonymous
and pseudonymous spaces, I would add one more step: empower students to enact some form of
resistance and subversion within the framework of the interface. A project like this could help
students gain a better understanding of how interfaces influence user behavior and how users can
resist online aggression and open avenues to productive discourse online.
Moreover, the social media platforms we choose for a project like this will impact the
outcome of the analysis. Vie (2008) argued that we “focus on incorporating… technologies that
students are familiar with but do not think critically about” (p. 10). The site(s) we choose will
vary depending on teacher and students’ interests and expertise, but it seems crucial to choose an
interface with which students are familiar and with which they may be expected to work in their
future professions. Table 19 details some specific technical and digital writing pedagogical goals
adapted from the ATTW (2015) “Code of Ethics.”

1

Like Frost (2011), I assigned students to work collaboratively on a wiki that addressed a variety of social media
interfaces. Students worked together in pairs to produce analyses of the key functionality of the interface, the impact
of any privacy policies, security features, or rules users are expected to follow. The key part of this project is the
implications: how do these functions, policies, features, and rules impact users’ behavior and the kinds of
communities that can form within the interface?
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Table 19. Learning Objectives for Technical Communication and Digital Writing Courses

Upper-Division and Graduate-Level Courses
Finally, graduate-level courses on digital rhetoric and writing should speak to online
aggression in some way. Many graduate courses tackle important theoretical, methodological,
and practical aspects of digital rhetoric and touch on issues and themes like digital genres,
democracy, authorship and remix, the growing importance of visual rhetoric, and how digital
communication impacts our culture and the way we communicate with each other, among many
other possible course themes. Despite years of evidence that not every aspect of digital
communication is advantageous to all users—disparate access to technologies and a subsequent
unequal level of opportunity to develop technoliteracy, among others, are major snags in the
utopic narrative of digital rhetoric—many graduate-level digital rhetoric courses tend to focus on
the benefits and opportunities digital technologies afford without due acknowledgement to how it
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can be restrictive for some users. Online aggression is a major barrier to a free and openly
accessible Internet that promotes equal democratic participation, and it deserves a spot in
graduate-level digital rhetoric curricula.
Digital rhetoric graduate courses that address online aggression could also engage in
some level of critical production in addition to analysis and theoretical discussion. This kind of
course could posit, analyze, and test methods for subverting online aggression while also
addressing some of the key issues digital rhetoric courses cover. For instance, in a course that
covers the impact of digital technologies on how we communicate, student discussions could
consider why digital social media inspires online aggression while positing and practicing
methods for resisting it. Or in a course that addresses visual rhetoric and remix, students could
find hostile visuals and remix and subvert them. Rather than assigning learning objectives and
outcomes, Table 20 offers some questions graduate students should be encouraged to consider in
their digital rhetoric courses; students could also tackle some of the questions I pose in the Future
Research Directions section below.
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Table 20. Questions for Graduate-Level Digital Rhetoric Courses

Future Research Directions

The methods I have posited in each chapter for subverting online aggression are far from
perfect. In each chapter, I have pointed to the method’s shortcomings: counter-memes are shortlived and their impact can be lost if not reinforced continually; using identity rhetoric can mean
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denying key aspects of your individual identity; and parodying haters on YouTube can result in
accidental perpetuation of the hateful sentiments behind mean comments. Additionally, these
methods may only work for certain users in these spaces, or they may only work in certain
contexts, or they may only work in these spaces but not in other similar ones. Importantly,
scholars and teacher-scholars need to keep looking at similar spaces and artifacts to determine
what kinds of methods can subvert online aggression and promote democratic participation. For
instance, what kinds of behaviors silence debate on Reddit? Or Twitter (which is semipseudonymous/semi-nonymous depending on how users construct their usernames)? How can
we disrupt damaging behaviors in the comments sections on articles and blogs? And how do we
do it without “feeding the trolls?” And what do we do if trolls, haters, and cyberbullies find ways
to work around our methods to continue silence users in digital spaces? These are exactly the
kinds of questions we need to be asking—and answering!—if we want to see online aggression
begin to give way to the kinds of democratic ideals we value in rhetorical studies.

Ethical Obligations

Finally, we—as digital citizens—need to tease out what our own ethical obligations are
when we encounter online aggression in our day-to-day digital interactions. In the offline world,
we are told “if you see something, say or do something”—and in fact, many of us working in
public institutions have a legal duty to do so—and are cautioned against the bystander effect. Do
we have the same obligations to speak up and/or act when in the online world? I think we do. As
such, we should begin engaging in these and other methods for resisting and subverting online
aggression. I do not mean to suggest that we should step too far out of our comfort zones to do
this. For instance, if you do not view or make memes, you don’t have to start if that’s not your
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cup of tea; or if you do not consider yourself a member of /b/’s collective identity, you shouldn’t
be expected to pretend like you are so you can enable an identity rupture; or if making YouTube
videos isn’t your thing, you shouldn’t have to start. But if we encounter online aggression in any
of the digital avenues we frequent or of which we consider ourselves to be members—perhaps a
blog, a listserv, an imageboard, or any other social media space—or if we circulate and enjoy
different kinds of remixable digital texts, we have an obligation to speak up and act. Silence in
the face of online aggression can be worse than feeding the trolls: it can be complicity in the
online aggression itself.
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